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Abstract 
In order to understand our complex engagement with counter-moral fictions, and to assess it 
adequately, we must acknowledge that there are different types of counter-moral fictions. In 
particular, there is an important distinction between fictional and actual immorality in counter-
moral fictions. Appreciators engage with fictional immorality because the affective responses 
elicited by the narrative allow for a discontinuity in their evaluative attitudes. While these 
affective responses constitute genuine emotions, they contrast with the emotions appreciators 
would normally experience in real-life scenarios that involve moral deviance. This is possible 
because the criteria governing emotional responses to merely fictional immorality do not 
include ethical appropriateness.  
Further, the distinction between fictional and actual immorality not only impacts how 
appreciators engage with counter-moral fictions, but how we should assess both the works and 
our imaginative and emotional engagement with them. Only instances of actual immorality can 
be legitimate candidates to be ethically criticised; but this ethical assessment depends on the 
extra-fictional commitments of the attitude expressed by the work. For this reason, the ethical 
assessment of actual immorality can only be understood as an extrinsic assessment of the work 
in a specific context that gives the work certain extra-fictional pretensions. We should thus 
defend contextual autonomism in regards to the ethical criticism of fiction. Finally, 
appreciators’ responses to fiction can only be legitimately ethically assessed when they are 
expressive of their actual attitudes and motivations. Nevertheless, in these cases the object of 
the ethical assessment are not the responses to fiction, but appreciators’ actual character. 
Therefore responses to fiction cannot be assessed qua responses to fiction, and we should 
defend response amoralism. 
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Introduction 
In his Republic, Plato argues that mimetic arts should be banned from the city because of their 
negative effects on moral education. On the one hand, he argues in book III that the imitation 
of vicious characters could have ill effects on the virtuous men performing tragedies. On the 
other hand, in book X he makes a more general argument against mimetic arts concerning not 
only performers, but spectators: while enjoying tragedy, otherwise virtuous men ‘shut down’ 
reason and let their other impulses run wild. For Plato, the problem is not only that mimetic art 
is inferior to truth, but that poetry appeals to the inferior part of the soul by eliciting intense 
emotional responses in audience members. The poet does not only nourish the irrational part 
of the soul, but destroys the rational part. And this is the case not only for vicious members of 
the audience, but for virtuous appreciators as well: the aesthetic power of poetry is such that it 
emotionally moves even those who are virtuous; and in moving them, the irrational part of their 
soul takes over. Even more so, in engaging with poetry appreciators are not only moved by the 
aesthetic force of the work, but they enjoy the intense emotional responses elicited by the poet. 
The aesthetic value of the works is directly tied to their ability to move appreciators insofar as 
we praise those poets who move us the most.  
Plato’s radical condemnation of the mimetic arts has since been abandoned. On the contrary, it 
is now widely believed that art, and literature in particular, plays a positive role in our moral 
education. In her Love’s Knowledge (1990), Martha Nussbaum argues that literature 
contributes to our moral lives by extending our far too limited lived experiences. Literature 
preserves the complexity of real life, and it aids appreciators in attuning their moral perception. 
Novels, such as those by Henry James or Marcel Proust, can work as guides because they help 
us in focusing our attention on relevant details. Nöel Carroll also argues that art helps us in 
exercising our moral perception and understanding (Carroll, 2000). According to Carroll, art 
contributes to enlarging appreciators’ moral understanding because it teaches how to apply 
moral norms to concrete situations by making us reflect on the vivid scenarios brought to life 
by works of fiction. Moreover, it is the same ability to elicit intense emotional responses 
previously condemned by Plato that has been the focus of reconsideration of the value of art in 
our moral lives. Nussbaum, for example, argues that literature contributes to our moral lives 
by encouraging empathy and compassion, and by familiarizing appreciators with worldviews 
different from their own.  
However, arguing that art can play a positive role in our moral lives leaves open the possibility 
that art expressing immoral views might have a negative impact on appreciators’ moral 
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education. That is, even if some artworks might be good for our moral lives, it is still possible 
to claim that some other artworks might have a corrupting power on appreciators. More 
importantly, some might argue that these moral considerations should play an important part 
of our engagement with works of art, and their assessment. In his paper “In praise of immoral 
art”, Daniel Jacobson defines moralism as “the tendency to let moral considerations take over 
the entirety of evaluative space” (Jacobson, 1997, 156). He identifies two different versions of 
moralism: Platonic and Humean moralism. Platonic moralism argues that the mimetic arts are 
dangerous, and should be banned, because of the corrupting powers they have in their audience 
in virtue of the strong emotional responses they produce. A moderate version of Platonic 
moralism, nevertheless, would argue that while not all mimetic artworks should be condemned 
in virtue of their corrupting powers, those artworks that express immoral views are dangerous 
because they convince audiences to enter into sentiments that should be avoided. For a 
moderate Platonic moralist, the danger of artworks that express immoral views is that their 
aesthetic force is such that they manage to move appreciators, leaving them at risk of being 
seduced by the immoral attitudes advanced by the work. Moderate Platonic moralism argues 
that, precisely because immoral works can capture audiences, moral considerations should take 
over the evaluation of art: ethical merits and demerits count when determining the aesthetic 
value of works. 
While the moderate Platonic moralist argues that moral considerations should take over the 
assessment of works, the Humean moralist argues that moral considerations take over the 
engagement with works as well. Humean moralism argues that appreciators take into account 
moral considerations not only when evaluating works, but when engaging with them. Contrary 
to Plato who argues that poetry moves the irrational part of the soul even in virtuous 
appreciators, Hume argues that literary works require a very violent effort of the imagination 
to get us to enter into sentiments different to our own. That is, Hume seems to think that a 
virtuous person would not be seduced by artworks that express immoral attitudes. Moreover, 
Hume argues that the fact that audiences cannot be easily convinced to adopt sentiments 
different to their own counts against the aesthetic force and value of a work. A Humean moralist 
would thus argue that artworks expressing immoral views are problematic not only because 
they express immoral views, but because moral audiences find it difficult to engage with them 
insofar as their imagination needs to make a violent effort to sympathise with the sentiments 
expressed by the work. According to this view, moral considerations take over the aesthetic 
5 
 
assessment of the work because the immoral attitudes expressed impact the ability of the work 
to move appreciators; ethical demerits thus count as aesthetic demerits as well. 
Jacobson identifies as Humean moralists those positions that argue that an artwork’s moral 
defects render it aesthetically defective because audiences fail to respond in the way intended 
by the work. For example, Noël Carroll’s moderate moralism counts as Humean moralism 
because he claims that moral flaws “will count as an aesthetic defect when it actually deters 
the response to which the work aspires” (Carroll, 1996, 134). But it is also interesting to note 
that some accounts of what has been called ‘The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’ would fall 
under the scope of Humean moralism. As it was originally formulated, the puzzle of 
imaginative resistance noted, following Hume, that while appreciators engage with deviant 
factual scenarios in fiction, they encounter imaginative difficulties when trying to engage with 
morally deviant scenarios in fiction.  
Against both Humean and Platonic moralists, who argue that moral considerations should be 
part of the relevant considerations when assessing works of art, autonomist positions argue that 
a work expressing immoral views should have no bearing over our evaluation of art qua art. 
Autonomism argues that while it is certainly possible to ethically assess works of art, such an 
assessment is actually irrelevant for our understanding of art. That is, autonomist positions 
argue that the ethical value of a work of art is irrelevant for its aesthetic and artistic value. For 
example, Clive Bell argues that while we certainly can assess the ethical value of a work, we 
do not treat it as an artwork in such an evaluation. According to Bell, “moral judgements about 
the value of particular works of art have nothing to do with their artistic value” (Bell, 1987, 
116). 
Given this picture, when examining our engagement with works of fiction that express immoral 
views, and their role in our moral lives, we are left with three possible approaches. We could 
assume the Platonic version of moralism and claim that works of fiction that express immoral 
views have corrupting powers because they are able to seduce appreciators and convince them 
to adopt attitudes they would normally condemn. We could, on the other hand, deny the 
seductive powers of immoral works and assume the Humean version of moralism to claim that 
moral defects not only affect the aesthetic value of works, but they deter our engagement with 
fictional narratives. Or we could assume the autonomist position and claim that, even when 
immoral works have the power to seduce us and convince us to adopt attitudes we would 
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normally condemn, moral considerations should have no bearing on our engagement and our 
evaluation of works of fiction.  
Unfortunately, all of these options seem to paint an overly simplistic picture of our engagement 
with works of fiction that explore immoral perspectives. Autonomist positions fail to see that 
not only do audiences sometimes take into account moral considerations when engaging with 
works of fiction, but that they are justified in doing so given the relevance and cultural impact 
of fictional narratives. Humean views, on the other hand, fail to see that audiences in fact do 
engage with some works of fiction that invite them to enter into sentiments radically different 
from their own; and, even more so, Humean accounts fail to see that some artworks’ aesthetic 
value is enhanced precisely in virtue of their moral defects, as Matthew Kieran (2006) and 
Anne Eaton’s (2012) immoralist positions point out. Finally, a Platonic account fails to 
effectively explain what the corrupting powers of fiction could mean: how are appreciators’ 
moral attitudes affected when they engage with immoral perspectives in fictional narratives? 
The aim of this work is to present a more nuanced account of our engagement with works of 
fiction that explore deviant moral perspectives. 
Before going further, it is important to clarify the relation between fiction, imagination and 
emotion. In Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990), Kendall Walton argues that the notion of fiction 
is necessarily tied to the notions of make-believe and imagination. According to his view, a 
work of fiction is that which can be used as a prop in a game of make-believe. Other authors, 
such as Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (1994), and David Davies 
(1996), agree with Walton that the notion of fiction is tied to the notion of imagination. But 
they disagree in thinking that a work of fiction is simply that which is used as a prop in a game 
of make-believe. They argue that a work of fiction is that which is created to be used in a game 
of make-believe. The thesis assumes this characterization of a fictional narrative as a narrative 
that is created to prescribe appreciators to imagine a given scenario. As we will see throughout 
the thesis, this original intention to prescribe appreciators to make-believe is of utmost 
relevance when examining immorality in fiction. 
Fictional narratives prescribe appreciators to imagine a set of propositions, and in imagining 
the propositions prescribed by the work appreciators engage in a game of make-believe. Walton 
thinks that engaging with works of fiction constitutes a guided imaginative endeavour in which 
appreciators imagine what is prescribed by the work. And this guided imaginative endeavour 
does not only involve imagining a set of propositions, but imagining from the inside the set of 
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propositions prescribed by the work: appreciators imagine themselves interacting with the 
fictional world, they imagine the fictional events as if they were experiencing them from within 
the fictional world. This explains, for Walton, that the imagining that takes place during the 
game of make-believe does not merely involve entertaining a set of propositions, but it involves 
vividly imagining certain fictional events. 
It is not necessary, nevertheless, to agree with Walton that imaginatively engaging with fiction 
involves imagining from the inside. Richard Moran (1994) criticises Walton’s notion of 
imagining from the inside because he thinks it actually fails to account for the vivid character 
of imaginatively engaging with fiction. Moran thinks that imagining from the inside can also 
be reduced to entertaining a set of fictional propositions, only this time the propositions are 
about the participant, about what she is feeling and experiencing. Moran emphasizes instead 
the role of the work’s expressive features in appreciators’ imaginative engagement with 
artworks. When engaging with fiction, appreciators’ imaginative activity consists in more than 
just entertaining a set of propositions because appreciators respond to how these propositions 
are presented by the work’s aesthetic features. According to Moran, the work’s expressive 
qualities do not “usually contribute to making something fictionally true, but they introduce 
elements that are often impossible to imagine as part of any fictional world. And yet their 
contribution to what the audience feels is direct and profound” (Moran, 1994, 84).  
Moran is right in noting that to defend an imaginative engagement with fiction that involves 
something more than just entertaining a set of propositions it is not necessary to claim that we 
imagine from the inside. First, because it is not clear that when engaging with fiction 
appreciators imagine themselves interacting with the fictional world and characters. Second, 
because even imagining of themselves that they interact with the fictional world and characters 
does not necessarily imply that they vividly imagine the fictional events. What is important to 
note is that imaginatively engaging with fiction involves an imaginative activity that includes 
affective responses from those participating in the game of make-believe. The notion of vivid 
imagination that is involved in our engagement with fiction involves affectively responding to 
what is being narrated by the work. Engaging with fiction is not only about the imaginings that 
are prescribed by the work, but about the manner in which these imaginings are prescribed. 
Thus, this thesis assumes that engaging with fiction means engaging in an imaginative 
endeavour prescribed by the works of fiction. And it further assumes that this imaginative 
engagement involves being emotionally engaged with the fictional narrative. I agree with 
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Moran that this emotional engagement with fictional narratives is possible thanks not only to 
the content of the fiction, to the imaginings prescribed by the narrative, but to the modes of 
representation, to the aesthetic features of the work. Appreciators are moved by the way in 
which the fictional content is presented, and so they emotionally engage with the work. If we 
look back to Plato’s condemnation of poetry, it is precisely this sort of imaginative endeavour 
that is problematic.  
Counter-moral fictions are not problematic simply because they prescribe appreciators to 
imagine content-immoral perspectives, but because they prescribe appreciators to imagine 
content-immoral perspectives with the corresponding affective attitudes. More importantly 
perhaps, the sort of imaginative endeavour counter-moral fictions engage appreciators in does 
not only involve content-immoral imaginings and responses, but it involves the expectation of 
gaining aesthetic pleasure from the imaginative engagement. It could be said, therefore, that 
counter-moral fictions are problematic in three aspects: (1) they prescribe content-immoral 
imaginings, (2) they prescribe content-immoral responses, and (3) they do so with the 
expectation that these prescriptions will generate aesthetic pleasure in appreciators. This thesis 
works under the assumption that when engaging with counter-moral fictions, appreciators 
knowingly and willingly engage in an imaginative project that involves imagining with feeling 
morally deviant perspectives; and they do so to gain aesthetic pleasure from this content-
immoral imaginative project. 
I want to note, before moving onto the argument of the thesis, that instead of talking about 
‘immoral fictions’ or ‘immoral art’, as Jacobson does, I use the term ‘counter-moral fictions’ 
to refer to works of fiction that endorse morally deviant perspectives, and that prescribe 
appreciators to adopt morally deviant attitudes during their imaginative engagement. The term 
‘counter-moral’ is meant to convey that the perspective manifested in the work is morally 
inaccurate or inappropriate, that is, that the content of the views explored by the work are 
immoral. But at the same time, I refer to ‘counter-moral’ rather than ‘immoral fictions’ because 
I want to remain neutral regarding the evaluative strength of the term. I refrain from talking 
about ‘immoral fictions’ precisely because part of the aim of the thesis is to determine whether 
we can legitimately ethically assess immorality in fiction. In addition to using the term 
‘counter-moral’ I use the term ‘content-immoral’ to convey that certain imaginings and 
responses represent morally inappropriate or inaccurate views, but to remain neutral on whether 
they can be properly morally assessed. That is, I refer to content-immoral imaginings and 
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responses because during the imaginative engagement with counter-moral fictions appreciators 
experience responses whose content conflicts with the responses they would normally endorse.  
As I said before, this work aims at presenting a more nuanced account of our engagement with 
works of fiction that explore deviant moral perspectives. The main argument of the thesis is as 
follows. In order to understand our complex engagement with counter-moral fictions, and to 
assess it adequately, we must acknowledge that there are different types of counter-moral 
fictions. In particular, there is an important distinction between fictional and actual immorality 
in counter-moral fictions. Appreciators usually engage with instances of fictional immorality, 
but encounter difficulties in engaging with actual immorality. Appreciators engage with 
fictional immorality because the affective responses elicited by the narrative allow for a 
discontinuity in their evaluative attitudes. While these affective responses constitute genuine 
emotions, they contrast with the emotions appreciators would normally experience in real-life 
scenarios that involve moral deviance. This is possible because the criteria governing emotional 
responses to merely fictional immorality do not include ethical appropriateness. Further, the 
distinction between fictional and actual immorality not only impacts how appreciators engage 
with counter-moral fictions, but how we should assess both the works and our imaginative and 
emotional engagement with them. Only instances of actual immorality can be legitimate 
candidates to be ethically criticised; but this ethical assessment depends on the extra-fictional 
commitments of the attitude expressed by the work. For this reason, the ethical assessment of 
actual immorality can only be understood as an extrinsic assessment on the work in a specific 
context that gives the work certain extra-fictional pretensions. We should thus defend 
contextual autonomism in regards to the ethical criticism of fiction. Finally, appreciators’ 
responses to fiction can only be legitimately ethically assessed when they are expressive of 
their actual attitudes and motivations. Nevertheless, in these cases the object of the ethical 
assessment are not the responses to fiction, but appreciators’ actual character. Therefore 
responses to fiction cannot be assessed qua responses to fiction, and we should defend response 
amoralism.  
From this rough exposition of the argument it is possible to see that the thesis explores two 
dimensions of appreciators’ engagement with counter-moral fictions: a descriptive and an 
evaluative dimension. On the descriptive dimension, I defend the claim that appreciators can 
and do have rich imaginative engagements with some works of fiction that endorse counter-
moral perspectives. I side with the Platonic view and argue against Humean moralism that 
works of fiction that endorse counter-moral perspectives have the power to move appreciators, 
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and to convince them to adopt what they would normally regard as inappropriate attitudes 
toward fictional events. However, on the evaluative dimension, I argue that not all works of 
fiction that endorse counter-moral perspectives are legitimate candidates to be ethically 
criticised. That is, I argue that a work’s moral defects do not necessarily impact its aesthetic 
value. Further, I argue that appreciators who adopt attitudes they would normally regard as 
inappropriate, cannot be ethically assessed in virtue of their imaginative engagement with 
merely fictional perspectives. That is, I argue that responses to merely fictional scenarios 
cannot be legitimately ethically assessed qua responses to fiction. In what follows I present in 
more detail the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter One is an introductory chapter that examines counter-moral fictions. This chapter 
presents a taxonomy of counter-moral fictions and proposes a distinction between fictional and 
actual immorality. Here I also explore the notions of perspective and framework, and their role 
in our imaginative engagement with fiction to understand how we can identify counter-moral 
perspectives in fiction. 
The rest of the thesis is divided into two parts that correspond to the two dimensions identified 
before. The first part argues for the view that the aesthetic powers of what I call counter-moral 
fictions convince appreciators to adopt a morally deviant perspective during their encounter 
with the work with the corresponding responses. This first part corresponds to chapters two to 
four. Chapter Two examines the accounts that claim that we have difficulties engaging with 
deviant moral perspectives in fiction because we import our evaluative attitudes. This chapter 
argues that these accounts assume what I call ‘The continuity thesis’, and that they cannot 
explain the complexity of our engagement with different types of counter-moral content. 
Chapter Three argues that certain elements of a fictional narrative provide a fictional context 
that enables a discontinuity in our cognitive-affective attitudes when engaging with counter-
moral fictions. This fictional context enables emotional asymmetries that guarantee our non-
moral allegiance to counter-moral perspectives in fiction. Chapter Four argues that, while 
emotional responses to fiction are genuine emotions, emotional asymmetries happen because 
the fictional context of certain narratives allows for criteria of appropriateness to differ from 
the criteria of appropriateness of emotional responses to actual scenarios. 
The second part argues for the normative claim that counter-moral fictions cannot be 
legitimately ethically criticised and that appreciators’ responses to counter-moral fictions 
cannot be legitimately ethically assessed. This second part defends a moderate version of 
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autonomism that I call ‘contextual autonomism’ in regards to ethical criticism, and argues for 
response amoralism in regards to the ethical assessment of appreciators’ responses. Part two of 
the thesis corresponds to chapter five and six. Chapter Five argues that only instances of actual 
immorality can be legitimate candidates to be ethically criticised, but that in these cases the 
real target of the ethical judgement is not the fictional narrative itself. I argue that we can only 
aspire to an extrinsic ethical assessment of a narrative that depends entirely on contextual 
considerations: in certain contexts, we have reasons to regard certain works of fiction as 
morally defective and to reject them, but these reasons are external to the narratives. Finally, 
Chapter Six argues that deviant responses to fictional scenarios are so dissociated from 
practical and moral concerns that we should conclude that our responses during imaginative 
engagement with fiction cannot be ethically assessed. 
The contextual account that I will defend throughout the thesis is attractive because it can 
explain our engagement with different types of counter-moral fictions, while accommodating 
the demands of moralism, immoralism and autonomism. But more importantly, this contextual 
account aims at showing that it is possible to advance a socially committed critical practice of 
fictional narratives without sacrificing the complex relation between our moral lives and our 
artistic practices.  
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1. A taxonomy of counter-moral fictions 
 
D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation is often lauded as a seminal work in the history of 
cinematography. An adaptation of Thomas F. Dixon Jr.’s The Clansman, the film follows two 
families on opposite sides of the American civil war, and the impact of the Republican 
Reconstruction movement on the American South. The movie presents a dramatized version 
of the founding of the Ku Klux Klan as a movement that sought to rescue the nation from the 
generalised disorder brought about by the recognition of black Americans’ equal rights as 
citizens. In particular, the movie contends that the Reconstruction movement promoted black 
supremacy and racial impurity through the introduction of a law that approved interracial 
marriage. The movie has been acclaimed as technically impeccable, and is recognised as 
pioneering many of the cinematic resources that makeup the cinematographic language today. 
Yet, for all the aesthetic merits of the work, for all it has been praised as a cornerstone of 
filmmaking, I find myself unable of engaging with the film, of responding with the prescribed 
sympathy for members of the Ku Klux Klan. The movie’s aesthetic resources are aimed at 
portraying black American characters as corrupt and evil, and members of the Ku Klux Klan 
as heroes asserting justice and saving the great American Nation. The birth of the KKK is 
hailed in the movie for allowing the North and South to be brought together again with the goal 
of fighting the brutality of black Americans’ resentment. One of the earlier versions of the film 
showed an intertitle that read “The former enemies of the North and South are united again in 
common defence of their Aryan birthright”. The “birth of a nation” refers to the resurgence of 
White power as the force that guides America. The movie voices real views held by real people 
to this day. White supremacist groups are alive and well. Even more so, the movie has acquired 
a new significance in light of the re-emergence of radical groups across the world today. 
The Birth of a Nation is an easy example of what is at stake when appreciators encounter 
immorality in fictional narratives. But works of fiction explore immorality in a variety of ways. 
Consider now Chan-wook Park’s Lady Vengeance. The film follows the story of Geum-ja Lee, 
a woman seeking revenge after being wrongly incarcerated for the kidnap and murder of a boy. 
After spending years preparing her revenge, she realizes that Mr. Baek, the English school 
teacher who betrayed and set her up, managed to get away with the murder of four more kids. 
Geum-ja decides to sacrifice her own revenge and contacts the families broken by Mr. Baek to 
let them decide his fate. They argue against a proper trial and instead proceed to torture the 
man who robbed them of their children. Park makes torture appealing: not only does he manage 
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to make appreciators overlook Baek’s suffering, but brings out in the audience a strange sense 
of anticipation and, quite frankly, excitement. The eagerness of the participants, both the 
families and the viewers, is exacerbated by the dark comedic tones of the preparation scenes. 
Park’s is the vivid and engaging revenge of the otherwise harmless and helpless parents, 
siblings, grandparents. The violence of the scenes that follow may make one shriek; but, truth 
to be told, the feeling throughout is that justice is being served. I do not believe in violence, let 
alone torture. I firmly believe that everyone deserves a fair trial. But while watching Lady 
Vengeance I wanted Mr. Baek to be harmed. I nodded when the families involved agreed that 
they could do as they wanted with Mr. Baek as long as he was kept alive until every family had 
had a chance to make him hurt; and I shared the feeling of relief while they were eating cake 
after getting rid of the body. When watching Lady Vengeance, I had no trouble adopting a 
moral outlook that I do not actually endorse. The pleasure I experience with the torture of Mr. 
Baek is not something that haunts me.  
The film invites appreciators to passionately endorse the torture of Mr. Baek during the 
duration of the film. Contrary to The Birth of a Nation, nevertheless, Park should not be thought 
of as actually advocating for torture. But while in some cases it is easy to see whether works 
of fiction endorse the moral flaws explored by their perspectives, we can find more complex 
interactions between a work’s immoral perspective and actually held immoral views. For 
example, The Wire, HBO’s crime drama series, has been widely praised by critics for its 
portrayal of urban inequality in America. The show explores the complex interaction of issues 
of race and poverty in Baltimore. Season four and five, for example, follow four black 
American boys studying the eighth grade, and the narrative aims at exposing how their lives 
are irreparably marked by structural injustices. But The Wire has one important moral failing 
that has been largely ignored by critics. For all the show brings forward the bleak reality of 
inequality in the so-called post-racial America, it also manages to ignore the issues faced by 
black American women of the same background. The television series completely erases black 
women from the narrative. It fails to acknowledge that they are victims of specific kinds of 
structural injustices that stem from the complex interaction of gender, race and class. This 
criticism could be easily dismissed by noting that this is simply not the aim of the show. But 
the truth is that the show contributes to the invisibility of black women and their erasure from 
public narratives. While I might not notice the implicit immoral attitude found in the work 
during my engagement with it, it certainly causes unease when I look back on it. And given the 
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deep issues of racial and gender inequality faced by black women in America, the show’s 
erasure of their voices should be certainly be regarded as an important moral failing. 
 
It is clear then that immorality in fiction comes in many forms. The many ways in which we 
find immorality in fiction definitely impacts how we respond to the works, how we evaluate 
them, and how we evaluate ourselves for engaging or failing to engage with them. As I said in 
the introduction, the aim of the thesis is to explore how audiences engage with radically 
different moral outlooks in fiction, and how deviant perspectives, and our engagement with 
them should be assessed. Given this picture, it is necessary to identify what should be regarded 
as a deviant perspective in fiction, and which moral flaws are relevant for the analysis that will 
follow in the rest of the thesis. This first chapter examines the different types of counter-moral 
content that we can find in works of fiction, and whether these moral flaws should be 
considered as part of the perspective advanced by fictional narratives. 
In the first section of the chapter I present a categorisation of counter-moral fictions. I advance 
a distinction between fictional and actual immorality in counter-moral fictions that emphasizes 
the quarantining effect of the former. I examine the way in which fictional and actual 
immorality can be found in works of fiction, as immoral perspectives and immoral worlds or 
contexts. The second and third sections examine possible objections to my categorization of 
counter-moral fictions. The first objection argues that for a narrative to truly count as immoral, 
it needs to make deviant moral claims true in the fictional world, and endorse them. I call this 
the alethic objection. The alethic objection questions the distinction between immoral 
perspectives and immoral worlds. However, I argue that this first objection downplays the 
importance of the notions of framework and prescribed responses in the imaginative 
engagement with fictions. 
The second objection to my categorisation of counter-moral fictions argues that, even if we 
take into consideration the notion of a framework, for a work of fiction to truly count as 
immoral we would need to be able to identify an immoral manifested attitude. I call this the 
manifested attitude objection. This objection questions the distinction between fictional and 
actual immorality because it argues that only instances of actual immorality could be 
considered truly immoral. I respond to this objection by proposing a distinction between 
fictional and extra-fictional perspectives in works of fiction, and I argue that the taxonomy 
tracks this distinction. 
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1.1 The diversity of counter-moral fictions 
From the examples presented above it seems clear that immorality can be found in works of 
fiction in different ways. Sometimes, as it is the case with Lady Vengeance, immorality is 
meant to be contained in the fictional worlds inasmuch as the narrative doesn’t intend to impact 
appreciators’ actual attitudes. Other times the immorality explored by the narrative is meant to 
transcend the boundaries of fiction, as is the case for The Birth of a Nation; the narrative 
explicitly endorses white supremacist groups in America. And yet we find some other 
narratives, as in the case of The Wire, that might present traces of real immoral views which 
nonetheless are not directly addressed or endorsed by the fiction. These differences impact 
appreciators’ imaginative activity, but they also have implications for the assessment of the 
works and our engagement with them.  
For this reason, I believe it is important to distinguish between merely fictional and actual 
immorality in counter-moral fictions. In what follows, I propose a classification of counter-
moral fictions based on the nature of their immoral content. This classification informs my 
analysis of our imaginative engagement with immorality in fiction, and its assessment in the 
rest of the thesis.1  
 
1.1.1 Fictional immorality  
Fictional immorality refers to the prescription of imaginings involving a perspective the agents 
(both the author and members of the audience) take to be immoral. Works of fiction that present 
merely fictional immorality prescribe appreciators to adopt a deviant perspective, with the 
corresponding deviant responses, during the imaginative engagement. Fictional immorality is 
quarantined to the fictional world because the immoral content includes fictional prescriptions 
only: in these cases, the narrative does not include claims about the actual state of the world. 
The counter-moral prescriptions, therefore, are only relevant during the imaginative 
engagement with the narrative. Chan-wook Park’s Sympathy for Lady Vengeance, for instance, 
invites appreciators to passionately endorse the torture of Mr. Baek in the hands of the families 
whose children he kidnapped and murdered. The raw violence of the torture scenes contrasts 
                                                          
1 Because the thesis examines our engagement with immorality in fiction, I only consider those instances in which 
appreciators acknowledge the counter-moral character of the prescribed imaginings. The only exception are those 
cases that I will call borderline fictions in which appreciators acknowledge the counter-moral character of the 
prescriptions but they also note that other appreciators might not realise the attitudes are counter-moral. 
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with the dark comedic notes of the families’ anticipation, and thus lends the narrative an almost 
playful tone. Nevertheless, Park is not advocating for “an eye for an eye”, and the prescribed 
perspective2, that is the attitude toward the narrated events, should be seen as quarantined in 
the fictional world.  
Works of fiction that present merely fictional immorality are created as deviant. In these cases 
the author is aware of the counter-moral nature of the prescriptions. The narrative prescribes 
counter-moral scenarios as counter-moral; and the author intends for these scenarios to be 
received by the audience as counter-moral. This type of counter-moral content is thus 
prescribed deliberately as counter-moral. Fictional immorality fulfills the following conditions: 
a) it involves the prescription of a counter-moral perspective, and b) the author recognizes and 
the audience is put in a position where they can recognize the counter-moral character of the 
prescriptions, thus excluding those cases where an actual immoral attitude normalizes fictional 
immorality.  
Works of fiction, nevertheless, not only include prescribed imaginings, but they include a set 
of prescribed responses to the narrated events. As said before, fictional immorality prescribes 
a deviant perspective with the corresponding deviant responses. These responses contrast with 
appreciators’ actual attitudes, and would be regarded as immoral if they were directed at a 
similar scenario in real life. But since merely fictional immorality requires appreciators to 
acknowledge the deviant nature of the prescriptions, these responses are quarantined to the 
fictional scenario. If these responses are regarded as deviant by appreciators it is precisely 
because they would not approve of them in the actual world.   
What is important to emphasize is that fictional immorality is detached from practical concerns, 
not only because we cannot act on fictional events, but because the prescribed responses 
concern the fictional world only. Because the author and the audiences are aware of the deviant 
nature of the perspective and the corresponding responses, the objects of the imaginative 
activity are imagined entities only. In this sense, the narrative prescribes content-immoral 
imaginings and content-immoral responses. What I argue throughout the thesis is that these 
responses are content-immoral in that they involve attitudes that are morally inappropriate, that 
are recognized as morally deviant; but they are content-immoral in that, although they can be 
evaluated as morally inappropriate, they are not properly immoral because they are not actually 
                                                          
2 In section 1.2 I explore in depth the notion of a narrative’s prescribed perspective and its role in our imaginative 
engagement with immorality in fiction.  
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endorsed nor are they directed at actual events and entities. So, in addition to the two previous 
conditions, instances of fictional immorality are those that c) prescribe content-immoral 
responses. 
Merely fictional immorality in counter-moral fictions can be found in different ways. First as 
cases of counter-moral fictional perspectives; and second as cases of counter-moral fictional 
worlds. By counter-moral fictional worlds I refer to those narratives that ask appreciators to 
imagine a world governed by deviant moral principles, while cases of counter-moral fictional 
perspectives refer to those narratives that simply prescribe a counter-moral point of view 
toward the narrated events. I will now go over these two forms of merely fictional immorality. 
 
A) Immoral perspective  
Works of fiction featuring a counter-moral fictional perspective are those that prescribe 
appreciators to adopt a deviant perspective during their imaginative engagement. But in these 
cases the deviant fictional perspective is presented as counter-moral within the fictional world 
as well. Appreciators are thus invited to engage with a fictional perspective that is fictionally 
counter-moral, a perspective that is deviant also within the fictional world. In these cases of 
fictional immorality, although the perspective is presented as counter-moral within the fictional 
world, the audience is asked to engage with counter-moral responses that would be considered 
inappropriate both in the fictional and the actual world. A counter-moral fictional perspective 
presents morally flawed characters in a sympathetic light. The perspective prescribes strong 
pro-attitudes toward characters that are presented as immoral within the world of the narrative. 
To do this, the fictional perspective emphasizes morally irrelevant attractive features to 
manipulate appreciators’ responses. Appreciators overlook the moral flaws in favour of 
immoral features that are presented as sympathetic by the perspective. In these cases, 
appreciators engage with a deviant perspective qua fictionally immoral.  
In this category we find narratives that feature what A. W. Eaton (2012) has identified as rough 
heroes, such as AMC’s television series Breaking Bad. When appreciators are first introduced 
to Walter White, he is portrayed as a sympathetic character: he is a brilliant man trapped in an 
unfulfilling and underpaid job, a tragic hero haunted by bad fortune and death. Everything 
about Breaking Bad is designed to make appreciators feel that White is trapped in a 
meaningless existence: from Albuquerque’s dry landscape to the students’ indifference to his 
teachings. This is why Heisenberg’s (White’s criminal alter ego) genius outweighs his criminal 
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behavior. And once the appreciator has come to accept that White is a trapped genius, she is 
willing to justify any wrongdoing just to see Heisenberg succeed as he deserves. Breaking Bad 
actually tests appreciators to see how far they are willing to play along with a perspective that 
roots for a bad guy: one of the most interesting elements of the series is that each season 
presents audiences with an increasingly immoral Walter White. Although the original 
straightforward sympathy felt for the character vanishes, audiences still want to see him 
succeed, regardless of how immoral his actions might be. Appreciators are not asked to imagine 
a fictional world in which Heisenberg’s actions are acceptable; they are, nevertheless, asked to 
engage with a perspective that makes Heisenberg appealing, and that will ultimately lead them 
to overlook immoral attitudes and actions. 
Most fictional narratives include morally flawed characters. But rough heroes, such as Walter 
White, are not simply morally flawed characters, they are morally flawed protagonists. Even 
more so, they are morally flawed protagonists who demand appreciators’ allegiance. But it’s 
important to keep in mind that rough heroes are distinct from antiheroes. Antiheroes are 
protagonists that lack traditional heroic qualities and that are morally flawed in some respects; 
these flaws, however, are outweighed by their moral virtues: antiheroes might be rough around 
the edges, but they ultimately aim at the greater good (Carroll, 2008; Eaton, 2010, 2012). On 
the contrary, rough heroes’ moral flaws cannot simply be written off as a kooky feature of their 
overall good character. During the series final episode “Felina”, White finally admits to his 
wife that all the wrongdoing was done not for the sake of his family, but for him: “I did it for 
me. I liked it. I was good at it. And… I was really… I was alive”. I believe the same thing can 
be said for appreciators: although at first it might seem that their sympathy for White is 
grounded on his concern for his family’s wellbeing, in the end appreciators come to see that 
what truly makes White appealing as a rough hero are his deep moral flaws that are revealed 
throughout the series. Eaton thus identifies five features of the rough hero (2012, 284): (1) his 
flaws are grievous, (2) his flaws are an integral part of his personality, (3) he fully intends to 
be bad and is remorseless, (4) the audience is not prescribed to forgive him or dismiss his 
actions as the result of misfortune, weakness or ignorance, and (5) his vices are not outweighed 
by other more redeeming features.  
 
B) Counter-moral fictional world  
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Other cases of fictional narratives do not only aim at presenting an counter-moral perspective 
in a sympathetic light, but present a deviant perspective that is fictionally normalized. Works 
of fiction that feature counter-moral fictional worlds prescribe appreciators to adopt a deviant 
perspective that is not regarded as counter-moral within the fictional world. In cases of counter-
moral fictional worlds, appreciators are asked to imagine a deviant world governed by deviant 
moral principles. Fictional narratives that present an counter-moral fictional world do not 
simply present a perspective that emphasizes morally irrelevant features to manipulate 
appreciators’ responses, but rather they construct a fictional world where the morally relevant 
features are completely different from those in an actual scenario. In these cases, the counter-
moral character is twofold: the fictional world is governed by deviant moral principles, and the 
fictional perspective endorses such deviant moral principles. Appreciators are thus asked to 
respond to a counter-moral perspective as if it was the norm in the fictional world. This 
category is the most radical version of fictional immorality. In these cases, appreciators are not 
only being asked to have counter-moral responses, but they are asked to accept as true in the 
fiction deviant moral claims. 
This is the case of narratives like Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian.  The novel follows 
‘The Kid’ and his experiences with a gang that massacres people in the border of US and 
Mexico. Blood Meridian does not simply prescribe appreciators to sympathize with an immoral 
character by prescribing strong pro-attitudes toward The Kid as part of this criminal group. The 
entire novel is meant to show that there’s nothing but immorality: war and brutality are the 
norm. And in the end, Holden, the antagonist and the symbol of the brutality that governs the 
world (who is given, by the way, an almost divine nature), wins. 
Contrast this with instances of narratives that explore immoral worlds presented through a 
moral perspective, as in the case of dystopian narratives. These are narratives that prescribe 
appreciators to imagine a fictional world governed by deviant moral principles, but in which 
the perspective clearly condemns the moral failings. This is the case of dystopian narratives, 
such as Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale. Contrary to instances of counter-moral 
fictional worlds, dystopian narratives would not count as instances of counter-moral fictions 
because while the fictional world is governed by deviant moral principles, the perspective 
advanced by the narrative and prescribed to appreciators is aimed at condemning such deviant 
views. 
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1.1.2 Actual immorality  
Actual immorality refers to the prescription of imaginings that involve a counter-moral 
perspective. However, contrary to fictional immorality, its prescriptions include claims about 
the actual world. That is, while the counter-moral prescriptions in instances of fictional 
immorality are recognized as deviant by the author and members of the audience, instances of 
actual immorality include immoral claims and attitudes that are actually endorsed in real life. 
In this sense, the counter-moral prescriptions in these cases are not quarantined to the fictional 
world: the immoral content in these narratives is not only part of a fictional perspective, but 
informs an actual perspective. The prescriptions can thus be understood not merely as fictional 
prescriptions, but as actual invitations to adopt an actual immoral perspective. Contrary to 
fictional immorality, the counter-moral prescriptions of actual immorality are meant to stand 
beyond the scope of the fictional world and our imaginative engagement with the narrative. 
Moreover, these narratives normalize counter-moral prescriptions. The counter-moral 
prescriptions are not to be regarded as deviant, but are prescribed in a perceived continuity with 
(deviant) moral claims about the actual state of the world. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation, for 
instance, is problematic because it endorses a false version of American history that champions 
white-supremacism. 
Actual immorality in counter-moral fictions can also be found in different ways. First as cases 
of immoral perspectives, and second as cases of immoral contexts. It is worth noting, however, 
that these two forms of actual immorality might overlap in certain narratives. We might find 
cases of immoral perspectives that can be seen as part of an immoral context, and cases of 
immoral contexts that are translated into immoral perspectives. I will now go into these 
differences and how they can be found in works of fiction. 
 
A) Actual immoral perspective  
An actual immoral perspective refers to those cases where the artist holds an immoral 
worldview that is imported to the work of fiction. In these cases, the artist’s immoral views and 
attitudes inform the prescribed perspective of the work. In some cases, the artist’s immoral 
perspective is intentionally imported to the fictional world. These are cases where the artist 
uses the fictional perspective to invite appreciators to actually participate in the deviant 
worldviews she holds. As such, in these works of fiction we can identify an invitation to export 
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the artist’s immoral perspective as expressed in the work. This is the case of The Clansman, 
Thomas F. Dixon Jr.’s novel that was later adapted into Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation. Dixon 
actually believed in white supremacism and promoted racial segregation. The Clansman and 
The Birth of a Nation portray black Americans as inherently violent, and accuse the Republican 
Reconstruction movement of inciting freed slaves to rise against their former masters. In light 
of Dixon’s other writings, we can say that The Clansman aimed directly at convincing 
audiences of the superiority of white Americans and the corrupt nature of African American 
people. So, although he never embraced the second era Ku Klux Klan, it is not surprising that 
his work provided inspiration both to the revived KKK and other white supremacist groups.  
Dixon and Griffith’s case is a very clear example of an actual immoral perspective because 
their work explicitly endorses white supremacism and the KKK. But an actual immoral 
perspective can also be found in more subtle ways. We can find cases where the artist holds an 
immoral view that is imported to the work, and that informs the fictional perspective, but that 
cannot be taken as an overt invitation for appreciators to export the immoral outlook. Take 
Woody Allen as an example. In addition to the allegations of sexual abuse made by Dylan 
Farrow, his adoptive daughter, Allen has been widely criticized for marrying Soon-Yi Previn, 
the adoptive daughter of his previous partner of twelve years, Mia Farrow. While it could be 
said that Allen’s movies do not explicitly endorse romantic relationships with minors, some of 
them advance and normalize a perspective that fails to acknowledge the problematic nature of 
relationships with a substantive power imbalance. And this seems expressive of Allen’s 
immoral attitudes. In his 1979 film, Manhattan, Allen stars as forty two year old Isaac Davies, 
a fictionalized version of the filmmaker himself. The movie explores Isaac’s romantic 
relationship with seventeen year old Tracy. Although the movie has received widespread 
critical acclaim, and is recognized as one of Allen’s best, little has been said about its 
problematic premise.3 The vast age difference becomes significant in the movie not because of 
how it creates a power imbalance in the relationship, but because Tracy doesn’t seem to have 
the maturity to meet Isaac’s intellectual needs. It is true that in the end Tracy moves forward 
and Isaac recognizes that she was too young. But again, the emphasis is not on Tracy’s 
vulnerability, but on Isaac. The problematic nature of the relationship and the issue of consent 
are merely brushed off to focus on the protagonists’ quirky traits: Isaac/Woody is represented 
                                                          
3 In February 2014, Greg Mitchell writing for The Nation put together the few 1979 reviews of the movie available 
online. None of them addresses the problematic age difference between the characters. 
(www.thenation.com/article/reviews-woody-allens-teen-romance-manhattan-vast-age-gap/) 
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as a charming neurotic, but a romantic in the end. And the movie fails to acknowledge that 
Isaac is in reality a predator who is not only seducing, but grooming his victim. Allen’s 2015 
Irrational Man presents the same problematic treatment of the issues of consent and power 
imbalance in relationships, as the film romanticizes a philosophy professor’s relationship with 
one of his students.  
Manhattan and Irrational Man are instances of an actual immoral perspective in fiction. The 
immoral views found in the works are not only part of a fictional perspective that concerns a 
fictional state of affairs, but they are part of an actual perspective directed at the actual state of 
the world. This actual perspective informs the creation of the work, and thus informs the 
fictional prescriptions. In this sense, the audience’s participation in a fictional perspective could 
be seen as the participation in the actual immoral views. One could argue that because the 
fictional and actual perspectives are inseparable, assenting to the fictional perspective 
somehow implies endorsing the actual attitudes explored by the works of fiction.  
In some other cases, however, the expression of the immoral views in the narrative is 
accidental. In these cases, while the authors profess appropriate moral views, they are unaware 
of the problematic nature of some of their attitudes; and these attitudes are imported to the 
work, so that they end up informing the fictional perspective. This usually happens when the 
immoral views are so deeply ingrained in the context that authors fail to see the morally 
problematic aspects of their attitudes. Robert Stecker uses the example of Verne’s residual 
racism in Mysterious Island to note how authors sometimes accidentally express immoral 
views in their works (Stecker, 2005, 141). Jack Kerouac is another interesting case, as he is 
often accused of misogyny. Beat authors thought they were defying sexist attitudes by 
emphasizing women’s sexual freedom. However, On the Road seems to express residual sexist 
attitudes as it fails to develop in depth its female characters: women are objectified and reduced 
to traditional gender roles.  
 
B) Actual immoral context  
Works of fiction are not ahistorical. Both artists and artistic practices are bound by their 
historical context and its social practices. Precisely because authors and their works are 
circumscribed by their context, some narratives count as instances of counter-moral fictions 
because they reflect the prevalent immoral attitudes of their historical context. That is, in some 
cases, the immoral attitudes are so deeply ingrained in the context of production of the work 
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that they are imported to the narrative. The immoral attitudes thus become part of the work of 
fiction. As I said before, actual immorality of perspective and context are not mutually 
exclusive. Although we find instances of works whose authors hold immoral views that are no 
longer prevalent in their context of origin, most of the cases of immoral perspectives can be 
identified as instances of immoral contexts as well. Nevertheless, not all works of fiction 
created within an immoral context reflect immorality in the same way. In some works of fiction 
the immoral views inform the fictional perspective, and are thus endorsed by the narrative. In 
some others cases, on the other hand, the immoral practices seem to be implicitly assumed by 
the fictional world, but are not directly acknowledged nor endorsed by the fictional perspective, 
they are merely taken for granted.  
When the immoral attitudes found in the context are imported to the narrative and inform the 
fictional perspective, the immoral views become an essential part of the fictional world. 
Because the immoral views inform the perspective, we can say that the perspective endorses 
them. In these cases, the immoral attitudes are not only reflected in the construction of the 
story, but they are essential to understand how the fictional world functions and to grasp the 
perspective prescribed by the narration. That is, the immoral views are essential in these cases 
because the narrative cannot be understood without them. This is the case of Gone with the 
Wind. The narrative expresses an immoral attitude toward Black American history that reveals 
the prevalent attitude toward issues of race during the early 20th century. Gone with the Wind 
depicts slavery and the American South in a nostalgic light, and presents stereotypical black 
characters that reinforce the condescending treatment of black American people that often 
masks racism. What is important to note is that the racism found in Gone with the Wind is not 
simply an element that reflects a racist context, and that could be ignored for the sake of the 
narrative. The narrative’s perspective endorses this nostalgic view of the South and the 
treatment of Black American characters. The whole story is built around its nostalgic 
representation of slavery, and the characters’ development depends on their stereotypical traits. 
In this sense, the counter-moral content in Gone with the Wind is very different to that found 
in The Wire. As I said at the beginning of the chapter, The Wire explicitly aims at exploring 
inequality in America through the interaction of issues of race and class. And yet, it fails to 
acknowledge that black American women are victims of specific kinds of structural injustices, 
and thus contributes to their erasure from public narratives. The counter-moral content found 
in The Wire is a product of the dominant immoral views in the context of production of the 
series, but it cannot be said to be endorsed by the fictional perspective. The deviant elements 
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are not treated as true in the fictional world, nor are they endorsed by the perspective. In this 
sense, the immoral elements do not contribute to the construction of the narrative and the telling 
of the story. The counter-moral content in these cases is incidental to the fictional narrative. 
Although it could be said that the immoral elements are part of the implicit context inherited 
by the work from its historical circumstances, it does not seem as though they are part of the 
fictional world as such because they are not necessary to understand the fictional narrative.  
HBO’s True Detective provides another example of incidental actual immorality in works of 
fiction brought about by an immoral context of production. The first season of the series 
follows detectives Rust Cohle and Martin Hart in the investigation of the murder of a prostitute 
and their hunt for a serial killer. Although the show has received widespread critical acclaim, 
it has been highly criticized for its portrayal of women. In particular, criticism has focused on 
the lack of complexity of its female characters and on the numerous scenes involving female 
nudity. The only main female character is Maggie, Hart’s wife. And her role in the development 
of the story is not explored beyond the men that surround her; Maggie is only a prop used to 
examine the complexity of the relationship between Cohle and Hart. Other female characters 
include Lisa, Hart’s mistress, a receptionist at the police department, and various prostitutes 
that are contacted during the investigation. Even more so, actresses have had to put up, not only 
with the lack of development of their characters, but with the objectification of women on the 
show. It is not simply that the series fictionally objectifies women; this would be expected from 
a show that explores sexual violence against women and children. The problem is that the 
television show objectifies its actresses: women are offered poor roles and are expected to 
participate in numerous scenes that involve nudity. Thus, the immoral character of the show is 
not related to content-immoral imaginings, but to actual immoral attitudes expressed in the 
writing, production and filming of the series. The show reflects real attitudes towards women 
and reveals worrying aspects of the social context of the work. It is not clear, however, that the 
real immoral attitudes are endorsed by the fictional perspective. 
 
1.1.3 Borderline cases  
Finally, it is important to note that the distinction between fictional and actual immorality is 
not straightforward. We can find what may be considered borderline cases of fictional 
immorality: narratives that were created by the artist as instances of fictional immorality, that 
are regarded by the reader/viewer as instances of fictional immorality, but whose context of 
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reception is susceptible to take the fictional prescriptions as an invitation to believe. This 
happens when the deviant scenario is still part of what William James calls a ‘live option’, that 
is, when a significant number of people in the context of reception still believe the immoral 
claim to actually hold. In these cases, regardless of authorial intentions, we have reasons to 
treat instances of fictional immorality as actual immorality because the perspective explored is 
still considered a live option in the context we inhabit. So, although we recognize that the 
fictional nature of the prescriptions is meant to neutralise the export of the perspective to the 
actual world, we might also realize that other appreciators would take the immoral perspective 
to stand in the actual world. The fact that these narratives could be regarded by certain members 
of the audience as advancing deviant claims they believe to be morally appropriate would give 
us legitimate reasons to treat them as instances of actual immorality.  
As I said before, for a narrative to count as an instance of fictional immorality it must fulfil 
three conditions: a) it prescribes a counter-moral fictional perspective, b) the author recognizes 
and the audience is put in a position where they can recognize the counter-moral character of 
the prescriptions, and c) because the prescriptions are quarantined in the fictional world and 
the objects of the prescribed responses are the fictional events, the narrative prescribes content-
immoral responses. In the cases described as borderline cases of fictional immorality, however, 
these three conditions are not fulfilled. Although the author creates the narrative as an instance 
of fictional immorality, and is thus aware of the counter-moral nature of the prescriptions, when 
the deviant claims are still part of a live option, the context of reception is such that audience 
members are not in a position to recognize the counter-moral nature of the prescriptions. That 
is, the context of reception is such that a significant number of audience members could fail to 
recognise that the narrative was created as deviant, and would thus take the narrative to advance 
a counter-moral actual perspective. As a result, although the responses are prescribed as 
content-immoral, when the deviant views are still part of a live option the objects of the 
prescribed responses would be taken to be not only the fictional events, but real entities and 
events.  
Gone Girl provides a complex example of a borderline instance of the fictional/actual 
immorality distinction. The narrative follows the Dunne marriage, Nick and Amy. Formerly a 
journalist, Nick loses his job and uses Amy’s trust fund money to move back to his hometown 
and open a bar. But while her husband is living his dream, Amy soon starts feeling trapped in 
the suburban life. After realising Nick has not only spent her money and moved her to his 
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hometown, but cheated on her, Amy decides she is tired of giving up her life for the sake of 
her ungrateful husband. She decides to enact her revenge by framing him for her own murder.  
Gillian Flynn’s novel prescribes sympathy toward Amy. The narrative prescribes appreciators 
to endorse Amy’s false abuse accusations in order to see her plan of ruining her husband’s life 
succeed. The novel emphasises Amy’s wit, intelligence and charm in order to secure 
appreciators’ sympathy. But David Fincher’s 2014 film adaptation turns Amy into the villain, 
and instead prescribes sympathy for Nick. There is nothing in Gone Girl that would indicate 
that Flynn is inviting appreciators to believe that false abuse allegations are right, or that they 
should endorse them in real life. And yet Fincher failed to adopt the prescribed perspective and 
changed the object of appreciators’ sympathies in his own reading of the work. So what caused 
the shift? I believe this happened because Fincher realised that Amy’s actions are still regarded 
as a live option in the context of production and reception of the work. What Flynn creates as 
a fictional perspective can easily be misinterpreted as an endorsement of actual immorality. 
In David Fincher’s context, our context, the myth of the false sexual abuse allegations is a 
widespread narrative. Although data have proven it wrong again and again, most people remain 
convinced that false accusations regarding sexual violence are common. According to this 
narrative, women often lie about being victims of sexual abuse to get away with their intentions. 
From scorned lovers and resentful employees, to random strangers, in the public narrative 
women often fabricate stories of sexual violence to destroy men’s lives. Given this context, 
appreciators, including Fincher, falsely believe that fabricating abuse allegations is still 
regarded as a live option by many. Adopting a fictional perspective that endorses a woman who 
fabricates such allegations to get away with what she wants would be tantamount to endorsing 
women who do the same in real life. Gone Girl the novel would thus be seen as endorsing these 
women at the expense of those men whose lives have been ruined. David Fincher solves this 
problem in the movie by no longer prescribing a perspective that sympathises with the lying 
woman, but with her victim, poor Nick Dunne. But those appreciators who believe that the 
myth of false abuse accusations is just that, a myth, might in turn see the engagement with 
Fincher’s iteration of Gone Girl as endorsing the view that victims of sexual violence often 
fabricate these stories to benefit from them. 
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1.2 Prescribed responses and immorality in fiction 
As we have seen, immorality in fiction comes in many forms. I have tried to argue that there is 
an important distinction between merely fictional and actual immorality. And I have tried to 
show that even within instances of fictional and actual immorality there are differences in the 
scope of the prescribed counter-moral claims. But someone could still argue that not all the 
cases I have explored should count as instances of counter-moral fictions in the relevant sense. 
If this was the case, it could be argued that not all of the instances presented before are relevant 
when examining how audiences engage with immorality in fiction, and how narratives and 
appreciators should be assessed. A first objection could argue that my categorization of 
counter-moral fictions fails because some of the narratives do not prescribe deviant moral 
claims as true in the fictional world. Let us call this the “alethic objection”. This objection 
would claim that for a work of fiction to count as immoral in the relevant sense, the narrative 
would need to make deviant moral claims true in the fictional world. Contrary to this, in most 
of the cases examined above appreciators are not being asked to imagine a deviant world in 
which deviant moral claims are presented as true. According to this first objection, without the 
prescription of deviant moral claims as true in the fictional worlds, narratives cannot be said to 
endorse immorality.  
The alethic objection claims that instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives, such as 
Breaking Bad, should not count as immoral in the relevant sense because they prescribe 
appreciators to adopt a counter-moral perspective that is counter-moral within the fictional 
world as well. That is, according to the alethic objection, instances of counter-moral fictional 
perspectives are not counter-moral fictions because they do not prescribe a counter-moral 
fictional perspective that is presented as morally accurate within the fictional world. Some 
instances of actual immoral contexts, such as The Wire or True Detective, should not count as 
counter-moral fictions either because they do not endorse the deviant perspectives as true in 
the fictional world. That is, according to the alethic objection, instances of incidental 
immorality that was imported from an actual context should not count as instances of counter-
moral fictions because the narratives do not endorse the deviant moral claims. As a result, 
according to the alethic objection only instances of counter-moral fictional worlds, actual 
immoral perspectives, and endorsed real immoral contexts would count as counter-moral 
fictions in the relevant sense. 
Indeed, this is how Noël Carroll objects to Eaton’s rough heroes. In a response to her “Robust 
Immoralism”, he argues that narratives that feature rough heroes, that I have identified here as 
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merely fictionally immoral, cannot really be regarded as immoral precisely because the rough 
heroes are represented as immoral within the fictional world. According to Carroll, appreciators 
are invited to admire certain traits, while still condemning the immoral character of the hero. 
In this sense, the perspective does not endorse immoral attitudes (Carroll, 2013), and thus the 
narratives should not be considered as counter-moral in the relevant sense. Counter-moral 
fictional immoral worlds, and instances of actual immorality, on the other hand, present a 
fictionally normalized immoral perspective. In these cases, the narratives display a perspective 
that is not regarded as counter-moral within the fictional world. And in these cases it could be 
said that the narrative endorses the deviant moral claims precisely inasmuch as it does not 
acknowledge the deviant nature of the moral claims. 
According to the alethic objection, instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives, such as 
Breaking Bad, are not immoral in the relevant sense because they are not really trying to make 
an immoral claim. It could even be argued that these narratives actually condemn immorality, 
not only by acknowledging the counter-moral character of the perspective, but by presenting 
the characters’ fate. Many of the narratives that involve counter-moral fictional perspectives 
culminate with the destruction of the protagonist after all. The sympathy appreciators would 
feel for the counter-moral perspective is, therefore, only temporary. The prescribed sympathy 
is only a provisional prescription, while the ultimate prescriptions should be identified with a 
sense of moral reaffirmation. So, what would be ultimately true in the fictional world is that 
immorality does not pay, and, therefore, the narrative does not really prescribe a counter-moral 
fictional perspective.  
 
However, I think the alethic objection fails. It is not necessary for narratives to present deviant 
moral claims as true in the fictional world for them to be counter-moral. A work of fiction 
should be regarded as a counter-moral fiction in the relevant sense if it invites appreciators to 
adopt a perspective that includes responses that would be considered morally inappropriate if 
directed at the actual world. In instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives, for example, 
even when the perspective is framed as counter-moral within the fictional world, the narratives 
convince audiences to adopt a perspective that contrasts with their everyday moral attitudes 
and to overlook the moral flaws of the rough heroes. And this oversight is certainly endorsed 
(and driven) by the fictional perspective. Instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives 
endorse the oversight inasmuch as they prescribe what would normally be regarded as 
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unmerited sympathy and, as we will see in the third chapter, nonmoral affect-based allegiance 
to immoral characters. In addition to this, these narratives prescribe responses that are certainly 
counter-moral: to allow one’s moral perspective to be contaminated by nonmoral approval 
should not be regarded as a moral virtue. 
The problem with the objection that claims that counter-moral fictions are only those that 
prescribe deviant claims as true in the fictional world is that it overlooks that fact that the 
imaginative engagement with fiction requires more than merely entertaining a set of 
propositions as true in a fictional world. The engagement with fictions is not merely a matter 
of what is represented but how it is represented. Responses to the fictional scenarios and 
characters depend on a prescribed point of view upon the narrated events that focuses 
appreciators’ attention on certain features over others, namely, the “authorial attitude to story 
content” (Currie, 2012, 51). The fictional perspective refers to the point of view that guides the 
narration of the events presented in the fictional world, and that prompts appreciators to react 
in specific ways. Establishing a perspective is, therefore, not only a matter of prescribing 
propositions, but a matter of framing the prescriptions so that they emphasize certain aspects 
of the narrated events. The perspective guides the thread of the story, the explicit and implicit 
evaluations of the events, and the tone of the narration. The perspective sets the tone of the 
narration by a set of what Currie calls ‘expressive features’, which “function to indicate the 
ways in which authorial interest is directed towards unity, time, specificity, and causation” 
(Currie, 2012, 52).  
The relevance of the perspective in our engagement with fictional narratives means that even 
when these narratives do not prescribe the deviant moral claims as true in the fictional world, 
they do prescribe a perspective that asks appreciators to ignore important moral flaws. 
Appreciators’ focus is shifted away from the characters’ immoral features, to emphasise other 
characteristics that present them as attractive instead. Even more so, counter-moral fictional 
perspectives focus on immoral characters’ attractive features and ignore those who have been 
wronged by the immoral acts. To classify a narrative as a counter-moral fiction, therefore, one 
needs to identify the prescribed perspective. 
 
1.2.1 Prescribed perspective 
Whose perspective corresponds to the prescribed perspective? Appreciators might be able to 
identify different points of view within a narrative. Each character will have her own point of 
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view, even if it is not fully explored in the narrative. Many narratives include immoral 
characters that are an active part of the fictional scenario. But this doesn’t mean that such 
narratives can be identified as counter-moral fictions in the relevant sense. In many of these 
cases appreciators may not be invited to adopt a perspective that sympathizes with the deviant 
character.  
The relevant perspective in terms of what is being prescribed by the narrative is that of the 
narrator. However, identifying the narrator’s point of view as the prescribed perspective brings 
a new set of problems. We might find cases of stories with multiple narrators. And we might 
find stories with unreliable narrators. More importantly, we might find cases where the 
narrator’s point of view and the prescribed perspective split up. It is therefore important to note 
that the narrator whose point of view determines the fictional perspective is the external 
narrator or author narrator.4  I will not argue in favour of the notion of an implied author and 
its consequences for interpretation and the experience of fiction.5 But it is important for the 
discussion that follows to identify what this author-narrator amounts to. As we have seen, the 
perspective should be understood as the implied attitude towards the fictional events narrated, 
and, in turn, the implied attitude towards the narrated events depends on the external or author-
narrator. The author-narrator is, therefore, necessary to determine what the narrative prescribes 
and endorses. 
To illustrate the importance of the prescribed perspective and the interaction between the 
content of a narrative and the mode of its presentation, think of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita. 
The novel presents an interesting difference between the perspective of the internal narrator 
and the prescribed perspective, that is, the perspective endorsed by the author-narrator. Within 
the novel, the narrative is presented through the eyes of Humbert Humbert. Humbert’s telling 
of the story seems remorseful, but at the same time, he constantly implies that he was simply a 
victim of Lolita’s advances. Humbert is also eager to defend himself by explaining his actions 
in light of the loss of his mother and his childhood love, Annabel. However, the tone of the 
novel is far from endorsing a sympathetic treatment of Humbert: the expressive features of the 
novel portray Humbert in an ironic tone that presents him as a deeply pathetic figure, or as 
                                                          
4 For the rest of the discussion I will assume Currie’s identification of the author and narrator of the fictional world 
as it’s found in “Authors and Narrators”, in Narratives and Narrators. I will not, however, go into the difficulties 
found in cases where we can identify fictions within fictions and second narrators (Currie, 2012). 
5 In particular, I will not focus on the possible differences that can be found between the actual author of a narrative 
and the hypothetical author that can be reconstructed by attending to the narrative. In the discussion that follows 
I will favour Jerrold Levinson’s hypothetical intentionalism. I will thus argue that the relevant perspective should 
be identified with utterance meaning. 
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Nabokov himself puts it, “a vain and cruel wretch who manages to appear 'touching.'”6  The 
author-narrator thus seeks to distance himself from the internal narrator’s apologetic nature; 
and thus the prescribed perspective guides the thread of the novel to achieve this.  
It is important to note at this point that, by alluding to the author-narrator, I am not referring to 
the actual author. The prescribed perspective refers to a fictional perspective, and in this sense, 
it is important to separate it from what the author would actually endorse. The author-narrator 
refers to the external narrator that an appreciator would be able to reconstruct from the 
expressive features that guide the tone of the narration of the fictional events, and the set of 
responses prescribed to the audience. In the above example, what is important to note is that, 
although we have a direct quote from Nabokov explaining how he saw Humbert, the same 
could be inferred from elements present in the fictional context. That is to say that, in strict 
sense, Nabokov’s actual testimony is unnecessary to grasp the fictional perspective prescribed 
by the fictional world.  
Again, the reconstruction of the relevant author-narrator is necessary to determine the 
prescribed perspective of a work of fiction. And in this sense Jerrold Levinson’s hypothetical 
intentionalism is of great help. As said before, identifying the prescribed perspective does not 
mean reconstructing the actual artist’s intentions, but rather it seems that the perspective of the 
author-narrator can be understood in terms of utterance meaning:  
we arrive at utterance meaning in the most comprehensive and informed 
manner we can muster as the utterance’s intended recipients. Actual utterer’s 
intention, then, is not what is determinative of the meaning of a literary 
offering (or the linguistic discourse) but such intention as optimally 
hypothesized, given all the resources available to us in the work’s internal 
structure and the relevant surrounding context of creation, in all its 
legitimately invoked specificity. (Levinson, 1992, 224) 
The prescribed perspective corresponds to that of the author-narrator, that is, the author-
narrator that audiences can reconstruct from all the elements available in the narrative. As such, 
the prescribed perspective is something internal to the narrative, in the sense that it cannot be 
found in actual artists’ intentions. But it is important to note, nevertheless, the relevance of the 
surrounding context. Since appreciators cannot access the external narrator’s actual mental 
states, they depend both on the work’s internal elements and on contextual considerations to 
                                                          
6 Nabokov quoted by Levine in (Levine, 1995). 
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reconstruct the narrative’s fictional perspective. The author-narrator’s perspective is thus 
reconstructed by attending to all the available elements in the narrative interpreted within a 
contextual matrix. This is what explains cases like The Wire, in which we cannot identify an 
explicit authorial intention to prescribe a counter-moral perspective, that is, narratives that 
inadvertently incorporate actual immoral views into the fictional perspective. In these cases, 
an appreciator can reasonably identify counter-moral aspects of a fictional perspective in the 
light of actual immoral views found in a narrative’s context, regardless of the actual author’s 
explicit intentions.  
The perspective is also essential for the imaginative engagement. Just in as much as fictions 
are not just explicit prescriptions to entertain isolated propositions, the engagement with 
fictions must not be reduced to the understanding of the set of fictional propositions prescribed. 
Along with the prescription to imagine a set of propositions, narratives prescribe appreciators 
to respond in certain ways to the narrated events: “Rhetorical devices manipulate or direct 
responses under the fictive stance so that a reader is guided not only in what to imagine but 
also in how to imagine it” (Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, 139). Appreciators are meant to respond 
to the point of view presented by the narrative. These relevant responses are not merely 
triggered by what is being represented but by how it is represented.  
The prescribed perspective includes a specific framework to guide appreciators’ responses. The 
notion of framework, as defined by Greg Currie, refers to the prescribed set of cognitive, 
evaluative and emotional responses prescribed by the narrative. Since the framework refers to 
a set of cognitive, evaluative and emotional responses to the fictional events, it is important to 
take into consideration the distinction proposed by Shen-yi Liao between  make-believe and  
real-world moral outlooks (Liao, 2013). The make-believe moral outlook refers to the outlook 
a fictional narrative asks us to imagine; the real-world moral outlook refers to the outlook 
appreciators in fact have. These outlooks include not just imaginings and beliefs, but other non-
cognitive morally relevant attitudes (Liao, 2013, 271). A narrative’s framework thus prescribes 
a make-believe moral outlook that involves both propositional imaginings and non-cognitive 
morally relevant attitudes. The framework refers to how we are being asked to respond by what 
is being narrated in virtue of how it is narrated (Currie, 2012, 86), and so the framework is in 
charge of shaping appreciators’ make-believe outlook during their engagement with the 
narrative. In the case of immoral fictions, it can be said that it is the framework that is 
responsible for the distortion of appreciators’ moral outlook in favour of an immoral make-
believe outlook during their imaginative engagement. This is important because, as Cain Todd 
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notes, the explicit prescription and compliance to adopt a corrupt attitude is not necessary: the 
prescribed perspective and the acceptance of the perspective is all it takes (Todd, 2009). 
The role of the prescribed perspective, therefore, is twofold. On the one hand, the perspective 
guides the narration. On the other hand, it guides appreciators responses. The prescribed 
perspective aims at shaping the audience’s own perspective by eliciting specific responses to 
the narrated events. This reveals what Lamarque and Olsen recognize as the Gricean turn of 
the perspective: “Competent readers not only respond in this way, they also recognize (at least 
as literary critics they recognize) that this response is required of them. That is, they notice that 
it is being controlled and directed by the narrative content”. (Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, 142) 
 
The alethic objection, which claims that counter-moral fictions are only those that prescribe 
deviant claims as true in the fictional world, misses two important points: 1) that the 
framework, the preferred set of responses to the narrative, follows the fictional perspective and 
not what is fictionally true; 2) that even when we refer to the prescribed perspective as that of 
the author-narrator, the narrative’s perspective is a fictional perspective. Regarding the first 
point, it is important to emphasize that appreciators often respond with counter-moral 
responses, even if these responses are not fictionally normalized (that is, even if the responses 
are counter-mora within the fictional world). Contrary to what the alethic objection suggests, a 
narrative should be regarded as counter-moral when it manipulates and misguides appreciators’ 
make-believe moral outlook so that their responses focus on the wrong salient features, 
regardless of what is fictionally true. This seems to be what Jacobson is suggesting by noting 
“(…) how much of aesthetic experience is not a matter of what a work makes fictional, or what 
is true of some “fictional world”; for these concepts cannot capture the kinetic nature of our 
emotional and evaluative responses to narrative and dramatic art” (Jacobson, 1997, 166). 
Instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives count as counter-moral in the relevant sense 
precisely because, even when deviant moral claims are not fictionally true, appreciators are 
asked to engage with a counter-moral perspective: the narrative prescribes a counter-moral 
framework, a set of cognitive affective responses that contrasts with appreciators’ real-world 
moral outlook and that would be regarded as morally inappropriate in an actual scenario. In 
this sense it is important to distinguish narratives like Lolita from narratives like Breaking Bad. 
Lolita cannot be regarded as a counter-moral fiction in the sense that I have defined. Although 
the narrative follows an immoral character, the prescribed perspective towards the immoral 
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character clearly condemns the immoral actions, and the corresponding framework demands 
from the audience a fitting response: readers are meant to feel repulsed by Humbert Humbert. 
Breaking Bad, on the other hand, constitutes a counter-moral fiction because it presents a 
fictional world in which Walter’s actions are immoral, but in which the perspective invites 
appreciators to sympathize with an immoral character qua immoral. 
As said before, the alethic objection also misses the fact that a narrative’s prescribed 
perspective constitutes a fictional perspective. I believe it is important to emphasize that the 
narrative’s framework involves the prescription of a make-believe moral outlook only, and not 
a real-world moral outlook. A narrative should be regarded as a counter-moral fiction insofar 
as it prescribes a counter-moral framework, that is, content-immoral imaginings and the 
corresponding content-immoral responses. This means that for a fiction to count as a counter-
moral fiction it needs only to prescribe a counter-moral make-believe outlook. Instances of 
counter-moral fictional perspectives are counter-moral because they prescribe content-immoral 
imaginings and content-immoral responses. Narratives do not need to include actual invitations 
to adopt an immoral real-world outlook. Ignoring the notion of framework also misses this. 
The framework refers to an imagined moral outlook. Narratives prescribe appreciators a 
perspective that guides their engagement with the narrated events. But this says nothing about 
how the narrative might invite appreciators to believe certain things as opposed to merely 
imagine. As we will see in the following section, the difference between make-believe and real-
world moral outlooks implies a difference between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives. 
And this difference will in turn determine how the prescriptions to imagine relate to invitations 
to believe in certain cases. 
 
1.3 Manifested attitudes and immorality in fiction 
So far I have argued against the alethic objection that some works of fiction should be regarded 
as counter-moral even when they do not prescribe deviant moral claims as true in the fictional 
world because they prescribe a counter-moral fictional perspective. But someone could still 
argue that my categorisation of counter-moral fictions that emphasises a distinction between 
fictional and actual immorality is mistaken insofar as instances of merely fictional immorality 
are not counter-moral in the relevant sense because they do not manifest an immoral attitude. 
A second objection to my categorisation of counter-moral fictions would claim that works of 
fiction should be considered as counter-moral in the relevant sense only when they include an 
35 
 
immoral manifested attitude. Let us call this the “Manifested attitude objection”.  According to 
this second objection, because instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives acknowledge 
the deviant character of the prescribed perspective they do not manifest an immoral attitude, 
and they should not be considered as counter-moral fictions in the relevant sense.  
However, the main problem with the manifested attitude objection is that it is not clear how we 
should understand the notion of an immoral manifested attitude. According to Berys Gaut, the 
manifested attitude refers to the work displaying pro or con attitudes toward some represented 
state of affairs via the prescribed responses (Gaut, 2007, 230). A narrative manifests an 
immoral attitude by prescribing ethically unmerited responses: “The notion of manifesting an 
attitude should be construed in terms of a work’s displaying pro or con attitudes toward some 
state of affairs or things, which the work may do in many ways besides explicitly stating an 
opinion about them” (Gaut, 1998, 183). For a narrative to be counter-moral in the relevant 
sense, therefore, it would have to manifest an immoral attitude; and this in turn would mean 
that the narrative prescribes ethically unmerited responses, that is, pro or con attitudes.  
If we were to understand the manifested attitude merely as the prescription of ethically 
unmerited responses, it would seem that the manifested attitude objection would be wrong in 
dismissing instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives as counter-moral in the relevant 
sense; after all, we have seen that these narratives prescribe a counter-moral framework. 
However, the manifested attitude objection argues that we cannot simply look at prescribed 
responses to identify the narrative’s manifested attitude. According to Gaut, the manifested 
attitude cannot be identified by simply alluding to individual responses. The manifested attitude 
can only be identified by attending to "the complete set of relevant prescriptions that a work 
makes toward fictional events”(Gaut, 1998, 193). This is important because, according to Gaut, 
sometimes the individual responses prescribed are contrary to the manifested attitude of the 
work. For instance, Gaut asks us to consider “a novel that apparently prescribes its readers to 
be amused at a character’s underserved suffering but that does so in order to show up the ease 
with which the reader can be seduced into callous responses. Then one response (amusement) 
is prescribed, but a very different attitude is manifested by the work (disapproval of the ease 
with which we can be morally seduced). Hence it may seem that the manifestation of attitudes 
is wholly distinct from and independent of the prescription of responses” (Gaut, 2007, 230). 
According to Gaut, this reveals not that the manifested attitude is distinct from the prescribed 
responses, but that we can identify in the narrative lower and higher-order prescribed responses. 
In some narratives, we might find individual prescribed responses that are only prescribed 
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provisionally, to advance a higher order prescription that should be identified as the manifested 
attitude of the work. This means that it is not a case of the prescribed responses differing from 
the manifested attitude, but rather of individual responses that correspond to lower order 
prescriptions, and that contrast with higher order responses. The manifested attitude should 
then be understood as the higher order prescriptions. According to the manifested attitude 
objection to my categorisation of counter-moral fictions, for a narrative to count as counter-
moral in the relevant sense it must include deviant higher order prescriptions.  
But what are these higher order prescriptions? Let’s go back to Gaut’s example of a narrative 
that prescribes amusement at undeserved suffering to evidence the fragility of our moral 
outlook. On the one hand, we have amusement as the prescribed response toward the narrated 
events. This prescribed response is directed toward the imaginings prescribed by the narrative. 
As such, the prescription is aimed at shaping what Shen-yi Liao calls a make-believe moral 
outlook, that is, an imagined moral outlook that concerns the imagined events. But, at the same 
time, appreciators are prescribed to regard their amusement as callous and unmerited. This 
means that the higher order response does not have the represented events as its object, but 
rather the make-believe moral outlook. And, more importantly, the fact that the higher order 
prescription is aimed at evidencing the fragility of our moral outlook shows that the higher 
order prescription is aimed at shaping what Liao calls a real world moral outlook. Higher order 
prescriptions, therefore, seem to be prescriptions that are directed at real world moral outlooks, 
and that concern an actual state of affairs. And if the higher order prescriptions concern not just 
the imagined state of affairs presented by the narrative, but the actual state of the world, the 
attitude of the work manifested in these higher order prescriptions can be identified with an 
actual, as opposed to a fictional, perspective.  
According to Gaut, the manifested attitude of the work can thus be identified with the 
manifested artist’s character (Gaut, 2007, 115). As we have seen in the previous section, the 
engagement with works of fiction is not merely a matter of what is represented, but about how 
it is represented. Works of fiction possess expressive features that reveal an attitude toward the 
narrated events. And, according to Gaut, the expressive features of the work are derived from 
the expressive acts of the artist (Gaut, 2007, 71). Gaut follows Guy Sircello in claiming that 
artistic acts ground the expressive properties of the works. Artistic acts refer to what artists do 
in the artworks: “An artistic act is simply one performed by the artist in and by means of the 
work. As Sircello stresses, it is internally related to the properties of the work. (…) So the 
artistic act is not to be thought of as something that exists prior to and as the cause of features 
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of the work; rather, the description of an artistic act is a redescription of features of the work 
in order to bring out how they are internally related to acts of the artist.” (Gaut, 2007, 71) 
Taking into consideration the notion of artistic acts, Gaut claims that the work’s manifested 
attitude is equivalent to the artist’s attitude, precisely inasmuch as the work’s expressive 
features are derived from expressive acts of the artist.  
The manifested attitude objection to my categorisation of counter-moral fictions, therefore, 
claims that for a fiction to count as counter-moral in the relevant sense it must include an artist’s 
immoral attitude. This means that according to the manifested attitude objection works of 
fiction should be regarded as counter-moral in the relevant sense only when they include a 
deviant actual perspective, rather than simply a deviant fictional perspective. If this is the case, 
then only instances of what I have identified as actual immorality can truly count as counter-
moral fictions. This second objection claims that narratives that I have identified as fictionally 
immoral would not really count as counter-moral because, although they prescribe pro attitudes 
toward immoral characters, the narratives are clearly created as counter-moral by the artist. The 
counter-moral responses prescribed would only count as lower order prescriptions that should 
not be identified with the manifested attitude, which involves higher order prescriptions. 
According to the manifested attitude objection, a truly counter-moral fiction would be one 
whose ultimate goal is to persuade appreciators to actually endorse immoral beliefs, and to 
prescribe ethically unmerited responses toward actual events. 
 
1.3.1 Fictional and extra-fictional perspectives in fiction 
However, I believe that the manifested attitude objection is wrong in claiming that for a work 
of fiction to count as counter-moral in the relevant sense it must include an actual immoral 
perspective. The main problem with the objection is that it is wrong in identifying the 
manifested attitude of the work with that of the artist. And in doing so, it obscures an important 
distinction between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives that, as we will see, is relevant for 
the analysis of our engagement with immorality in fiction and our assessment of both counter-
moral narratives and our responses to them. 
As we saw in the beginning of this section, the manifested attitude should be understood as the 
work displaying pro or con attitudes toward the narrated events. It is in this sense that the 
manifested attitude could be identified with the complete set of prescribed responses toward 
the narrative. The prescribed perspective guides the focus of the narration and, by prescribing 
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responses, it advances an attitude toward the fictional events. According to Gaut, prescribed 
responses are meant to cover “a wide range of states directed at represented events and 
characters, including being pleased at something, feeling an emotion toward it, being amused 
about it, and desiring something with respect to it – wanting it to continue or stop, wanting to 
know what happens next” (Gaut, 1998, 193). However, in Gaut’s analysis the artist’s attitudes, 
understood as the higher order prescriptions that guide lower order prescribed responses, seem 
to have as their object not the narrated events but the prescribed responses and a real world 
moral outlook. Thus it is not clear whether the work’s manifested attitude is to be understood 
as a make-believe outlook that is directed only at the narrated events, or if it refers to a real-
world outlook expressed in the work that is directed at an actual state of affairs. 
To solve this difficulty, it is necessary to distinguish between fictional and extra-fictional 
perspectives in works of fiction. I believe that the work’s manifested attitude should be 
identified with the fictional perspective that concerns merely a make-believe moral outlook, 
while the extra-fictional perspective constitutes a meta-perspective that concerns not just the 
actual state of affairs but the relation between make-believe and real world moral outlooks. To 
distinguish between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives, I think it is important to consider 
the difference between internal and external points of view of the readers discussed by 
Lamarque and Olsen: “A reader can have both an (‘internal’) imaginative involvement with 
fictive content and an (‘external’) awareness that the content is under the control of a writer”. 
(Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, 144) Under this distinction, the imaginative involvement is 
circumscribed to what is fictional, while elements such as authorial actual purposes are 
reflected upon from an external perspective (Lamarque & Olsen, 1994). 
The fictional perspective refers to the complete set of responses toward the narrated events. 
That is, the fictional perspective refers to the prescribed pro or con attitudes toward the 
represented events and characters as represented by the work. According to what was said in 
the previous section, the fictional perspective corresponds to the author-narrator’s attitude 
toward the narrated events as represented in the work. Thus, the fictional perspective concerns 
a make-believe moral outlook exclusively.  
The extra-fictional perspective, on the other hand, refers to a perspective that concerns a real 
world moral outlook. This perspective is directed toward an actual state of affairs. The extra-
fictional perspective thus corresponds to the attitude the author-narrator would hold when faced 
with real events and real people. As such, the extra-fictional perspective sometimes includes 
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invitations not only to imagine, but invitations to believe: via an extra-fictional perspective, the 
narrative invites us to reflect upon the actual state of the world and our own moral outlook. The 
extra-fictional perspectives can invite appreciators to adopt a real world moral outlook as a 
result of the imaginative engagement with fiction. Even more so, the extra-fictional perspective 
can also be regarded as a meta-perspective since it is often directed at our responses prescribed 
by the fictional perspective. The extra-fictional perspective can invite appreciators to reflect on 
the prescribed make-believe moral outlook in light of a real world moral outlook.  
I believe it is important to recognize these two perspectives in order to be able to account for 
the complexity of fictional narratives. My categorisation of counter-moral fictions alludes to 
the distinction between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives by introducing a distinction 
between merely fictional and actual immorality in counter-moral fictions. And the manifested 
attitude objection to my categorisation obscures the distinction by claiming that counter-moral 
fictions are only those that include an artist’s actual immoral perspective.  
It might be difficult to distinguish between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives since in 
many cases the two perspectives coincide. This is the case for narratives that present a moral 
fictional perspective and a moral extra-fictional perspective. And it is also the case for 
narratives that present an immoral fictional perspective and an immoral extra fictional 
perspective, as it is the case for instances of actual immorality that I have outlined above. But 
the more interesting cases are those where the two perspectives differ. As evidenced in the 
example examined by Gaut, some works prescribe either a neutral or an immoral fictional 
perspective that contrasts with the extra-fictional perspective. In these cases, by prescribing the 
contrasting fictional perspective, the author-narrator wants to shed light on relevant aspects of 
a real world moral outlook. However, I believe it is misleading to claim that in these cases what 
I have identified as the fictional perspective refers to provisional prescriptions only. Gaut fails 
to note that for the extra-fictional perspective to be successful, the audience needs to really 
adopt the contrasting make-believe moral outlook during their imaginative engagement with 
the narrative. That is, the expected change in the real world moral outlook can only be brought 
about by the adoption of a counter-moral perspective during the imaginative engagement. 
Moreover, the counter-moral fictional perspective should not be understood as something 
provisional: the counter-moral make-believe outlook is not eventually replaced by a moral 
make-believe outlook. That is, while the extra-fictional perspective aims at causing an impact 
on the audience’s real world moral outlook, the make-believe moral outlook stays the same. 
The fictional perspective is not replaced by the extra-fictional perspective during the 
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imaginative engagement. Rather, these two perspectives correspond to two different levels 
found in the narrative and in appreciators’ engagement.  
In this sense we can accept that instances of fictional immorality count as counter-moral 
without requiring that the external perspective finds them actually immoral. That is, instances 
of fictional immorality are counter-moral in the relevant sense because they prescribe a 
counter-moral make-believe moral outlook that is not only provisional: audiences are really 
meant to adopt a deviant make-believe moral outlook during their imaginative engagement. 
But this does not mean that instances of fictional immorality need to prescribe a deviant real 
world moral outlook to count as immoral. Counter-moral fictions can elicit content-immoral 
responses because the responses are circumscribed to the internal perspective; and the counter-
moral prescriptions to imagine, along with the corresponding content-immoral responses, could 
have a moralizing intention when regarded from an external perspective, but without affecting 
the content-immoral imaginative engagement with the fictional world.  
So what does the difference between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives mean for the 
work’s manifested attitude? I believe the manifested attitude of the work should be Identified 
with the fictional perspective, not with the extra-fictional perspective. That is, the manifested 
attitude should be identified with the perspective the author-narrator holds toward the narrated 
events and that can be identified by attending to the prescribed responses to the fictional events. 
Contrary to that the manifested attitude objection claims, instances of what I have identified as 
merely fictional immorality are counter-moral in the relevant sense because they involve a 
deviant fictional perspective that prescribes a deviant make-believe moral outlook. Gaut might 
be right in saying that the artist’s attitude is manifested in the work via certain expressive 
properties brought about by artistic acts. But I believe this is irrelevant for the distinction 
between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives. What I want to note is that even if we could 
say something about the artist’s attitude by attending to the work’s expressive features, this 
would only amount to an extra-fictional perspective that has an actual state of affairs as its 
object. The work’s manifested attitude, as opposed to the artist’s manifested attitude, can be 
found in the fictional perspective, that is, the perspective that has as its object the fictional 
events and characters.  
Finally, I want to note that the distinction between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives 
should not be cashed out in terms of a distinction between actual and implied authors. I believe 
both of these perspectives can only be identified by referring to the author-narrator that the 
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audiences can reconstruct from the available elements in the narrative. What I have tried to 
claim is that even taking into consideration the fact that we can only access the author-narrator 
in the work, it is important to separate between the author-narrator’s make-believe and real 
world moral outlooks. The fictional perspective refers to the perspective the author narrator 
prescribes toward the narrated events, that is, to a make-believe moral outlook. The extra-
fictional perspective refers to the perspective the author-narrator would hold toward actual 
events, that is, a real world moral outlook. 
 
In this chapter I have argued that there are different types of counter-moral fictions that should 
nonetheless be regarded as counter-moral in the relevant sense. I have argued against the alethic 
objection that counter-moral fictions do not need to present deviant moral claims as true in the 
fictional world. Counter-moral fictions are those that prescribe a counter-moral perspective 
with a corresponding counter-moral framework. And I have argued against the manifested 
attitude objection that counter-moral fictions do not need to include a deviant extra-fictional 
perspective to be regarded as counter-moral in the relevant sense. For a narrative to count as a 
counter-moral fiction it needs only to prescribe a deviant make-believe moral outlook. In the 
following chapter I will explore how the diversity of counter-moral fictions has an impact on 
how audiences engage with different types of counter-moral content.   
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2. The Continuity Thesis 
 
The classification of counter-moral fictions I advanced in the previous chapter shows that 
appreciators relate to a fiction’s counter-moral content in a variety of ways. In some cases, as 
it is with instances of fictional immorality, appreciators are willing to engage with works of 
fiction that present morally problematic scenarios that directly contrast with their moral 
outlook, and to adopt what they regard as a counter-moral make-believe outlook. The 
difference between a counter-moral fictional perspective and a counter-moral fictional world 
makes it clear that appreciators do not need to imagine a fictional world governed by deviant 
moral principles to adopt a deviant perspective during their imaginative engagement. As I 
argued before, in instances of counter-moral fictional perspectives, appreciators adopt a deviant 
make-believe moral outlook when they adopt a deviant perspective in fiction, that is, when they 
adopt a perspective that leads them to ignore in the narrative what they would normally 
consider morally salient features or when they allow their moral outlook to be contaminated by 
non-moral considerations. In these cases, although they do not come to imagine that the deviant 
moral claims are true in the fictional world, we can say that they adopt a counter-moral outlook 
by responding in ways that contrast with their actual attitudes. In recent years, the proliferation 
of narratives featuring what A. W. Eaton has called Rough Heroes, such as Breaking Bad, 
emphasises how the prescription of a deviant perspective in fiction is a recurrent narrative 
resource. Appreciators are thus capable of engaging in rich imaginative endeavours that involve 
adopting deviant perspectives inasmuch as they have affective responses they would normally 
consider inappropriate. 
In recent years, philosophers have written extensively on what was originally called “The 
Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance”.7 The puzzle refers to the problems imagination seems to 
encounter when dealing with deviant scenarios in fiction, that is, with fictional scenarios that 
contrast with appreciators’ actual attitudes. According to the puzzle, appreciators do not 
imaginatively engage with some fictional scenarios that involve deviance. Walton’s famous 
Giselda example, “In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl” 
(Walton, 1994), has been used by some authors to show that there is a curious asymmetry 
between our reception of deviant factual scenarios and deviant evaluations in fiction. In his “Of 
                                                          
7 For a detailed overview of the literature on imaginative resistance and the solutions offered, see (Liao & Gendler, 
2016; Miyazono & Liao, 2016). 
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the Standard of Taste” (1757), David Hume first noted the asymmetry found between our 
reception of deviance in speculative and moral matters in literary works:  
Speculative errors that are found in the literary works of any age or country 
don’t detract much from the value of those works. To get us to enter into all 
the opinions that prevailed at that time, and to enjoy the sentiments or 
conclusions derived from them, all that is needed is a certain turn of thought 
or imagination (…). But to change our judgments on conduct, and arouse in 
us sentiments of approval or blame, love or hatred, different from the ones 
that long custom has made familiar to us—that requires a very violent effort.  
Following Hume, the literature on imaginative resistance has noted that there is an asymmetry 
between our engagement with evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction. Imaginative 
resistance arises because, while appreciators do not have problems engaging with fictional 
scenarios that ask them to imagine deviant factual matters, they do encounter difficulty when 
trying to engage with fictions that ask them to imagine deviant evaluations. And so, while 
appreciators do not normally find it difficult to engage with a work of fantasy or science fiction, 
they do find it difficult to imaginatively engage with a narrative that asks them to agree that 
Giselda did the right thing in killing her daughter. For this reason, Tamar Gendler first 
formulated the puzzle of imaginative resistance as “the puzzle of explaining our comparative 
difficulty in imagining fictional worlds that we take to be morally deviant” (Gendler, 2000, 
56).8 Although both Gendler and Hume focus on moral deviance, authors like Walton (2006) 
and Brian Weatherson (2004) have noted that imaginative resistance arises when appreciators 
are faced with deviant evaluative scenarios in general.9  
                                                          
8 Although Gendler originally identified a single puzzle, Walton and Weatherson have since noted that what was 
originally named “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance” actually comprises four different, if related, problems. 
The alethic puzzle refers to why authorial authority is not enough to make certain claims true in the fiction. The 
imaginative puzzle refers to the lack of psychological participation certain fictional scenarios provoke. The 
phenomenological puzzle refers to why certain propositions in fiction are striking. And the aesthetic puzzle refers 
to how evaluative deviance impacts the aesthetic value of certain fictional scenarios. In what follows I refer in 
general to the problems of imaginative difficulties or to resistance phenomena. 
9 There is a widespread disagreement regarding the nature of the deviant scenarios that prompt problems in 
imaginative engagement. Some authors, like Yablo (2002) and Todd (2009), claim it has something to do with 
the application of certain concepts. Others, like Weatherson (2004) and Stock (2005), claim it has something to 
do with inconsistencies found in the stories. Most authors, nevertheless, accept that other non-evaluative fictional 
scenarios can also cause problems of imaginative barriers, as it is the case for scenarios that conflict with simple 
necessary truths. Due to the aims of the thesis, this chapter only focuses on cases of deviant evaluative scenarios 
that cause problems of imaginative resistance, and on those accounts that claim that these problems are caused by 
the evaluative nature of the propositions. 
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The literature on imaginative resistance has focused on examining the causes of the asymmetry 
between evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in our engagement with fiction to explain 
why sometimes appreciators experience imaginative difficulties. This chapter examines those 
accounts of imaginative resistance that identify the evaluative nature of the problematic 
scenarios as the underlying cause of resistance phenomena. 10 I argue that these solutions fail 
to account for the complexity of our imaginative engagement with different types of counter-
moral content in narratives, and that the supposed asymmetry between evaluative and non-
evaluative deviant scenarios is in fact unsupported by the diversity of counter-moral fictions. 
The examples examined in the previous chapter indicate that audiences are able and willing to 
engage with morally deviant perspectives in certain instances of fictional narratives. During 
their imaginative engagement, appreciators commonly adopt attitudes they would otherwise 
consider unacceptable. They feel a strong sympathy for immoral characters, they applaud 
immoral decisions, they overlook immoral actions, and they root for the bad guys. In light of 
these examples, it would seem that cases where appreciators agree to ignore their everyday 
evaluative framework in favour of a deviant perspective prescribed by the narrative are as 
puzzling as cases where they experience imaginative difficulties. A satisfactory account of our 
imaginative engagement with immorality fiction, therefore, needs to explain both the cases that 
cause imaginative difficulties and the cases that do not.  
This chapter examines some of the solutions to the problems of imaginative resistance with the 
objective of determining how appreciators imaginatively engage with immorality in fiction, 
and why they willingly adopt a counter-moral make-believe outlook in some cases, but not in 
others. I examine the solutions in light of two so-called problems derived from our engagement 
with morally deviant scenarios in fiction: the problem of immorality and truth in fiction, and 
the problem of immorality and perspective. The problem of immorality and truth in fiction 
focuses on the construction of fictional worlds, and refers to the possibility of making a deviant 
evaluation true in the world of the story. The problem of immorality and perspective refers to 
the possibility of imagining and adopting a counter-moral perspective in fiction. This division 
is meant to track the distinction between counter-moral fictional worlds and counter-moral 
                                                          
10 The second wave of literature on imaginative resistance, as Gendler has called it, has emphasised the role of 
context in explaining resistance phenomena. For example, authors like Stuart Brock (2012) and Cain Todd (2009) 
claim that the so-called puzzle of imaginative resistance arises only when propositions are provided with no 
surrounding context. Authors like Shen-yi Liao (2013, 2016), Bence Nanay (2010),  and Jonathan Weinberg 
(2008) have argued that genre plays an essential role in appreciators’ engagement with deviant evaluative 
scenarios in fiction. Chapter three examines these arguments to show that the fictional context provides grounds 
for defending what I will call ‘The discontinuity thesis’.  
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fictional perspectives examined in the previous chapter. The solutions to the two problems 
examined in this second chapter reveal there is an explanatory gap in the accounts of 
imaginative resistance that explain resistance phenomena by alluding to an asymmetry between 
evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios.  
I argue that these accounts invoke the continuity of our evaluative attitudes and their criteria of 
appropriateness between fictional and actual scenarios to explain the asymmetry. I call this 
‘The continuity thesis’. The chapter addresses the two problems outlined above to examine 
how the continuity thesis is assumed in each case, and to show that it yields a defective 
explanation of appreciators’ engagement with counter-moral fictions because the continuity 
assumption is left unexplained. This chapter shows that the examined solutions to the problems 
of imaginative barriers are flawed on two counts. First, the continuity assumption remains 
unexplained, and therefore there is no reason to defend an asymmetry in our engagement with 
deviant evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction. Second, the diagnoses that assume 
the continuity thesis are proven wrong by the diversity of counter-moral fictions because the 
features they identify as the causes of imaginative problems are present in narratives that don’t 
cause imaginative resistance. 
To do this, the first section of the chapter outlines the continuity thesis, and shows how it is 
presented as the explanation for the supposed asymmetry. In section two I examine how the 
continuity thesis is present in the accounts advanced for each of the problems mentioned above. 
Section three analyses two arguments in favour of the continuity thesis: the argument from 
response moralism and the argument from value-like imaginings. In section four I claim that 
the arguments examined before are not enough to defend the continuity thesis, and that, 
ultimately, they all fail to answer the question at the core of the problems defined from the 
beginning: why is our engagement with deviant evaluations in fiction different from our 
engagement with merely descriptive scenarios in some cases but not others. In the final section 
I reprise the distinction between fictional and actual immorality in fiction to advance an 
explanation for the cases of counter-moral narratives that cause imaginative resistance, and for 
those that do not. 
 
2.1 What is the continuity thesis? 
As said at the beginning, although the problems of counter-moral scenarios in fiction have been 
approached from different perspectives, and authors have provided different solutions, the 
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accounts that claim that problems of imaginative difficulties have something to do with the 
evaluative nature of the propositions argue that there is an asymmetry in our engagement with 
deviant evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction. While appreciators do not typically 
have problems engaging with fictional narratives that ask them to imagine deviant factual 
matters, they seem to encounter difficulties when trying to engage with fictions that ask them 
to imagine deviant evaluations. But why is it that we find such an asymmetry? These accounts 
invoke the continuity of the evaluative attitudes and their criteria of appropriateness between 
fictional and actual scenarios to explain the asymmetry. I call this the Continuity thesis. In what 
follows I argue that the continuity thesis is present as the background assumption in the 
solutions to the problems of imaginative difficulties that focus on the evaluative nature of the 
resisted scenarios.  
According to these accounts, deviant evaluations in fiction cause imaginative problems because 
appreciators’ evaluative attitudes in fiction follow the evaluative attitudes they would have in 
an actual scenario, while their non-evaluative attitudes adjust to what is prescribed by fictional 
narratives. The continuity thesis is thus an explanation for the supposed asymmetry found in 
our engagement with deviant factual and deviant evaluative scenarios in fiction. The continuity 
thesis claims that there is such an asymmetry because of the underlying continuity of 
appreciators’ evaluative attitudes during their engagement with fiction. Because of this 
continuity, appreciators do not11 adopt the prescribed evaluative perspective with its 
corresponding attitudes.  
The accounts that explain the asymmetry in virtue of the evaluative nature of the scenarios that 
cause imaginative difficulties, assume the continuity thesis inasmuch as they argue that the 
asymmetry is caused by the persistence of appreciators’ evaluative attitudes in spite of what is 
prescribed by the fictional scenario, contrary to what happens in cases of factual deviance. 
These accounts assume the continuity thesis by claiming that the asymmetry is caused by the 
continuity of our evaluations in fictional and actual scenarios. And this in turn is explained by 
the continuity of our evaluative framework: we import our evaluative framework as part of the 
background information that helps us in making sense of the fictional narrative.  
                                                          
11 In her first formulation of the puzzle of imaginative resistance, Gendler identifies two different categories of 
solutions. Either imaginative resistance is caused by our inability to imagine certain fictional propositions (can’t 
solutions), or imaginative barriers emerge because we are unwilling to imagine certain fictional propositions 
(won’t solutions) (Gendler, 2000). For the purposes of this discussion, I ignore the differences between cantian 
and wontian solutions to the puzzle of resistance phenomena. 
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We can thus formulate the continuity thesis as follows: 
The continuity thesis: the thesis that appreciators import their evaluative framework 
during their imaginative engagement with fiction. 
The continuity thesis can therefore be formulated in terms of the import principle12. The import 
principle refers to how much of their cognitive stock appreciators need to take into account for 
the imaginative engagement with fiction to work. The continuity thesis claims that there is 
continuity in appreciators’ evaluative attitudes because they are imported to the fictional world. 
The asymmetry is explained because appreciators import their evaluative attitudes, but not 
(necessarily) their factual beliefs. As such, the continuity thesis argues that there is an 
asymmetry in the workings of the import principle that governs evaluative and non-evaluative 
background information. While appreciators don’t necessarily import the background 
information regarding non-evaluative matters, they do import their evaluative framework. The 
asymmetry supposedly found in the import principle explains the asymmetry found in the 
engagement with deviant scenarios in fiction. 
In general, fictional factual beliefs allow discontinuity because they are specified by the 
fictional context. The import principle governing non-evaluative fictional truths dictates that 
the background information we are allowed to import to the fictional narrative is limited by the 
fictional prescriptions: appreciators should import to the fictional scenario what they know 
about the world unless it directly contrasts with the implicit and explicit prescriptions found in 
the fictional narrative. The import principle can be thus defined as: 
Import principle: Where p is a non-evaluative proposition relevant in the context 
of the narrative, assume p is true in F unless F prescribes that –p.  
However, as said before, the continuity thesis explains the assumed asymmetry in terms of an 
asymmetry in the workings of the import principle for evaluative and non-evaluative fictional 
scenarios. When it comes to evaluative propositions, the import principle dictates that 
appreciators should not simply import background assumptions unless otherwise specified by 
the fictional world, but that they should import background assumptions, and the resulting 
                                                          
12 The terms ‘import’ and ‘export’ are taken from Tamar Gendler (2000). Following Gendler, Allan Hazlett, in 
his article “How to Defend Response Moralism” formulates the Import and Export principles (Hazlett, 2009). The 
formulation of the import principle that I present in the next paragraphs is a modification of Hazlett’s Import 
principle.  
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attitudes, regardless of what is prescribed. So, for evaluative propositions in fictions, the import 
principle would be defined as: 
Import principle1: Where p is an evaluative proposition that actually holds, assume 
p is true in F regardless of what F prescribes. 
The accounts that assume the continuity thesis as an explanation for the supposed asymmetry 
between deviant evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction argue that imaginative 
resistance arises because what is prescribed by the author directly contrasts with how 
appreciators would evaluate the scenario in real circumstances. Contrary to what happens with 
deviant factual scenarios, the prescription of a deviant evaluation is not enough to cancel the 
import mechanism, and the appreciators’ actual attitudes are given priority. As a result, 
appreciators have difficulties or do not fully participate in the fictional world because they 
reject the prescribed perspective. 
 
2.2 The continuity thesis and the problems of counter-moral fictions 
As I said in the introduction to this chapter, I think it is possible to speak of two different types 
of imaginative problems that might arise during our engagement with the diversity of counter-
moral fictions: the problem of immorality and fictional truth, and the problem of immorality 
and perspective. The problem of immorality and fictional truth refers to the problems that arise 
when fictional narratives prescribe deviant evaluations as true in the fiction; the problem of 
immorality and perspective, on the other hand, refers to the problems that arise when fictional 
narratives prescribe a perspective that endorses deviant evaluative attitudes. This distinction 
tracks the difference between counter-moral perspectives and counter-moral worlds examined 
in the first chapter. This section examines some of the proposed solutions to the puzzle of 
imaginative resistance in virtue of the problem they address, and it shows how the continuity 
thesis is found as an underlying assumption. 
 
2.2.1 The continuity thesis and the problem of immorality and fictional truth 
The problem of immorality and fictional truth refers to the possibility of making true a deviant 
evaluation in the world of a fictional narrative. That is, it refers to the problems that arise when 
appreciators engage with narratives that prescribe them to imagine a fictional world in which 
deviant evaluations are true. This would be the case for instances of counter-moral fictional 
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worlds, that is, narratives that ask appreciators to imagine a fictional world governed by deviant 
principles, such as McCarthy’s Blood Meridian.  
In the literature on imaginative resistance, the problem of immorality and fictional truth is 
addressed by those accounts that explain resistance phenomena by claiming that appreciators 
encounter imaginative difficulties because the prescribed deviant evaluations cannot be true 
in the world of the fiction. That is, according to these accounts, appreciators experience 
imaginative difficulties when imagining the world of Blood Meridian because the deviant 
evaluations prescribed by the narrative cannot be true in the fictional world. So, while 
narratives can make certain deviant factual propositions true in their fictional worlds, such as 
“The rabbit took a watch out of his waistcoat pocket”, narratives cannot arbitrarily make 
deviant evaluations true in their stories. That is, there is an asymmetry in the prescription of 
fictional truths for deviant evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios. A fictional narrative can 
make true in the world of the story a set of deviant non-evaluative propositions by stipulating 
the right fictional context (as in the case of fantasy or science fiction). But the continuity 
assumption dictates that for evaluative propositions to be true in the fictional world, they must 
follow the evaluations that would hold in an actual scenario. The accounts that argue that 
imaginative problems arise because deviant evaluations cannot be true in the fiction assume 
the continuity thesis inasmuch as appreciators are meant to import their evaluative framework 
to determine what is and is not true in the fictional world. In Walton’s Giselda example, this 
means that appreciators encounter imaginative difficulties because they do not accept that 
killing one’s own daughter is the right thing to do in the fictional world; instead, the criteria of 
what is right and wrong in the fictional world follow the criteria of what is right and wrong in 
the actual world, and appreciators import their evaluative attitudes during their engagement 
with the world of the fictional narrative. 
Kendall Walton claims that appreciators encounter difficulties in imagining deviant evaluations 
in fiction because appraisals supervene on certain ‘natural’ characteristics. These relations of 
dependence do not allow for fictional worlds to differ in evaluative aspects from the real one 
(Walton, 1994). Walton acknowledges that authors are not constrained by what is the case in 
the actual world when stipulating fictional truths on factual matters; in factual fictional truths 
what he calls ‘The Reality principle’ is not decisive, otherwise audiences would be unable to 
engage with non-realistic fictions. But, he claims that when it comes to engaging with 
evaluations, appreciators bring along their evaluative framework because their understanding 
of the dependence relations remains the same (Walton, 2006; 1994). It is interesting to note 
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that Walton does not deny that the relations of dependence for evaluations could be different 
in fiction. He explicitly denies endorsement of the impossibility hypothesis. But rather he 
argues that appreciators do not accept the relations to be different, thus importing their 
evaluative attitudes (Walton, 2006). 
Tamar Gendler identifies what she calls a ‘doubling of the narrator’. Gendler suggests that 
imaginative resistance can be regarded as a ‘That’s what you think’ move: whenever 
appreciators encounter the prescription of a deviant evaluation, instead of regarding it as true 
in the story, they regard it as what the narrator thinks is true (Gendler, 2000, 63-64). In this 
sense, we can say that when engaging with fictional worlds, appreciators prioritise and import 
their actual evaluative attitudes over the fictional prescriptions. For Gendler, moral evaluations 
are categorical, in the sense that if they are true in this world, they are true in any possible 
world; and this includes fictional worlds, regardless of what is prescribed (Gendler, 2000. 78). 
So, while the violation of factual truths in fiction doesn’t cause imaginative resistance, deviant 
moral evaluations are resisted by appreciators because of their categorical nature. Readers of 
fiction do not imagine deviant evaluations being true in the story because moral evaluations 
are true in all possible worlds, including fictional worlds. And, if this is so, appreciators’ 
evaluative framework is meant to stand even during their engagement with a fictional world. 
This explains Gendler’s emphasis on the democratic nature of appraisals. According to her, 
appraisals are democratic because appreciators have a bearing on the application of evaluations, 
so that it is not enough for the narrative to prescribe a deviant evaluation for appreciators to 
accept it. The fact that appreciators import their evaluative framework due to its categorical 
nature explains why, according to Gendler, appreciators are both unwilling and incapable of 
vividly imagining deviant moral propositions during their imaginative engagement (Gendler, 
2006, 157). 
 
2.2.2 The continuity thesis and the problem of immorality and perspective 
As we just saw, the problem of immorality and fictional truth refers to whether a narrative can 
stipulate deviant evaluations as true in the fictional world. However, even if we allowed for 
deviant evaluations to be true in the fiction, we would still have to examine whether it is 
possible for appreciators to have a rich imaginative engagement with such deviant worlds, to 
respond according to what a deviant perspective prescribes. The problem of immorality and 
perspective refers to the difficulties that arise when a fictional narrative prescribes appreciators 
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to adopt a perspective that endorses deviant evaluations. This problem would arise when 
appreciators engage with instances of counter-moral perspectives, such as Breaking Bad. As I 
said in the previous chapter, instances of counter-moral perspectives do not prescribe deviant 
evaluations as true in the story, but they prescribe appreciators to adopt a perspective that 
involves deviant evaluative attitudes, with the corresponding deviant responses. In the case of 
Breaking Bad, appreciators are meant to regard Walter White as an immoral character even 
within the world of the fiction. But they are also prescribed to adopt a perspective that regards 
his success as a drug kingpin as more important than the wellbeing of his family, a perspective 
that dismisses his wife’s moral concerns as exaggerated and unreasonable.  
Accounts of imaginative resistance address the problem of immorality and perspective when 
they claim that, even when the deviant evaluations are not prescribed as true, imaginative 
difficulties arise because appreciators do not adopt the prescribed deviant perspective because 
it contrasts with their actual attitudes. That is, the solutions to the problems of imaginative 
difficulties that assume an asymmetry between deviant evaluative and non-evaluative 
prescriptions in fiction argue that resistance arises when appreciators do not inhabit a deviant 
perspective because it violently contrasts with their own evaluative attitudes. The continuity 
thesis is assumed by these accounts because they claim that appreciators do not engage with 
deviant evaluative perspectives because they import their evaluative framework during their 
imaginative engagement with fiction. Imaginative difficulties arise because, instead of holding 
the deviant attitudes prescribed by the narrative, appreciators hold the attitudes they would 
normally hold toward a deviant character in a real scenario. Going back to Walton’s Giselda 
example, these accounts of imaginative resistance argue that imaginative difficulties arise 
because appreciators do not adopt a perspective under which they sympathise with Giselda 
killing her daughter, regardless of whether it is fictionally true or not that she did the right 
thing. The reason why appreciators do not adopt a perspective that sympathises with Giselda 
is because they import their everyday perspective that condemns murdering one’s own 
daughter. 
Richard Moran, for example, claims that emotional responses toward imagined scenarios 
follow the emotional responses appreciators would experience when facing an actual scenario. 
In his “The expression of feeling in imagination”, he notes that there is an inherent tension in 
engaging with contrasting perspectives in fiction. While he acknowledges that the fact that a 
scenario is actual or imagined makes a difference for the appropriateness of emotions, he also 
claims that appreciators do not abstract from their actual attitudes when responding to a deviant 
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scenario in fiction. According to him, this is due to the fact that the emotional responses 
prescribed by the narrative are not part of the content of what is imagined, but part of the 
manner in which it is imagined: “The way in which [the content] is imagined, on the other 
hand, is an aspect of the activity of imagining that one is really engaged in, a fact about one’s 
real psychological life and attitudes” (Moran, 1994, 93). In this sense, appreciators import their 
attitudes during their imaginative engagement with fiction. According to his view, fictions can 
stipulate the content of what is imagined, but they cannot stipulate how one responds to what 
is imagined; appreciators import their evaluative framework because it is them responding to 
what is prescribed. Moran claims that resistance arises precisely because of the differences 
between the emotional responses that are prescribed as part of the perspective and appreciators’ 
actual commitments, and the friction this causes (Moran, 1994, 95).  
Tamar Gendler’s continuity assumption regarding what can and cannot be true in the fictional 
world has consequences for the problem of immorality and perspective as well. While the 
prescription of deviant non-evaluative attitudes does not cause imaginative resistance, a 
perspective that involves deviant moral attitudes is resisted because of the categorical nature 
of moral claims. As I said in the previous section, Gendler argues that the categorical nature of 
moral claims means that they are democratic: because they are categorical, appreciators have 
a bearing on the application of moral concepts. The categorical nature of appreciators’ moral 
beliefs means that a narrative cannot simply prescribe appreciators to hold deviant moral 
attitudes. Rather, appreciators import their actual moral attitudes during their engagement with 
fiction because they legitimately stand in the fictional world, regardless of the prescribed 
perspective. Thus, the categorical and the democratic nature of moral evaluations explain why, 
according to Gendler, appreciators are both unwilling and incapable of vividly imagining 
deviant moral propositions, that is, of adopting a perspective that endorses deviant moral claims 
(Gendler, 2006, 157).  
Gregory Currie tackles the issue of imaginative difficulties by alluding to a distinction between 
two types of imaginings: belief-like and desire-like imaginings. The adoption of a perspective 
during the imaginative engagement with fiction involves not only belief-like imaginings, but a 
desire-like component (Currie, 2002). Currie’s solution to the puzzle of imaginative resistance 
is thus twofold: appreciators resist adopting deviant perspectives in fiction because they resist 
summoning both the necessary desire-like and belief-like imaginings.  Currie begins by arguing 
that appreciators do not engage with the relevant deviant desire-like imaginings because, like 
desires, they are internally constrained due to their world-to-mind direction of fit. Desires and 
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desire-like imaginings are constrained by “a complex set of dispositions that may, perhaps, be 
thought of as higher-order desires, but that, since they constitute her basic moral character, are 
not easily changed” (Currie, 2002, 214). Appreciators thus import to the fictional world their 
evaluative framework inasmuch as “desire-like imagining remains responsive to the dictates of 
moral character” (Currie, 2002, 214). The lack of the relevant deviant desire-like imaginings 
has consequences for evaluative belief-like imaginings. While factual belief-like imaginings 
allow discontinuity with the agent’s actual beliefs, evaluative belief-like imaginings are 
internally connected to desire-like imaginings, and thus also remain responsive to the agent’s 
evaluative framework. The continuity that explains the asymmetry is, therefore, manifested not 
only in the evaluative framework that regulates desire-like imaginings, but also in that 
appreciators import evaluative belief-like imaginings via desire-like imaginings. 
Dustin Stokes (2006) rightly notes that Currie fails to explain the conceptual connection 
between morality and desire-like imaginings, as there seem to be many cases (as both Stock 
and Stokes note) where we desire what we don’t value. Instead, Stokes claims that to solve the 
puzzle of imaginative difficulties we need to focus on values expressed in second-order desires. 
Imaginative resistance is explained by appreciators’ inability to form the relevant value-like 
imaginings. Stokes argues that the reason why appreciators fail to form the relevant second-
order desire-like imaginings, or value-like imaginings, necessary for the adoption of a deviant 
perspective during our imaginative engagement with fiction is that value-like imaginings have 
a conceptual connection to actual evaluations. In Stokes view, the inability to form the value-
like imaginings thus rests on the assumption of the continuity thesis: appreciators import value-
like imaginings because they are connected to appreciator’s actual evaluative attitudes. Stokes 
argues that, contrary to belief-like imaginings, value-like imaginings have a world-to-mind 
direction of fit; this means that, contrary to belief-like imaginings, value-like imaginings are 
agent-dependent (Stokes, 2006, 397-399). This ‘egocentric motivational role’ of value-like 
imaginings causes value-like imaginings to be guided by the agent’s actual evaluative 
framework. Imaginative difficulties arise when engaging with deviant perspectives in fiction 
because appreciators import their actual evaluative framework. Now, as Stokes rightly notes, 
if this was the whole story, appreciators would be incapable of adopting different perspectives 
in fiction, as their make-believe perspective would always follow their actual perspective. So, 
it is important to note that appreciators are capable of forming value-like imaginings that differ 
from their own, which is why they are capable of perspective-taking in their encounter with 
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fiction. But, when it comes to radically deviant value-like imaginings, the agent’s actual 
evaluative framework is given precedence over the prescribed evaluations (Stokes, 2006, 400). 
 
2.3 Continuity explained 
So far I have tried to show that the accounts that assume an asymmetry between our 
engagement with evaluative and non-evaluative deviance in fiction assume what I have called 
‘The continuity thesis’. As I said, the continuity thesis can be formulated in terms of the import 
principle: there is continuity in appreciators’ evaluative attitudes because they are imported to 
the fictional world. The continuity thesis explains the asymmetry in the engagement with 
deviant evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction in terms of the asymmetry in the 
workings of the import principle. While appreciators do not necessarily import the background 
information regarding non-evaluative matters, they do import their evaluative framework.  
However, those accounts that assume the continuity thesis to explain imaginative difficulties 
in our engagement with counter-moral fictions still need to explain why the rules of import are 
different for evaluative and non-evaluative cases. This section examines two different 
arguments that can be adduced to support the supposed asymmetry in the workings of the 
import principle that lies at the core of the continuity thesis assumed by the solutions to 
resistance phenomena examined so far. The first argues that the asymmetry in the import 
principle is caused by the implications of assenting to deviant evaluations in fiction. This first 
attempt to justify the continuity assumption depends on the assumption of a further asymmetry 
in the export mechanism. I will show that this argument depends on response moralism to 
justify the continuity thesis. The second argues that evaluations are agent-dependent. This 
argument claims that appreciators import their evaluative attitudes because evaluations are 
egocentric. 
 
2.3.1 Continuity and response moralism13  
The continuity thesis explains the asymmetry in the engagement with deviant evaluative and 
non-evaluative scenarios in fiction in terms of the asymmetry in the workings of the import 
principle: appreciators import their evaluative attitudes but not (necessarily) their non-
                                                          
13 Chapter 6 argues against response moralism in detail. In this section I only aim to show why response moralism 
does not provide the necessary grounds to defend the continuity thesis. 
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evaluative attitudes. However, the accounts examined in this chapter still need to explain why 
the rules of import are different for evaluative and non-evaluative cases. Some of the authors 
discussed above explain the asymmetry in the import principle in terms of the implications of 
assenting to deviant moral evaluations in fiction.  
Walton argues for the continuity of appreciators’ evaluative attitudes by claiming that 
imagining can sometimes cause appreciators to succumb to what they regard as pernicious 
because imagining can lead to believing. But in addition to the risk of confusion, Walton claims 
that imagining a reprehensible view is dangerous because it would imply giving it more 
credence than it deserves (Walton, 2006; 1994). This why appreciators do not accept fictional 
worlds differing from the actual world in evaluative matters.  
For Gendler, on the other hand, the asymmetry in the import principle is explained by a ‘pop 
out’ effect found in evaluative scenarios. The categorical nature of moral claims is manifested 
in a ‘pop out’ effect in which “(…) the reader takes the author to be asking her to believe a 
corresponding proposition p that concerns the actual world” (Gendler, 2006, 159). In Gendler’s 
view, the fact that evaluations are categorical means that assenting to an invitation to adopt a 
deviant make-believe moral outlook implies assenting to an invitation to adopt a deviant real-
world moral outlook. 
Finally, Currie seems to argue that the agent-dependent nature of desire-like imaginings, and 
their link to the moral character, means that allowing a deviant desire-like imagining would 
have consequences for the agent’s actual moral character. Deviant non-evaluative belief-like 
imaginings are quarantined in the fictional world because they are externally determined; the 
mind-to-world direction of fit would not allow appreciators to export them to the actual world. 
The agent-dependency of desire-like imaginings, on the other hand, means that a deviant 
desire-like imagining would somehow track an actual deviant desire that conflicts with the 
agent’s moral character: if appreciators experience deviant desire-like imaginings is because 
they somehow hold deviant desires. 
What is interesting to note, then, is that these attempts to justify the continuity thesis have in 
common the assumption of a further asymmetry of a closely related sort. In the accounts 
discussed above, the asymmetry found in the import principle is meant to be explained by a 
more fundamental asymmetry in the export mechanism.  
The export mechanism refers to the processes that allow appreciators to learn information about 
the actual world from their engagement with fiction. Gendler explains that this export 
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mechanism can work in two different ways: appreciators can export things that the storyteller 
intentionally and consciously imported, thus gaining knowledge by testimony; or appreciators 
can export things “whose truth becomes apparent as a result of thinking about the story itself” 
(Gendler, 2000, 76). It is relevant to note, however, that just as the import principle in non-
evaluative scenarios is constrained by what is prescribed by the narrative, the export 
mechanism for non-evaluative claims is modulated by appreciators’ actual beliefs. This means 
that the export mechanism is neutralized if and when appreciators believe something to be 
false. 
If, however, the export principle is meant to explain the asymmetry between evaluative and 
non-evaluative scenarios found in the import principle, this cannot be the whole story. The 
workings of the export mechanism also present an asymmetry for evaluative and non-
evaluative cases; the asymmetry in the import principle corresponds to this asymmetry in the 
export mechanism. Evaluative scenarios are different in terms of the export mechanism because 
they seem to lack what Gendler calls a quarantining feature: appraisals in fiction are not 
neutralised by appreciators’ contrasting evaluative attitudes. As such, evaluations found in 
fictional narratives are not limited to the fictional context, but behave like actual appraisals. 
While deviant non-evaluative propositions are taken to be a prescription to make-believe, 
deviant evaluative scenarios present a ‘clamour for exportation’ and are taken to be an 
invitation to believe. That is to say that deviant evaluations in fiction are taken as a mandate 
for exportation, even when they contrast with appreciators’ actual beliefs.  
The rules governing the export mechanism are different for evaluative and non-evaluative cases 
because in the former, knowledge of the deviant nature of the perspective is not enough to 
neutralize the presumed invitations to believe rather than make-believe. Imaginative resistance 
supposedly occurs because appreciators treat the deviant fictional evaluative prescriptions as 
actual invitations to hold an attitude that demands to be exported. For this reason appreciators 
import their evaluative framework, and their attitudes follow the attitudes they would hold in 
an actual scenario.  
However, even if it is true that when a narrative prescribes a deviant evaluation it should be 
taken as a prescription to believe, rather than make-believe, the standard export mechanism 
could still save appreciators from responding to the call: appreciators could neutralise an 
invitation to export a fictional prescription when they believe it to be false or inappropriate. 
Even if understood as an invitation to believe, rather than make-believe, it is not clear why the 
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invitation cannot be quarantined by the export mechanism, as it is the case for non-evaluative 
cases. If the possibility to export information from the fictional world in factual matters is 
neutralized by the belief in the falsity of the claim, it is not clear why appreciators would not 
be able to engage with what they regard as deviant evaluations in fiction if they take them to 
be quarantined in the fictional world. So, in principle, the invitation to hold a deviant moral 
belief could be ignored precisely because appreciators are aware of its deviant character, and 
it could simply be regarded as an invitation to make-believe.14 
It seems that to explain the asymmetry in the export mechanism for evaluative and non-
evaluative cases, continuity theorists need to defend the claim that deviant evaluative 
imaginings cannot be quarantined as simply make-believe. To do this, they would need to argue 
that the make-believe itself breaks the quarantining effect and implies exportation. This means 
that continuity theorists would have to show that the fundamental asymmetry in the export 
mechanism, that justifies the asymmetry found in the import principle, stands because merely 
make-believing a deviant evaluation already implies the participation in an actual deviant 
evaluation. 
Thus, one way to defend the continuity thesis is to allude to response moralism. Response 
moralism argues that our responses to fictional scenarios can be evaluated as bad to feel or 
wrong; that is, response moralism argues that some instances of make-believe themselves are 
bad or wrong. The continuity thesis would need to argue with response moralism that fictional 
deviant evaluations are special because assenting to them during an imaginative engagement is 
wrong in itself. Response moralism argues that deviant imaginings are bad or wrong in 
themselves because assenting to the deviant evaluations in fiction implies assenting to actual 
deviant evaluations. In this sense continuity theorists could claim that deviant evaluations in 
fiction are exported because they imply deviant evaluations in actual scenarios. Continuity 
theorists would then be able to argue that appreciators prioritise their evaluative framework 
because they resist actually embracing what they regard as reprehensible views. Imaginative 
resistance would be explained because adopting a perspective that involves deviant attitudes 
would imply holding deviant attitudes toward actual scenarios. 
To explain why deviant evaluations in fiction imply actual deviant evaluations, Allan Hazlett 
turns to what he calls the similarity assumption. Hazlett claims that the engagement with fiction 
                                                          
14 It is important to note that imaginative resistance would only arise for those appreciators who held moral beliefs 
contradicted by the fictional world, and who are aware that the perspective prescribed by the fictional world is 
deviant. 
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can only function under the assumption that the fictional world is similar to the actual world.  
The similarity assumption specifies that fictional worlds are similar to the actual world in 
certain aspects. These aspects form a similarity class which “(…) defines the domain for which 
the aforementioned assumption of similarity is warranted, for a fiction f” (Hazlett, 2009, 251). 
When appraisals are part of the similarity class, reacting to a deviant perspective in fiction is 
tantamount to reacting to its actual counterpart. Response moralism claims that the restrictions 
to the export mechanism fail (thus eliminating the quarantining effect) not because the make-
believe response is wrong, but because make-believe responses “(…) are also responses to real 
events and people. In as much as our emotional responses to fictions are directed at reality, 
they may be morally assessed. An emotional reaction is never wrong, however, merely in virtue 
of how it is directed at merely fictional events and characters” (Hazlett, 2009, 253). 
 
2.3.2 Continuity and value-like imaginings 
As we saw before, Dustin Stokes claims that we encounter problems when engaging with 
counter-moral scenarios in fiction because we fail to form the relevant value-like imaginings. 
As such there is an asymmetry between belief-like imaginings and value-like imaginings 
(Stokes, 2006, 394). Value-like imaginings have the relevant conceptual link to moral character 
to guarantee that when appreciators find deviant evaluations in fiction they are unable to form 
the relevant value-like imaginings, and thus import their actual evaluative attitudes. Stokes 
claims that the reason why we cannot form radically deviant value-like imaginings is because 
of their egocentric nature. Contrary to belief-like imaginings, which are determined by fictional 
prescriptions, value-like imaginings follow the agent’s actual value system. The argument that 
needs to be advanced to back the continuity thesis, therefore, has to do with the nature of the 
value system and second-order desires.  
Following David Lewis, Stokes argues that desires can be both de dicto, directed at the world, 
or de se, or directed at oneself, in terms of their intentionality. Values, or second-order desires, 
on the other hand, are always de se: “They are egocentric desires that one have a certain (first-
order) desire. (And they are egocentric irrespective of whether the embedded desire is de dicto 
or de se.)” (Stokes, 2006, 396) And, if this is the case for values, this will also be the case for 
value-like imaginings. As such, “all value-like imagining is self-directed”(Stokes, 2006, 396).  
In addition to the egocentric nature of value-like imaginings, Stokes accentuates the difference 
in the direction of fit between belief and desire to show that values, or second-order desires, 
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are not constrained by the fictional world, but by appreciators’ actual value systems. It is the 
direction of fit that determines the normative constraints of belief-like and value-like 
imaginings. Since beliefs have a representative function, they have a mind-to-world direction 
of fit. Therefore they are normatively constrained by the world. So, in the case of make-believe, 
belief-like imaginings are normatively constrained by the fictional world and by what the 
narrative prescribes. In contrast, values, like desires, have a world-to-mind direction of fit. As 
such, they are constrained by the agent’s value-system. This value system refers to “an agent’s 
evaluative profile or value set, constituted by all of the evaluative attitudes and dispositions of 
the agent: her moral character, aesthetic tastes, sensitivities and dispositions, desires, likes, 
dislikes, and so on” (Stokes, 2006, 398). The agent-dependent nature of values is present in 
their make-believe counterparts. Value-like imaginings are constrained by the agent’s actual 
value system. It can still be argued, as Stokes notes, that first-order desires don’t always follow 
our value-system. The egocentric nature of values, however, causes them to be more strongly 
constrained by the value system (Stokes, 2006, 399). 
Stokes also notes that, just as beliefs are subjectively constrained in some ways, desires are 
objectively constrained in some ways (Stokes, 2006, 398 (footnote)). This is what allows for 
value-like imaginings to be “constrained by value-systems and by the evaluative facts of the 
story” (Stokes, 2006, 399). As said before, he argues that if value-like imaginings always 
followed appreciators’ actual values, engaging with different perspectives in fiction would be 
impossible, since they would always import their own perspective to engage with what is being 
narrated. Since appreciators are capable of perspective taking during their engagement with 
fiction, it is possible to background the value system to “imaginatively ‘try on’ different 
perspectives” (Stokes, 2006, 400). If, however, the different perspective radically contrasts 
with the agent’s evaluative framework, the latter is prioritised. According to Stokes, 
nevertheless, what is considered as radically contrasting is something that remains subject to 
‘reader relativity’; it depends on the strength and salience of the agent’s values, on different 
conceptual associations, or even on different imaginative ability (Stokes, 2006, 403-403). 
 
2.4 Against the continuity thesis 
So far I have showed that those accounts that claim that imaginative resistance arises due to 
the evaluative nature of the scenarios depend on the continuity thesis insofar as they try to 
explain the asymmetry between our engagement with evaluative and non-evaluative deviance 
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by claiming that appreciators import their evaluative framework. However, in what follows I 
argue that the continuity thesis, and therefore the solutions to the puzzle of imaginative 
resistance that rely on it, is flawed on two counts. First, the continuity assumption that depends 
on the import of appreciators’ evaluative attitudes is unexplained; therefore, there is no reason 
to defend an asymmetry in our engagement with deviant evaluative and non-evaluative 
scenarios in fiction. Second, the continuity thesis fails to account for the diversity of counter-
moral fictions; in fact, the diagnoses that assume the continuity thesis are proven wrong by the 
different types of counter-moral fictions because the features they identify as the causes of 
imaginative problems are present in narratives that don’t cause imaginative resistance. These 
failings of the accounts that assume the continuity thesis are relevant because if we want to 
examine how appreciators engage with counter-moral fictions, as is the aim of this work, we 
have to be able to explain what happens both in those cases where imaginative difficulties arise 
and in those cases where they do not. 
 
2.4.1 Assuming the continuity thesis is unjustified 
I have argued that the accounts that claim that imaginative resistance is caused by the evaluative 
nature of the scenarios assume the continuity thesis. According to these views, imaginative 
difficulties arise because appreciators import their evaluative attitudes in their engagement with 
fiction. But in the arguments advanced by the accounts discussed above, it is never clear why 
it is assumed that appreciators import their evaluative framework, thus provoking difficulties 
in the imaginative engagement with deviant evaluations in fiction. To argue that evaluations in 
fiction follow the audience’s actual evaluative attitudes one needs to show that there is 
something special about evaluative attitudes, something that differentiates them from non-
evaluative attitudes. However, what I argue in what follows is that neither response moralism 
nor value-like imaginings can explain why the evaluative framework is meant to be exported, 
and therefore they cannot explain the asymmetry in our engagement with evaluative and non-
evaluative deviance in fiction. 
 
Against response moralism15 
                                                          
15 In what follows I present a very brief criticism on Hazlett’s version on response moralism. Chapter six explores 
other arguments in favour of response moralism, and shows why they are flawed.  
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As we saw above, one way to defend the asymmetry in the workings of the import principle is 
to allude to a further asymmetry found in the export mechanism. Deviant evaluations in fiction 
are such that they are exported just by participating in the make-believe. Appreciators thus 
import their evaluative attitudes because of the implications of assenting to deviant evaluations 
in fiction: by adopting a deviant perspective in fiction, appreciators assent to an invitation to 
hold an actual deviant perspective, thus exporting a make-believe moral outlook to a real-world 
moral outlook. Make-believe responses violate the quarantining mechanisms because make-
believe responses are already bad to feel or wrong. Appreciators import their evaluative 
attitudes to avoid holding deviant attitudes that make them morally accountable. In this sense, 
a version of the continuity thesis depends on response moralism. 
Response moralism, however, depends on the equivalence of actual responses and make-
believe responses to argue that the make-believe responses themselves violate the quarantining 
effect of fiction. And, as we saw, in Hazlett’s account this equivalence depends on evaluations 
being part of the similarity class, that is, the aspects in which the fictional world is similar to 
the actual world. The equivalence of actual and make-believe responses is only guaranteed in 
cases where the objects of the appraisals are part of the similarity class. However, the extension 
of the similarity class is arbitrarily determined in Hazlett’s account. He does not present an 
argument for when deviant moral scenarios should be taken to be part of the similarity class. 
And thus, there is no reason to think that appreciators’ responses violate the quarantine.   
It is not clear if the similarity class is determined by the author or by the readers. If the similarity 
class is determined by the author, it is still not clear why appreciators would not be able to 
regard the inclusion of the object of a deviant evaluation in the similarity class as a mistake. It 
seems that in cases of factual deviance, appreciators are capable of ignoring imprecise claims 
that were intended to be part of the similarity class; in cases where authors make factual 
mistakes, knowledgeable readers can simply eliminate the fictional propositions from the 
similarity class, without getting confused. So it is not clear why this would not be the case for 
evaluative deviance. If appreciators regard a fictional evaluation as deviant, it is precisely 
because they do not think the evaluation actually stands; deviant evaluations stand out because 
they contrast with appreciators’ understanding of the world. Therefore, it is not clear why, 
when encountering a deviant evaluation in fiction directed at an object that was included as 
part of the similarity class by the author, readers would not simply eliminate it from the 
similarity class.  
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The same can be said if the similarity class is specified by the audience. If it is the audience 
who determines which objects are part of the similarity class during their engagement with 
fiction, and audience members recognise deviant evaluations as deviant, it seems clear that they 
would not include the object of the evaluation in the similarity class. Again, if appreciators 
regard a fictional evaluation as deviant, it is precisely because they do not think the evaluation 
actually stands. And so appreciators would not regard the object of the deviant evaluation as 
belonging to the similarity class precisely because they realise the response is inappropriate.   
Without the inclusion of the objects of deviant evaluations in the similarity class, response 
moralism cannot claim that the responses to fictional events are actually responses to real 
events; and, in turn, it cannot claim that make-believe responses to deviant evaluations in 
fiction violate the quarantine because they are bad or wrong themselves. And this is the same 
problem found in the accounts discussed above: it is not clear why evaluations in fiction 
constitute a special type of fictional prescription, why evaluations are part of the information 
that is imported to the fictional world, or why they are exported. 
In the arguments advanced by the accounts discussed above, it is never clear why the evaluative 
framework is imported, thus provoking difficulties in the imaginative engagement with deviant 
evaluations in fiction. To argue that evaluations in fiction follow the audience’s actual 
evaluative attitudes one needs to show that there is something special about evaluative 
attitudes. As argued in the second section of the chapter, these accounts of imaginative 
resistance seem to point to the export mechanism as the reason why evaluations require a 
special consideration in imaginative engagement. But, once again, it is not clear why 
evaluations would imply a special kind of export mechanism that is unable to quarantine what 
is recognised as deviant, as is the case with other instances of non-realistic fiction.  
I have tried to show that the ‘clamour for exportation’, and therefore the continuity thesis, could 
work under the assumption made by Hazlett’s response moralism: that the assent to a fictional 
deviant evaluation entails the implicit assent to a claim regarding the actual world. But the 
problem is that Hazlett offers no argument for why the objects of deviant evaluations are part 
of the similarity class. And this problem is mirrored in the export mechanism. The export 
mechanism dictated that appreciators can export something from the fictional world unless they 
believe it to be false (that is, unless they know the scenario is not part of the similarity class). 
Precisely because of this, the export mechanism can only apply for the similarity class. And, 
as shown before, response moralism offers no argument to claim that deviant moral evaluations 
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are always part of it, and, therefore, to claim that deviant moral scenarios present a ‘clamour 
for exportation’. Hazlett is right in claiming that the fact that fictions sometimes say something 
about the world should not be controversial, but what I do believe to be controversial is to claim 
that, when it comes to deviant moral claims, fictional narratives always aim at saying 
something about the world, and that therefore our reactions to deviant moral claims in fiction 
are always reactions to actual deviant moral claims. To provide no argument as to why 
evaluations have special implications for the similarity class, the export mechanism, and the 
import principle is to beg the question. 
 
Against value-like imaginings 
As we saw before, Stokes argues that to explain imaginative difficulties we need to examine 
value-like imaginings that are inherently linked to moral evaluations. According to Stokes’ 
account, imaginative resistance arises because appreciators cannot form the relevant value-like 
imaginings. Contra Currie, Stokes argues that appreciators can form desire-like imaginings 
during their engagement with deviant perspectives in fiction. In fact, engaging with a deviant 
perspective in fiction would be like actually desiring something we don’t value. And this is 
because, although desires and desire-like imaginings, are agent-dependent due to their world-
to-mind direction of fit, they are not necessarily constrained by an agent’s value system. So, 
while they are normatively evaluable in terms of their consistency, Stokes claims that “We are 
not very good at managing our desires. (…) We notoriously have desires that are inconsistent 
with the rest of our goals, projects, and other desires” (Stokes, 2006, 398). 
Values, on the other hand, are not only normatively evaluable, like first order desires, but are 
in fact constrained by the agent’s value system. These constraints cannot simply be caused by 
the agent-dependent nature of second order-desires, as this characteristic is shared by first-
order desires. Values are constrained by the agent’s value system because they are always 
egocentric. Even when the embedded desires can be de dicto or de se, values, or second-order 
desires are always de se (Stokes, 2006, 399). Because they are egocentric, values connect 
directly to the agent’s value system. The continuity in appreciators’ evaluative framework 
during their engagement with fiction is explained, in Stockes’ account, by the egocentric nature 
of values. While desire-like imaginings are not constrained by the agent’s actual value system, 
value-like imaginings refer directly to the agent’s value system for normative constraints. 
Appreciators fail to assent to the prescription of deviant evaluations as true in the fictional 
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world because they cannot form value-like imaginings that radically differ from their value 
system. 
Stokes seems to argue that values and value systems are different: the latter normatively 
constrain the former. Value systems must, therefore, be constituted by something other than 
just values (although it might include them). Stokes includes as part of the value system “all of 
the evaluative attitudes and dispositions of the agent: her moral character, aesthetic tastes, 
sensitivities and dispositions, desires, likes, dislikes, and so on” (Stokes, 2006, 398). But he 
fails to mention that value systems must also include a reference to relevant beliefs. Moral 
beliefs, for instance, seem to be an essential part of an agent’s moral character. So, while it 
might be true that values are agent-dependent and egocentric, it could be argued that at least 
part of the value system has a mind-to-world direction of fit.  
Stokes recognises that, like beliefs, belief-like imaginings have a mind-to-world direction of 
fit. If at least part of the value system is constituted by beliefs, it doesn’t seem clear why in 
their engagement with fiction appreciators do not form the relevant moral belief-like 
imaginings to modify the constraints so that the agent can form the relevant deviant value-like 
imaginings. Stokes does recognise, as we saw before, that appreciators can background their 
value system to allow for moderate deviant value-like imaginings; but radically deviant 
prescriptions are always resisted to prioritise the agent’s actual value system.  
It is not clear, however, what constitutes a radical value-like imagining. But even more so, it is 
not clear why (certain) beliefs within the value system do not allow fictional distortion, while 
factual beliefs do. Stokes would have to argue why there can’t be something like a fictional 
value system that is constituted by value-like and belief-like imaginings; or he would have to 
argue why value systems are off limits during the imaginative engagement. So, in the end, 
Stokes’ account assumes the continuity thesis inasmuch as he assumes the continuity of the 
value system, but he fails to argue for it. 
 
2.4.2 The continuity thesis and the complexity of counter-moral fictions  
In addition to the problems examined above, the solutions that assume the continuity thesis are 
unable to account for the complexity of our imaginative engagement with different types of 
counter-moral fictions. The examples advanced in the previous chapter show that audiences 
are able and willing to engage with morally deviant perspectives in certain types of fictional 
narratives but not others. Appreciators often feel a strong sympathy for immoral characters, 
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they applaud immoral decisions, they overlook immoral actions. If the accounts of imaginative 
resistance that focus on the evaluative nature of the resisted scenarios were right, and 
imaginative difficulties were caused by the nature of evaluations, appreciators would resist 
participation in all instances of counter-moral fictions. And this is not the case. A satisfactory 
account of our imaginative engagement with fiction needs to explain both the cases that cause 
imaginative difficulties and those that do not. And the fact is that the continuity thesis cannot 
account for the variability of resistance phenomena. In this sense, I believe it is possible to say 
that the diagnoses of the causes of imaginative resistance are wrong: the features they present 
as the causes of imaginative resistance are found in narratives that do not cause imaginative 
problems.  
One of the problems is that a big part of the discussion has been framed in terms of clear and 
explicit propositions in the narrative that are resisted. But this approach fails to acknowledge 
that fictional narratives prescribe perspectives and not simply propositions. Continuity theorists 
ignore the fictional context in which the deviant evaluations and deviant perspectives are 
prescribed. Kathleen Stock (2005) and Cain Todd (2009) both emphasise the importance of 
context in imaginative engagement. They are right in noting that the original formulation of 
the puzzle was highly misleading in presenting only isolated propositions. The problem with 
these examples is that they are not really representative of what we would expect from a 
fictional scenario. Fictions are rarely made of just one sentence. Fictional propositions are 
always presented within a fictional context. It is within this context that appreciators accept, or 
reject them. It could be true that if an appreciator encountered the isolated proposition “Justice 
is served when a criminal is tortured”, she would be likely to reject it. However, when she 
encounters the same implicit attitude in the fictional context of Lady Vengeance, it would seem 
that the implicit proposition is accepted as fitting; even more so, she is likely to respond 
accordingly by sympathizing with the perpetrators.  
Nevertheless, the importance of context for the imaginative engagement with deviance in 
fiction is not exclusive to evaluative propositions, and thus it does not support the supposed 
asymmetry between evaluative and non-evaluative cases. Appreciators need the relevant 
context to imagine deviant factual propositions, such as “The rabbit took a watch out of his 
waistcoat pocket”. Stock notes that this is reason enough to think that the difference between 
factual and evaluative propositions, established from the first writings on imaginative 
resistance, is not as straightforward as authors made it seem. Thus imaginative failure does not 
occur whenever we encounter a deviant evaluation in a fictional context, but rather when we 
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cannot identify the fictional context that justifies such an evaluation. Even in those cases where 
fictions are made of just one sentence, like Moterroso’s “Upon awakening, the dinosaur was 
still there.”, appreciators are still required to come up with the relevant context that could justify 
an otherwise nonsensical proposition. And even without an explicit narrative context, 
appreciators would most likely find the proposition in an actual context (for instance, finding 
the proposition in a book of fiction, the author’s belonging to a certain literary movement, etc.) 
that would encourage appreciators to come up with a fictional context to make sense of the 
proposition. In the same light, if appreciators were presented with a fiction made up of only 
“In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing. After all, it was a girl” in the relevant context 
(for instance, finding the proposition in a short story compilation), they would be required to 
come up with the necessary context before resisting the proposition altogether. Stock notes that 
even Gendler accepts that the relevant context (if the baby was a changeling, for instance) 
would make Giselda’s decision a sensible thing (Stock, 2005) (Gendler, 2000). 
The use of such short examples in the original literature on imaginative resistance not only 
leaves aside the context, but also the aesthetic properties of the fictional scenario that help in 
establishing the prescribed perspective. As said in the first chapter, appreciators do not merely 
respond to what is represented, but to how it is represented. The modes of representation and 
the way in which they manipulate appreciators’ responses are particularly important for 
narratives that present deviance. But, again, I do not think this is something exclusive to 
evaluative propositions. Appreciators often engage with radically deviant factual propositions 
in fiction because of how propositions are presented. For example, Julio Cortázar is famous for 
introducing radically deviant fictional worlds (like a man throwing up bunnies in his short story 
“Letter to a young lady in Paris”) as if they were mundane: the utterly detailed narration of the 
otherwise realistic world is not disrupted by the revelation of the fantastic element, and the 
narrator shares the details without any signs of bewilderment. This is far from the only resource 
available for artists, and I believe we have reasons to think that appreciators are capable of 
engaging with deviant evaluative worlds for the same reasons they accept such deviant worlds 
as those created by Cortázar. When the relevant context has been provided and the right 
aesthetic properties are put into place, the assent to the deviant proposition might come 
naturally16. 
                                                          
16 Shen-yi Liao examines the phenomenon of ‘hermeneutic recalibration’. This refers to “a common and non-
puzzling literary technique to jar the reader temporarily and force her to reconsider the work in response” (Liao, 
2013). He notes that many cases that were originally thought to cause imaginative resistance, are actually cases 
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2.5 An eliminativist account? 
As I have tried to show, the problem with the continuity thesis is that it fails to explain why we 
should assume that evaluations in fiction are special, and, therefore, that our imaginative 
engagement with them is different. On the contrary, it seems that an account that claims that 
the import principle does not behave differently in evaluative and non-evaluative cases is more 
attractive. A discontinuity thesis would claim that both in evaluative and non-evaluative cases 
appreciators import their attitudes to the fictional narrative unless it directly contrasts with what 
is prescribed by the fictional perspective. That is, appreciators prioritise the fictional 
prescriptions during their imaginative engagement. Most importantly, a discontinuity thesis 
would claim that appreciators’ evaluative framework is guided by the prescribed perspective.  
In the following chapter I defend a discontinuity thesis that can explain our engagement with 
different types of counter-moral fictions. However, I do not believe that a discontinuity thesis 
should support an eliminativist account that denies resistance phenomena altogether. Like I 
said before, a successful account of our engagement with counter-moral fictions needs to be 
able to explain cases that do not cause imaginative difficulties and cases that do. In the previous 
chapter I noted that I find difficulties in engaging with narratives like The Wire, and that I 
absolutely refuse to engage with fictions like The Birth of a Nation or The Clansman. In this 
sense, an eliminativist account of imaginative resistance that denies an asymmetry between 
evaluative and non-evaluative cases also fails to account for the complexity of our engagement 
with counter-moral fictions. Under an eliminativist assumption, appreciators should assent to 
deviant prescriptions once the right context and the right aesthetic properties are put in place. 
Nevertheless there are cases in which appreciators overlook fictional prescriptions in favour of 
their actual evaluative framework, where imaginative resistance actually takes place; and this 
phenomena definitely undermine an eliminativist account.  
To explain resistance phenomena it is important to note that the fictional context is not just 
constituted by fictional prescriptions and aesthetic properties. As I argued in the first chapter, 
authorial intentions and the actual context in which fictions are produced have a bearing on the 
classification and the reception of fictional narratives. The distinction between fictional and 
                                                          
where the audience is capable of making sense of an originally shocking proposition by identifying the relevant 
fictional context.  
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actual immorality is of utmost relevance to determine why certain morally deviant scenarios 
cause imaginative difficulties, while others do not.  
Cases of actual immorality present what Gendler calls a ‘clamour for exportation’, insofar as 
we can identify an underlying authorial intention to make a claim about the actual world. These 
are cases where imaginative difficulties take place. Contrary to what Gendler argues, this 
‘clamour for exportation’ has nothing to do with evaluative nature of the scenarios. Instead, the 
invitation to believe, rather than make-believe, that appreciators refuse is found in the 
narrative’s extra-fictional perspective. Instances of actual immorality, such as Manhattan or 
Gone with the Wind, lack the necessary elements to quarantine the prescriptions to the fictional 
world. But what is important to note is that this is caused by the actual attitudes found in the 
works, and not by the special nature of evaluative propositions. As I said in the previous 
chapter, instances of actual immorality prescribe a real-world moral outlook in that they include 
an immoral extra-fictional perspective. And works of fiction that are instances of actual 
immorality present a ‘clamour for exportation’ not in virtue of the evaluative nature of the 
deviant perspective, but in virtue of the fact they include an extra-fictional perspective that 
prescribes an immoral real-world outlook. 
Instances of fictional immorality, on the other hand, do not present a ‘clamour for exportation’ 
insofar as they only include a counter-moral fictional perspective that prescribes only a make-
believe moral outlook. Because appreciators realize that merely fictional immorality does not 
violate the quarantining effect of fiction, they do not import their evaluative framework. In 
turn, they do not experience imaginative difficulties, and they can adopt a deviant fictional 
perspective with the corresponding deviant responses. 
I believe that imaginative resistance to evaluative scenarios in fiction can therefore be 
explained by alluding to the distinction between fictional and actual immorality, and fictional 
and extra-fictional perspectives. Appreciators encounter imaginative difficulties because they 
can identify a deviant extra-fictional perspective in instances of actual immorality. Precisely 
because these narratives include immoral real-world outlooks, appreciators cannot ignore 
moral considerations as they do in instances of fictional immorality. The distinction between 
fictional and actual immorality has thus implications for both the import principle and the 
export mechanism. Appreciators realize the quarantining effect of fiction is violated due to the 
‘clamour of exportation’ of actual immorality; they import their evaluative framework in those 
narratives where they can identify an extra-fictional perspective that prescribes a deviant real-
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world moral outlook; and thus they experience imaginative difficulties when trying to engage 
with these morally deviant scenarios. 
 
In this chapter I have showed that the continuity thesis found in much of the literature on the 
problems of imaginative resistance cannot account for our engagement with different types of 
counter-moral fictions. The diversity of counter-moral fictions shows that in some cases 
appreciators favour their actual evaluative attitudes, which stand in the way of participation 
with counter-moral perspectives in fiction. But it also shows that in some other cases 
appreciators’ make-believe moral outlook follows what is prescribed by the narrative. Because 
part of the aim of this thesis is to examine how appreciators engage with immorality in fiction 
it is important to explain what happens in both cases. I have offered an explanation of the causes 
of resistance phenomena by alluding to the distinction between fictional and actual immorality, 
and between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives. In the next chapter I explore a 
discontinuity thesis that can explain what happens in those cases where appreciators engage 
with immorality in fiction by adopting counter-moral perspectives. 
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3. The Discontinuity Thesis 
 
The examples examined in chapter one showed that appreciators engage in different ways with 
different types of counter-moral fictions. A satisfactory account of our engagement with 
immorality in fiction, therefore, needs to be able to explain why different types of counter-
moral content elicit different types of responses from appreciators. In the previous chapter I 
argued that the continuity thesis cannot account for these differences. I claimed that the 
continuity thesis is present in those solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance that assume 
there is an asymmetry between our engagement with evaluative and non-evaluative deviance 
in fiction. The continuity thesis attempts to explain this assumed asymmetry by claiming that 
appreciators import their evaluative framework during their imaginative engagement.  
However, I have showed that the continuity thesis and the accounts that rely on this continuity 
assumption are flawed on two counts. First, these accounts give no arguments for why we 
should think that appreciators import their evaluative attitudes whenever they encounter 
evaluative deviance in fiction; and, therefore, there is no reason to think there is an asymmetry 
between deviant evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction. I argued that the accounts 
that claim that imaginative resistance is caused by the evaluative nature of the scenarios assume 
the continuity thesis: appreciators import their evaluative attitudes in their engagement with 
fiction. But in the arguments advanced by the accounts discussed in chapter two, it is never 
clear why the evaluative framework is imported, thus causing imaginative resistance. To argue 
that evaluations in fiction follow the audience’s actual evaluative attitudes one needs to show 
that there is something special about evaluative attitudes. I concluded that neither response 
moralism nor value-like imaginings can explain the supposed asymmetry in our engagement 
with evaluative and non-evaluative deviance in fiction.  
Second, I argued that the diagnoses of the puzzle of imaginative resistance that assume the 
continuity thesis are proven wrong by our engagement with different types of counter-moral 
fictions. If the accounts of imaginative resistance that focus on the evaluative nature of the 
resisted scenarios were right, and imaginative difficulties were caused by the nature of 
evaluations, appreciators would resist participation in all instances of counter-moral fictions. 
And this is not the case. Again, a satisfactory account of our imaginative engagement with 
fiction needs to explain both the cases that cause imaginative difficulties and those that do not. 
And the fact is that the continuity thesis cannot account for the variability of resistance 
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phenomena. In this sense, I believe it is possible to say that  the diagnoses of the causes of 
imaginative resistance are wrong: the features they present as the causes of imaginative barriers 
are found in narratives that do not cause imaginative problems. 
If the continuity thesis fails to explain why we should think that evaluations in fiction are 
special and why our engagement with them is different, it seems that an account that claims 
that the import principle does not behave differently in evaluative and non-evaluative cases is 
more attractive. By the end of the previous chapter I pointed to a discontinuity thesis that would 
claim that both in evaluative and non-evaluative cases appreciators import their attitudes to the 
fictional narrative unless it directly contrasts with what is prescribed by the fictional 
perspective. However, I also noted that even if the discontinuity thesis does not assume an 
asymmetry between evaluative and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction, it would still need to 
account for those cases of counter-moral fictions that do trigger imaginative difficulties in 
appreciators. That is, the discontinuity thesis needs to be able to account for variations in our 
engagement with different types of counter-moral content in fictional narratives.  
This chapter argues for a discontinuity thesis that can explain how appreciators engage with 
the diversity of counter-moral fictions explored in the first chapter. The main aim of this chapter 
is to determine how and why, in instances of fictional immorality, appreciators do not import 
their evaluative framework, and to explore how audiences can engage with radically different 
moral outlooks in these cases. While it does not assume an asymmetry between evaluative and 
non-evaluative scenarios in fiction, I argue that the discontinuity thesis does assume an 
asymmetry between fictional and actual immorality in fiction. This asymmetry allows us to 
explain why certain morally deviant scenarios in fiction cause imaginative difficulties, while 
others do not. The discontinuity thesis thus claims that appreciators do not necessarily import 
their evaluative attitudes; and that the import principle that mandates appreciators to favour 
their evaluative attitudes over the fictional prescriptions in some cases is sensitive to the 
distinction between fictional and actual immorality. That is, the discontinuity thesis claims that 
there is variability in the workings of the import principle, but that this variability is not 
determined by the evaluative nature of certain scenarios, but by the fictional/actual distinction.  
I explore the notion of fictional context as that which allows appreciators to determine whether 
a counter-moral fiction constitutes an instance of fictional or actual immorality. The 
discontinuity thesis that I defend in what follows establishes that once the relevant fictional 
context is provided, and appreciators are sure that the narrative prescribes a counter-moral 
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make-believe outlook exclusively, they adopt what they would normally regard as deviant 
attitudes. The discontinuity thesis thus allows for the fictional endorsement of the deviant 
responses to the counter-moral content of the narrative. In this sense I argue that appreciators 
display allegiance to the immoral perspective prescribed by instances of fictional immorality.  
With these objectives in mind, the first section of the chapter explores the notion of allegiance. 
I argue that in instances of fictional immorality we can speak of affect-based allegiance to the 
prescribed perspective. This allegiance allows appreciators to ignore what they would normally 
regard as morally relevant considerations. The second section explores the importance of genre 
considerations for narratives to achieve affect-based allegiance. I explore the accounts 
advanced by Shen-yi Liao, Bence Nanay, and Jonathan Weinberg to see how genre can 
significantly impact appreciators engagement to works of fiction. However, by the end of this 
section I show that even with the inclusion of genre, these accounts cannot explain allegiance 
variability in different types of counter-moral fictions. The third section thus proposes the 
notion of fictional context; the elements of the fictional context are what allow appreciators to 
determine whether a narrative constitutes an instance of fictional or actual immorality. And 
this, in turn, explains the discontinuity in appreciators’ moral outlook when engaging with 
instances of fictional immorality. In addition to genre, I examine four other elements as part of 
the fictional context: authorial intentions, socio-historical context, fictional prescriptions, and 
modes of representation. By the end of the section I introduce the notion of aesthetic space as 
that which allows for the discontinuity: given that a narrative can be identified as an instance 
of fictional immorality, appreciators can ignore moral considerations during their imaginative 
engagement. Finally, section four examines the discontinuity thesis and its implications for our 
imaginative engagement with counter-moral fictions.  
  
3.1 Counter-moral fictions and affect-based allegiance 
The literature on imaginative resistance recognises in Hume the first discussion of the supposed 
asymmetry in our engagement with evaluative and non-evaluative deviance in fictional 
narratives. Hume notes that, while appreciators do not seem to find speculative errors in literary 
works problematic, they do need to make a “very violent effort” to engage with moral deviance. 
In particular, Hume refers to the works’ ability to arouse “sentiments of approval or blame, 
love or hatred, different from the ones that long custom has made familiar to us”. What is 
important to note, therefore, is that Hume is referring specifically to an emotional resistance in 
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appreciators to enter into deviant sentiments. That is, what seems puzzling about these cases is 
that appreciators encounter difficulties when imagining deviant evaluative scenarios because 
they are asked to imagine in a rich sense that involves more than just entertaining propositions; 
appreciators are asked to summon a wide range of attitudes that include affective responses. 
Tamar Gendler, for example, has noted that imaginative resistance does not seem to arise in 
instances of counterfactual reasoning where we are merely asked to suppose something is the 
case. Fictional narratives that present morally deviant scenarios seem to be problematic because 
they do not merely ask appreciators to entertain deviant propositions, but they ask them to 
respond accordingly.  
However, if we go back to the discussion in the previous chapter on the solutions to the so-
called puzzle of imaginative resistance we can see that much of the literature focuses on 
resistance to propositions. The previous discussion frames the imaginative difficulties in terms 
of either appreciators resisting imagining deviant propositions as true, or appreciators resisting 
to imagine explicit propositions concerning deviant evaluations. But, for the most part, the 
discussion fails to focus on what imagining those explicit propositions entails. If imaginative 
difficulties do not seem to arise in cases of counterfactual reasoning, we have reasons to think 
that the problem is not with appreciators entertaining explicit propositions concerning deviant 
evaluations, but with imagining these propositions in the rich sense described by Hume. And 
this richer sense of imagination involves adopting a perspective, with the corresponding 
attitudes, that endorses the deviant evaluations imagined. If this is so, then it seems that 
appreciators should have no problems with imagining a fictional world in which deviant 
evaluations are true. Imaginative problems would arise only in those cases where appreciators 
are asked to adopt a perspective that endorses deviant evaluations and respond accordingly.  
Why is this relevant? As I noted in the previous chapter, Kendall Walton and Brian Weatherson 
identify four different (if related) puzzles comprised in what Gendler originally identified as a 
single puzzle. The alethic puzzle refers to why authorial authority is not enough to make certain 
claims true in the fiction. The imaginative puzzle refers to why appreciators find certain 
propositions difficult to imagine. The phenomenological puzzle refers to why certain 
propositions in fiction are striking. And the aesthetic puzzle refers to how evaluative deviance 
impacts the aesthetic value of certain fictional scenarios. But if we look closely at the 
formulation of these problems, most of the discussion lost sight of what was originally puzzling 
about these cases, namely why certain scenarios are difficult to imagine in a rich sense that 
involves adopting attitudes that include affective responses. And if our focus is on appreciators’ 
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engagement with counter-moral fictions, it is precisely the phenomenon of affective resistance 
that should be at the heart of the discussion. 
As I noted in the first chapter, engaging with counter-moral perspectives in fiction often does 
not require appreciators to imagine a fictional world in which deviant evaluations are true. That 
is, the imaginative engagement with counter-moral perspectives often does not involve 
imagining deviant evaluations as true. The distinction I made between counter-moral fictional 
perspectives and counter-moral fictional worlds aims at noting that in many cases appreciators 
are asked to engage with a deviant perspective while acknowledging its counter-moral 
character even within the fictional world. So if we go back to Walton’s famous Giselda 
example, the problem is that fictional narratives do not merely ask appreciators to imagine that 
Giselda did the right thing in killing her daughter, but that they ask appreciators to sympathize 
with Giselda killing her daughter. Examining our engagement with counter-moral fictions thus 
requires us to focus on what sympathizing with fictional perspectives entails. 
A narrative counts as an instance of counter-moral fiction not because it includes immoral 
characters, but because the narrative’s fictional perspective endorses immoral characters. A 
fictional perspective endorses immorality by prescribing sustained strong pro-attitudes toward 
immoral characters. As such, a counter-moral perspective is that which prescribes sympathy 
for immoral characters. But fictional narratives are often complex. It is not uncommon to find 
that our sympathies swerve during our engagement with the story. Or even that we feel 
sympathy for the antagonists and antipathy for the protagonists during certain moments. Even 
more so, this is often not a failure in appreciators’ engagement, but something that is 
encouraged by narratives. For this reason, Carl Plantinga defines mere sympathy as a pro-
attitude rooted in emotional responses that include concern for the character, but that need not 
be sustained throughout the entire narrative. Sympathies can be short-term and shallow, and 
can be displayed toward characters that are not endorsed by the narrative’s perspective, such 
as villains (Plantinga, 2010). 
The sympathy that allows the endorsement of immoral characters and counter-moral 
perspectives in fiction must, therefore, be understood more strongly, in terms of allegiance. A 
counter-moral fiction is that which prescribes allegiance toward immoral characters. If we can 
say that the narrative’s perspective endorses immorality it is because the strong pro-attitudes 
toward highly immoral characters are sustained throughout the engagement with the story. 
Allegiance refers to that strong pro-attitude that is extended throughout the narrative and that 
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maintains a continued interest in protagonists’ well-being. Allegiance includes sympathies, but 
it also involves pro-attitudes that can overlook character flaws and unsympathetic actions 
(Plantinga, 2010).  
The problem with claiming that the engagement with a deviant perspective requires a pro-
attitude as strong as allegiance is that, while mere sympathy is simply rooted in emotional 
responses, allegiance is generally rooted in moral judgement. According to Murray Smith, 
allegiance refers to the sustained pro-attitudes appreciators feel toward characters who have 
earned their moral approval. It is this moral approval that grounds appreciators’ wishing good 
things for a character. Smith claims that allegiance depends on appreciators recognising 
morally desirable traits in the protagonist of the narrative (Smith, 1995, 188). The prescribed 
perspective thus needs to emphasize these morally desirable traits to guarantee that appreciators 
will experience strong pro-attitudes throughout their engagement with the narrative.  
Many of the narratives that secure allegiance for highly unsympathetic characters are stories 
that follow antiheroes. Plantinga claims that allegiance does not depend on characters behaving 
well at all times, “but just as much by the estimation that he or she is “fundamentally good” 
(whatever that may mean to the spectator) despite temporary bad behaviour, or is perhaps bad 
in some respects but travels a path of moral improvement” (Plantinga, 2010, 42). Antiheroes 
are protagonists that lack traditional heroic qualities and that are morally flawed in some 
respects. These flaws, however, are outweighed by the protagonists’ moral virtues: antiheroes 
might be rough around the edges, but they ultimately aim at the greater good (Carroll, 2008; 
Eaton, 2010, 2012). In these cases, narratives secure allegiance that can overlook 
unsympathetic traits by emphasising other morally desirable features. Think, for example, of 
television series House. Dr Gregory House, the protagonist, is a misanthrope who is addicted 
to Vicodin. Not only is he rude and dismissive toward his colleagues and patients, but his 
addiction constantly puts them in danger. Although audience members are often prescribed 
strong con-attitudes toward him, allegiance to such an antipathetic character is secured 
throughout the narrative by emphasizing his ultimately redeeming feature: House is always 
focused on saving patients’ lives, even when he has selfish motivations to do so. 
However, I noted that instances of fictional immorality emphasise the immoral nature of the 
protagonists, and they prescribe a perspective that endorses such immorality. In this sense, it is 
important to note the differences between narratives that feature rough heroes and that prescribe 
a counter-moral perspective, and narratives that feature antiheroes that do not. Contrary to 
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antiheroes, the moral flaws of rough heroes cannot simply be written off as a kooky feature of 
their overall good character. A. W. Eaton identifies five features of the rough hero: (1) his flaws 
are grievous, (2) his flaws are an integral part of his personality, (3) he fully intends to be bad 
and is remorseless, (4) the audience is not prescribed to forgive him or dismiss his actions as 
the result of misfortune, weakness or ignorance, and (5) his vices are not outweighed by other 
more redeeming features (Eaton, 2012). 
Rough heroes mean to be bad. More importantly, their moral flaws are not only a central part 
of their personality, but a central part of the narrative. Unlike villains, rough heroes are 
endorsed by the narrative’s perspective. As I noted in the first chapter, Noël Carroll has argued 
against Eaton’s account of rough heroes that we must not mistake a character’s immorality 
with an endorsement of that immorality by the narrative. Thus, according to Carroll, rough 
heroes cannot be said to be endorsed by the narrative’s perspective since the narrative clearly 
portrays them as evil (Carroll, 2013, 372). Carroll, nevertheless, fails to see what Eaton 
identifies as the rough hero’s defining feature within a narrative: while he is presented as 
immoral, audiences are prescribed sustained strong pro-attitudes toward him. The narrative 
endorses rough heroes by prescribing these pro-attitudes. And if I argue that the fictional 
perspective endorses immorality it is precisely because appreciators are prescribed allegiance 
toward immoral characters. Rough heroes require a very special kind of allegiance that 
acknowledges the hero’s depravity, but that guarantees our continued investment in his success. 
In prescribing moral deviance deliberately, instances of fictional immorality do not prescribe a 
perspective that regards the immoral character of the protagonists as morally desirable. On the 
contrary, chapter one emphasised that these narratives require appreciators to acknowledge the 
deviant character of the perspective. So how can allegiance to immoral characters acknowledge 
their depraved nature while guaranteeing our continued investment in the narrative? Smith 
argues that the moral traits that ground allegiance do not need to be evaluated by audiences in 
absolute terms. In some cases, audiences ally with a protagonist who has morally undesirable 
traits because these are contrasted with a villains’ more undesirable traits. Murray uses the 
example of Hannibal Lecter in Silence of the Lambs. In this case, Lecter’s evil character is 
contrasted with the other crazed inmates (Smith, 1999, 226-227). This contrast, however, does 
not seem to be enough to ground allegiance. At most, showing that the protagonist’s moral 
flaws are not as grievous as those of the villain would help us in understanding why we display 
reduced antipathy for these depraved characters.  
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In “Just what is it that makes Tony Soprano such an appealing, attractive murderer?”, Smith 
argues that allegiance to depraved characters is grounded on two facts. First, these characters 
are represented in the narrative in such a way that emphasizes their regularity: audiences are 
groomed so that they come to see that the immoral characters are just like them. Following G. 
E. Lessing, Smith argues that seeing the immoral protagonist as ourselves is important in 
securing allegiance because our sustained pro-attitudes depend on us seeing him not as a 
monstrous figure, but as a mix of vice and virtue. The complexity of the characters allows 
audiences to ally with immoral characters in two ways: it gives appreciators some comfort in 
the thought that the protagonist is not ‘evil incarnate’, and it makes them think that they could 
find that fate themselves (Smith, 2011, 73-76). Second, Smith argues that the immoral traits 
are presented by the narrative in an attractive way: audiences find the moral transgressiveness 
of the immoral deeds alluring (Smith, 2011, 77-79).  
It is possible, therefore, to speak of an affect-based allegiance. In these cases, appreciators ally 
with immoral characters because of their affective responses: they strongly sympathise with 
the characters in that they find them familiar and attractive. Audiences overlook their actual 
evaluative framework in favour of the counter-moral perspective prescribed by the narrative 
because they find the moral transgression appealing. Eaton argues that narratives that feature 
rough heroes exploit a widespread contamination tendency in which our moral assessments are 
unconsciously contaminated by other attractive non-moral features (Eaton, 2013). For 
example, Eaton quotes the well-known “halo biases”, “according to which perceptions of a 
person’s physical attractiveness positively influence judgements of things like writing quality 
or morally desirable traits such as trustworthiness and kindness” (Eaton, 2013, 377). Plantinga 
also notes that our tendency to allow non-moral factors to influence moral judgements shows 
how emotional manipulation can ground non-moral allegiance to immoral characters in fiction 
(Plantinga, 2010, 46-49). 
Appreciators’ endorsement of immoral characters must not be understood in terms of explicit 
ascription to immoral claims, but as allowing strong sympathies to characters they otherwise 
judge immoral. It is this affective manipulation that grounds non-moral allegiance. In these 
cases, appreciators do not need to find desirable moral traits in protagonists. All they need is 
to find them appealing, to feel close to them. This affective manipulation is achieved through 
what Carroll calls “emotional prefocus”. Fictional narratives direct appreciators’ focus toward 
certain features that can guarantee certain emotional responses from the audience (Carroll, 
1999). 
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Nevertheless, Murray Smith disagrees with the notion of a non-moral allegiance. He argues 
that even in these cases, the non-moral elements do not displace moral factors, but rather help 
in ignoring some morally relevant features in favour of other morally relevant features:  
I maintain that moral evaluation lies at the core of allegiance. It is hard to 
think of cases in which a film elicits strong sympathy toward a character 
largely on the basis of amoral attributes; characters who appeal through wit 
or charm, for example, command our sympathetic allegiance because these 
amoral traits co-exist in the character with at least some morally positive 
traits (Smith, 2011, 84).  
As said before, according to Smith, narratives need to establish familiarity with immoral 
characters so that appreciators come to see that they are, much like them, a mix of vice and 
virtue. He argues that allegiance is still moral in these cases because appreciators overlook a 
character’s moral failings in virtue of his other virtues. 
However, I believe that in focusing on Lessing’s notes on tragedy, he misunderstands the role 
of familiarity in counter-moral fictions. Indeed, Lessing follows Aristotle, in arguing that for 
tragedy to achieve its desired aims, appreciators must see themselves in the protagonists. 
According to Aristotle, appreciators need to see themselves in the protagonist because 
otherwise they would be unable to respond emotionally to tragedy: to respond emotionally to 
poetry, appreciators need to feel that what is being represented could happen to them. In this 
sense, Aristotle and Lessing seem to argue that emotional responses to fiction are grounded on 
empathy. However, whether seeing ourselves in the fiction is necessary to respond emotionally, 
or not, is irrelevant for the discussion on allegiance: after all, if this was the case, feeling with 
fictional characters, as opposed to merely feeling for them, would be necessary for any type of 
emotional response to fiction, and it would not help in explaining allegiance to immoral 
characters.  
I believe what Smith misses is that familiarity is relevant to allegiance not because we see 
ourselves, a mix of vice and virtue, in the fiction, but because of the parochial nature of moral 
judgement noted by both Eaton and Plantinga. Appreciators have a tendency to diminish the 
gravity of moral transgressions of those closest to them, and indeed they do allow for non-
moral features to influence how they condemn the transgressors. Emphasising the ways in 
which morally flawed protagonists are one of us is, therefore, not only relevant for appreciators 
to see themselves in them and see they are not all bad, but for appreciators to manipulate their 
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moral judgements in virtue of their bond. For this reason, it is important to note that counter-
moral narratives do not need to prescribe what Smith calls “perverse allegiance” to endorse 
immorality. According to Smith, a perverse allegiance is that which elicits strong sympathy for 
immoral characters in virtue of the immoral actions: “the truly perverse allegiance is one with 
a reprehensible character on the basis of their reprehensible actions or traits, not in spite of 
them” (Smith, 1999, 223). Counter-moral narratives need only prescribe an ambivalent 
allegiance in which audiences are aware of the deviant nature of the protagonist’s character, 
but in which non-moral factors cause them to look the other way. Murray is right in noting that 
in ambivalent allegiance appreciators ally with the protagonist in spite of the moral 
transgressions, and not in virtue of them. But he is nonetheless wrong in thinking that in these 
cases allegiance is still driven by moral elements: the moral transgressions are ignored not 
because of other moral features, but because of the narratives’ emphasis on non-moral features. 
 
3.2 The role of genre in affect-based allegiance 
What Tamar Gendler has called the second wave of literature on imaginative resistance, has 
noted how one of the big mistakes in early accounts consisted in focusing on isolated 
propositions with no surrounding context. More recent accounts of imaginative resistance have 
thus noted the importance of context to explain the variability within resistance phenomena. In 
particular, authors like Bence Nanay, Shen-yi Liao, and Jonathan M. Weinberg, have turned to 
genre to explain why certain propositions cause resistance in some contexts but not in others. 
Bence Nanay (2010) argues that imaginative resistance arises because appreciators do not take 
the author to obey what Grice calls the co-operative principle. In these cases, appreciators do 
not understand how what the author has uttered can contribute to the conversation, or do not 
understand what the author meant by the utterance in the conversation. Because they regard 
the proposition as violating the co-operative principle, appreciators “resist” the proposition: 
they are popped-out of the narrative because of the confusion the utterance has caused. The 
attention is thus shifted from narrative to the author in the sense that appreciators focus on what 
the speaker could have meant that would have not violated the principle (Nanay, 2010, 596). 
However, Nanay notes that the co-operative principle depends on the context. This means that 
if appreciators expect to find a given utterance in that context, they will not need to shift their 
attention to the speaker to determine what she could have meant. And this context includes a 
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narrative’s genre: “the co-operative principle which we take the author to observe can be 
different in the case of different texts from different genres” (Nanay, 2010, 599).  
Shen-yi Liao also notes that focusing on genre explains the variability of resistance phenomena. 
After all, genre determines not just how artists construct the fictional worlds, but how audiences 
engage with them. Genres involve specific genre conventions which “constrain what is fictional 
because they constrain which implicit propositions and which inferential patterns are warranted 
for the fictional world” (Liao, 2016, 10). These genre conventions in turn generate specific 
genre expectations that guide appreciators’ engagement with particular genres. The narrative 
engagement with works of fiction in which appreciators get aesthetic pleasure from imaginative 
prompts requires them to “place one’s imaginings and related psychological responses under 
the governance of the narrative’s prescriptions” (Liao, 2016, 6). Genre expectations should be 
understood as schemas employed by appreciators to guide their narrative engagement and place 
their imaginings and responses under the narrative’s governance.17 Liao argues that 
imaginative resistance emerges when a fictional prescription violates genre conventions: 
appreciators experience difficulties because what can and cannot be true in a story depends on 
genre conventions, and because appreciators’ narrative engagement and responses depend on 
expectations that stem from genre conventions as well. 
Liao and Nanay’s accounts allow for narratives to prescribe affect-based allegiance precisely 
because a narrative's genre determines how the narrated events are framed. In the case of rough 
heroes, a genre account would claim that they do not cause imaginative resistance because 
appreciators expect these narratives to prescribe inappropriate attitudes toward immoral 
characters. The genre of rough heroes stipulates that narratives create a tension in appreciators 
in which they feel the urge to resist responding in the ways prescribed while at the same time 
feeling the urge of responding with pro-attitudes. The genre thus allows narratives to emphasize 
the immoral character of the hero for appreciators to condemn him, but at the same time it 
allows the narrative to generate pro-attitudes strong enough to ground non-moral allegiance. In 
this sense, while the narrative doesn’t make it true in the fictional world that the hero’s moral 
failings are moral virtues, it does make the pro-attitudes appropriate: the way in which the 
                                                          
17 While appreciators need to be familiar with genre conventions to be able to adequately employ schemas that 
guide their narrative engagement, it is not necessary for them to have an explicit and exhaustive knowledge of 
genre conventions. According to Liao, genre schemas are employed “quickly, automatically, and unconsciously” 
(Liao, 2016, 11). A successful narrative engagement requires practical competence, but this practical competence 
is achieved by being exposed to narratives with specific genre conventions. 
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narrative’s perspective endorses the rough hero makes allegiance the appropriate attitude from 
appreciators.  
Jonathan Weinberg for his part focuses on the architecture of imagination to explain how genre 
can constrain appreciators’ engagement with evaluative deviance in fictional narratives. He 
argues that imagining involves entertaining certain contents in what he calls the “imagination 
box”. The imagination box has the same format and structure of representations in the belief 
box, and this allows for its contents to interact with other psychological mechanisms in 
important ways. In particular, Weinberg notes that the contents of the imagination box interact 
with inference mechanisms, affect systems, the UpDater – which allows appreciators to update 
the contents of the IB in light of new information –, domain specific processes (including moral 
evaluation systems), and monitoring systems (Weinberg, 2008, 204). Genre determines how 
appreciators constitute the imagination box:  
The recognition of genre must then drive at least two kinds of configurations 
of the IB: what import/export rules it is to have to regulate the passing 
contents between the IB and the BB; and what further systems are to be 
allowed to operate on our imaginative representations and which to be 
prevented from doing so (Weinberg, 2008, 209).  
Focusing on the architecture of imagination allows us to see that not only does genre allow for 
narratives to prescribe allegiance, but it is also what allows appreciators to ally with radically 
deviant perspectives in fiction. According to Weinberg genre allows for:  
the activation or suppression of different affective responses”, and, more 
importantly, genre is responsible for “bringing some of these moral systems 
[Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and 
Purity/Sanctity] more fully online, while forcing others to recede into the 
background (Weinberg, 2008, 211).  
 
3.2.1 Intra-generic variations: resisting rough heroines 
Accounts that rely on genre to explain resistance phenomena are attractive because they can 
account for variability: deviant claims cause imaginative resistance in some contexts but not 
others because appreciators expect deviance in some contexts but not others. However, genre 
solutions to resistance related puzzles still fail to account for variations within genres. For 
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example, there seems to be an asymmetry between the narrative engagement with male 
characters who transgress moral norms and female characters who do the same. This 
asymmetry can be found not only at the level of appreciators’ responses but also at the level of 
artistic production: while the rough hero has thrived in recent years, the same cannot be said 
for rough heroines. Narratives that feature rough heroines are an interesting challenge to genre 
accounts precisely because they adjust to all genre conventions, and are still met with 
resistance.  
It is important to note here, as it has often been noted in the literature on imaginative resistance, 
that resistance refers to a comparative difficulty, not an absolute imaginative failure. So, the 
phenomenon I want to highlight refers to the few instances of rough heroines in narrative 
works, compared to the high numbers of rough heroes, and the common failure of uptake from 
audiences: although the narrative might present a woman as a rough heroine, audiences often 
dismiss her as a simple villain. It is also important to remember, as Eaton has noted, that 
resistance comes in degrees; so the resistance to rough heroines also refers to the greater effort 
needed to generate pro-attitudes toward female protagonists who transgress moral norms.  
Gone Girl is a very interesting example of a failed rough heroine. Gillian Flynn writes Amy 
Dunne as a funny, smart and focused woman. Her now famous Cool Girl monologue seemed 
to have all the right features to secure appreciators’ allegiance. Amy angrily expresses how 
women have to subsume their identities to men’s interests:  
Men always say that as the defining compliment, don’t they? She’s a cool 
girl. Being the Cool Girl means I am a hot, brilliant, funny woman who 
adores football, poker, dirty jokes, and burping, who plays videogames, 
drinks cheap beer, loves threesomes and anal sex, and jams hot dogs and 
hamburgers into her mouth like she’s hosting the world’s biggest culinary 
gang bang while somehow maintaining a size 2, because Cool Girls are above 
all hot. Hot and understanding. Cool girls never get angry; they only smile in 
a chagrined, loving manner and let their men do whatever they want. Go 
ahead, shit on me, I don’t mind, I’m the Cool Girl. (…) And the Cool Girls 
are even more pathetic: They’re not even pretending to be the woman they 
want to be, they’re pretending to be the woman a man wants them to be. Oh, 
and if you’re not a Cool Girl, I beg you not to believe that your man doesn’t 
want the Cool Girl. It might be a slightly different version – maybe he’s a 
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vegetarian, so Cool Girl loves seitan and is great with dogs; or maybe he’s a 
hipster artist, so Cool Girl is a tattooed, bespectacled nerd who loves comics. 
There are variations to the window dressing, but believe me, he wants Cool 
Girl, who is basically the girl who likes every fucking thing he likes and 
doesn’t ever complain. 
As we saw in the first chapter, when she realises Nick has cheated on her after spending her 
money and dragging her back to his hometown, Amy decides she is tired of giving up her life 
for the sake of her ungrateful husband, and decides to enact her revenge by framing him for 
her own murder. The narrative should have had us nodding along as she slowly ruined her 
husband’s life. We should have wanted to see him burn, we should have loved to see her win. 
Amy is as complex, smart, and determined as Walter White. And still audiences failed to see 
her as a rough heroine. Amy’s failure as a rough heroine was most evident in David Fincher’s 
2014 film adaptation. The movie became just another iteration of the “crazy bitch” narrative: 
instead of Amy being a compelling and engaging morally flawed character, she became a 
villain so hated that audiences longed to see finished. 
Flynn’s novel prescribes allegiance toward Amy. Appreciators are prescribed to endorse 
Amy’s false abuse accusations in order to see her plan of ruining her husband’s life succeed. 
The novel emphasises appealing character traits, such as Amy’s wit, intelligence and charm, 
and understandable motivations in order to secure appreciators’ strong and sustained pro-
attitudes that ground affect-based allegiance. These features fit the conventions of the rough 
hero genre. After all, it is the same wit, intelligence and charm that allows appreciators to 
overlook Walter White’s poisoning of a child in order to advance his plans. Nevertheless, Amy 
becomes the villain: as I said before, David Fincher’s interpretation of the work, which in turn 
grounds a different work of fiction in his film adaptation, prescribes allegiance to Nick Dunne 
as the sympathetic morally flawed protagonist. 
So why were imaginative difficulties caused? Why did Fincher fail to respond with the 
prescribed affect-based allegiance toward Amy? Why did the movie switch the subject of the 
prescribed allegiance? My guess is that Fincher refuses allegiance to Amy because he thinks 
Flynn’s novel can be regarded as a borderline case in the fictional/actual distinction. 
In chapter one I advanced an analysis of Gone Girl as a borderline instance of the 
fictional/actual distinction in counter-moral fictions. I noted that in David Fincher’s context, 
the myth of the false sexual abuse allegations is a widespread narrative. Although data have 
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proven it wrong again and again, most people remain convinced that false accusations 
regarding sexual violence are common. Adopting a fictional perspective that endorses a woman 
who fabricates such allegations would be tantamount to endorsing women who do the same in 
real life. Gone Girl the novel would thus be seen as endorsing these women at the expense of 
those men whose lives have been ruined.  
Appreciators resist rough heroines because they regard the prescribed perspective as a live 
option in a given context. This means that even with the right genre conventions in place, when 
audiences detect what Gendler identified as a ‘clamour for exportation’ in narratives thanks to 
contextual considerations, they fail to respond with allegiance toward immoral characters. This 
shows that although genre considerations are relevant in explaining appreciators endorsement 
of deviant perspectives in fiction, other contextual considerations are just as relevant in 
explaining how audiences engage with certain types of counter-moral fictions but not others. 
These contextual considerations, as I argue in the following section, are what allow 
appreciators to determine whether the make-believe moral outlook advanced by the narrative 
has implications for their real-life moral outlook. 
However, it seems that it is not just appreciators who resist rough heroines. Rough heroines are 
an interesting example because they show how contextual considerations impact the 
construction of genre conventions as well. I believe artists resist creating engaging morally 
transgressive female characters because the very genre conventions of rough heroes conflict 
with what is traditionally regarded as female traits. Rough heroines are resisted because they 
are gender convention and expectation discordant.  
We can find many instances of antiheroines. But if we examine them closely we can see that 
they often exploit gender expectations in one way or another to secure narrative engagement. 
We have antiheroines with a strong motherly instinct, such as Beatrix Kiddo in Kill Bill. We 
can find femmes fatales, like Marvel’s Black Widow or Nikita. More significantly, we can find 
several instances of antiheroines who are survivors of sexual violence, like Lizbeth Salander 
or Jessica Jones. That is, we accept morally flawed female characters inasmuch as they are 
carers, objects of the male gaze, or victims.  
As noted by Margrethe Bruun Vaage, the few morally flawed female protagonists in popular 
TV are not allowed to be as transgressive as their male counterparts: their transgressions are 
not as grievous, their family life is not affected by their misdeeds, and their moral flaws are 
presented in a comedic and endearing tone (Vaage, 2016, 171-180). But the fact that, unlike 
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antiheroines, rough heroines are meant to be unapologetically bad, and the fact that they are 
meant not to have any morally redeeming features means that their transgressions need to be 
more than just innocent misdeeds.  
The radical transgressions that characterise rough heroines imply that they need to part with 
those features that have traditionally been regarded as feminine: tenderness, graciousness, 
selflessness, sensuality. Women are brought up not only to be likeable and accommodating, 
but to aspire to universal approval, and rough heroines aspire to just the opposite. The 
interesting thing about Amy Dunne is that she becomes a rough heroine because she has grown 
tired of adjusting to gender expectations: amazing Amy, the perfect daughter, and cool Amy, 
the perfect wife. And so she transgresses moral norms because she wants to transgress gender 
role expectations. Moreover, rough heroines’ greatest transgression seems to be the challenge 
to power dynamics. While rough heroes are endearing because they take the direction of their 
lives into their own hands, rough heroines are resisted precisely because they challenge 
women’s subordinate position. In challenging women’s role as passive, emotional and docile 
beings, rough heroines bring forward the social structures that keep women oppressed.  
Of course the causes of resistance to rough heroines need to be examined in more depth. But 
what I want to note is that rough heroines reveal that resistance phenomena are also grounded 
on another feature of narrative engagement that has been largely overlooked: interpretive 
horizons. These horizons depend on the socio-historical context of reception and production of 
the narrative. This is to say that resistance phenomena are context dependent not only in that 
propositions are not found isolated, but contextualised by a narrative, as the second wave of 
literature on imaginative resistance has noted. Resistance phenomena, and the engagement with 
counter-moral fictions in general, are context dependant in that socio-historical contextual 
considerations condition appreciators’ imaginative engagement in important ways. Although 
the most recent literature on imaginative resistance has emphasised context, authors have 
focused on the context of propositions. But a satisfactory account of resistance phenomena and 
imaginative engagement with counter-moral fictions must also take into consideration the 
contexts in which these propositions are produced and received.  
 
3.3 Fictional context 
Resistance phenomena show that our engagement with counter-moral narratives is context-
dependent. Because this context includes elements such as a socio-historical context and genre, 
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I believe that appreciators’ reception of counter-moral narratives depends on the fictional 
context. In this section I argue that the fictional context should be understood as the necessary 
elements to arrive at a correct interpretation of the work. In chapter one I argued that the 
recognition of the narrative’s perspective and framework depends on identifying the author-
narrator. I argued that this author-narrator should not be understood as the work’s actual author, 
but as the external narrator that appreciators can reconstruct from all the elements available in 
the narrative. For this reason, I turned to Jerrold Levinson’s hypothetical intentionalism. 
Levinson acknowledges that the relevant elements available in the narrative do not merely refer 
to the work’s structure, but also to “the relevant surrounding context of creation” (Levinson, 
1992, 224). Moreover, reconstructing the surrounding context of creation of the work is 
relevant not only for the identification of the narrative’s perspective and framework, but for 
determining whether the perspective entails a make-believe or real-world moral outlook, and 
for distinguishing between fictional and extra-fictional perspective. The reconstruction of the 
narrative’s context is what allows for appreciators to determine whether there is an underlying 
actual immoral attitude, whether the author is inviting them to share a real-world view, or 
whether the immoral view is normalized in the author’s context. Thus, appreciators are able to 
distinguish whether a narrative constitutes an instance of fictional or actual immorality by 
reconstructing the fictional context, that is, the context that constitutes the identity of that 
specific narrative. 
Contrary to the assumption at the heart of the continuity thesis, appreciators do not necessarily 
import to the fictional world their evaluative framework. The discontinuity thesis is sensitive 
to the distinction between fictional and actual immorality because it is this distinction that 
dictates whether appreciators will import their evaluative framework during their imaginative 
engagement. Just inasmuch as the fictional context sets the prescribed perspective that guides 
the narration of the fictional events, the fictional context shapes appreciators responses by 
helping them distinguish between make-believe and real-world moral outlooks. In those cases 
where appreciators cannot identify an extra-fictional perspective that prescribes an immoral 
real-world outlook, appreciators do not import their evaluative framework and manage to adopt 
the deviant perspective prescribed by the narrative. In these cases, appreciators display affect-
based allegiance to deviant perspectives in fiction. This allegiance implies that appreciators’ 
moral outlook is discontinuous from their real-world moral outlook.  
This does not mean that all fictional narratives depend on a high level of discontinuity: it might 
be that the most common works of fiction build on our normal responses to set the framework. 
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But, contrary to what the continuity thesis claims, it is possible for appreciators to accept in 
works of fiction evaluative frameworks that contrast with their normal responses. While the 
adoption of deviant perspectives in fiction is not a simple task, I don’t think it requires a violent 
effort of the imagination that is any different from the necessary effort to engage with factually 
deviant fictional worlds. All it takes is the right fictional context. Because of the deviant nature 
of the scenarios, the fictional context might need to do more work than on a non-deviant 
narrative. But this is anticipated by the import principle. The difference between the continuity 
and the discontinuity thesis is that the latter does not assume a difference between evaluative 
and non-evaluative scenarios in fiction. According to the discontinuity thesis, in both 
evaluative and non-evaluative cases, the import principle is constrained by the fictional 
prescriptions, so that appreciators import to the fictional scenario their actual attitudes and 
responses unless it directly contrasts with what is prescribed by the fictional narrative.  
The discontinuity thesis, nevertheless, does assume an asymmetry between fictional and actual 
immorality that impacts the workings of the import principle. The asymmetry consists in the 
difference between make-believe and real-world moral outlooks. In instances of fictional 
immorality, the narratives prescribe a deviant fictional perspective that concerns a make-
believe moral outlook exclusively. In these cases, the fictional prescriptions are directed at the 
fictional events and entities only, and the author-narrator is not trying to make claims 
concerning the actual state of the world. Precisely because in instances of fictional immorality 
the fictional perspective is quarantined in the fictional world, the narrative opens an aesthetic 
space in which appreciators can ignore normal moral and practical considerations. Narratives 
that constitute instances of actual immorality, on the other hand, include an extra-fictional 
perspective that prescribes a real-world moral outlook. This real-world moral outlook is 
directed at actual events and entities: the author-narrator is trying to make claims that demand 
standing in the actual world as well. Precisely because the prescriptions are not quarantined in 
the fictional world, instances of actual immorality do not open the aesthetic space that removes 
moral and practical considerations. And in these cases appreciators import their evaluative 
framework and dismiss the deviant real-world moral outlook prescribed by the narrative.  
To distinguish whether a narrative constitutes an instance of fictional or actual immorality, and 
to determine whether they need to import their evaluative framework, appreciators need to 
examine the fictional context of a work of fiction; the elements that constitute the fictional 
context allow appreciators to arrive at a correct interpretation of the work that will in turn open 
the possibility of an aesthetic space that eliminates moral and practical considerations. The 
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fictional context consists of five elements: authorial intentions, socio-historical context, artistic 
conventions, fictional prescriptions, and modes of representation. The first three, authorial 
intentions, socio-historical context, and artistic conventions, correspond to what Lamarque and 
Olsen identify as the external reader perspective. By approaching the narrative as a work, 
appreciators keep in mind that the narrative is a cultural product that depends on a certain 
spatial and temporal location; by regarding it as a work of fiction, audiences are meant to keep 
in mind that the right attitude towards the fictive content is make-believing, rather than 
believing. The last two, fictional prescriptions and the modes of representation, correspond to 
the internal reader perspective. In what follows I briefly examine these five elements of the 
fictional context. 
 
Authorial intentions 
As I said before, I think Jerrold Levinson’s hypothetical intentionalism is the best option when 
trying to reconstruct the fictional perspective. For audiences to be able to reconstruct the 
author-narrator that guides the tone of the narration, Levinson shifts away from actual authorial 
intentions and aims instead at what would be most reasonable to hypothesize by considering 
various elements of the work of fiction:  
The notion of a literary work’s meaning, and thus of correct interpretations 
of it, is properly tied, as I have said, not to actual – even successfully realized 
– artist’s intent, but to our best construction, given the evidence of the work 
and appropriately possessed background information, of the artist’s intent to 
mean such and such for his or her intended audience (Levinson, 1992, 225).  
Reference to hypothetical intentions is useful because it helps in setting the distance between 
fictional and actual prescriptions, and because it guides appreciators in establishing the fictional 
and extra-fictional perspectives that will ultimately determine appreciators’ responses. 
 
Socio-historical context 
The possibility of hypothetical intentionalism is directly connected to the second element of 
the fictional context: the contextual construction of the work of fiction. As noted by Levinson,  
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any such plausible hypothesizing – any responsible ‘psyching out’ of the 
attitudes or values embodied in and put forward by a work – must be 
informed and constrained by a work’s position in a communicative matrix 
whose dimensions include the artist’s time and place, the artist’s social 
climate, the artist’s predecessors, the artist’s oeuvre as a whole, the particular 
artform, tradition, genre, and problematic within which the artist is working, 
and even the artist’s public self or identity.(Levinson, 1995, 188)  
These considerations lead to what Levinson calls the ‘thickly’ implied author (Levinson, 1995, 
189), and they are necessary for the interpretative process that is involved in the understanding 
of a fictional narrative inasmuch as they aid in reconstructing the author-narrator. Contextual 
considerations also help in establishing the interaction between implicit and explicit 
prescriptions, so that appreciators’ are able to discriminate which elements should be counted 
as part of the fictional perspective. The location of the work of fiction within its contextual 
matrix helps in determining three things: (1) which elements found in the narration belong to 
the prescribed perspective and which do not; (2) which elements that are not explicitly found 
in the narrative should be assumed by appreciators to understand the prescribed perspective; 
and (3) what is the work’s extra-fictional perspective. 18  
 
Artistic conventions 
In addition to the historical and social context of the work, it is necessary to emphasize the role 
of artistic conventions as the third element of the fictional context. The artistic conventions 
help appreciators in determining how the prescribed perspective is embodied in the 
prescriptions to imagine, what elements should be taken into consideration as modes of 
presentation (Lamarque & Olsen, 1994) or expressive features (Currie, 2012), and ultimately, 
what is the adequate response to the content of the fictional narrative. The analysis of genre by 
authors like Nanay, Liao and Weinberg provides an example of how artistic conventions 
determine fictional prescriptions and audience responses. So, for example, the genre of rough 
heroes dictates that narratives prescribe pro-attitudes toward immoral characters; to do this, 
                                                          
18 An interesting analysis of the importance of contextual factors in the understanding of a narrative is found in 
Borges’ “Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote”, where he examines the differences between two identical Don 
Quixotes: the original, authored by Cervantes, and one authored by Pierre Menard, a fictional character. Both 
Walton (1987) and Danto (1981) have used this short story to explore the decisive character of a work’s contextual 
location. 
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artistic conventions establish that the narrative must emphasise other attractive features that 
can ground appreciators’ sustained sympathies.  
 
Fictional prescriptions 
The fourth element corresponds to the fictional prescriptions found in the narrative. These 
prescriptions can be of two different types: explicit and implicit. It is important to note that the 
explicit prescriptions refer, not only to those prescriptions that can be found explicitly in the 
text, but to those prescriptions established by what we recognize as the author-narrator. The 
fact that we recognize as explicit prescriptions only those established by the author-narrator 
helps appreciators to deal with cases of multiple and unreliable narrators in fiction. As such, 
Currie defines an explicit prescription as that “which meets two conditions: (1) S is naturally 
interpretable in such a way as to convey directly, rather than merely to implicate, the thought 
that P, and (2) an overall best interpretation of the text is one which treats S as reliable” (Currie, 
2012, 13).  
The implicit prescriptions, on the other hand, are more problematic. On the one hand, they refer 
to the prescriptions that are implicated by the explicit prescriptions. But, on the other hand, in 
those cases where there is a difference between the internal narrator and the author narrator, 
implicit prescriptions are not implicated by the explicit content of the narrative and need to be 
determined by a process of what Currie calls ‘pragmatic inference’. This is the case of Lolita, 
where, as we saw at the beginning, the fictional prescriptions of the narrative condemn the 
actions narrated, while Humbert, the internal narrator, attempts to excuse them. It is because of 
this intricate relation between explicit content and prescriptions that the other elements of the 
fictional context are necessary. 
 
Modes of representation 
Finally, the way the content of the narrative is represented is important to determine the 
prescribed perspective, as it will set the tone that will allow appreciators to establish how to 
imagine the narrated events. The modes of representation thus refer to how the content of the 
fiction is presented to the appreciator. In this sense, these features mediate appreciators’ access 
to the fictional events (Kieran, 2012, 685). Within the modes of representation, I include the 
rhetoric and artistic devices, the focus of the narration, the use of language, the poetic form, 
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elicited imagery, the expressive and aesthetic features, and other elements that set the tone of 
the narration.  
The importance of the modes of representation is twofold. First, the modes of representation 
are decisive in those cases in which, as we saw above, the relation between the explicit content 
and the implicit prescriptions is not clear. As we said, the ironic tone set by the narrative in 
Lolita is what allows us to distinguish the fictional prescriptions and the prescribed perspective 
from the perspective presented by the internal narrator. Second, the modes of representation 
are essential in shaping appreciators’ responses. In some cases, the lack of the adequate modes 
of representation causes the work of fiction to fail completely as audiences do not respond as 
the framework requires, and rather respond in a way that directly contradicts the prescribed 
perspective. Think for example of Ed Wood’s horror films, or cheesy romantic fictions. In 
some other cases, different modes of representation of the same content yield different results 
in terms of appreciators’ responses. More importantly, as we will see in the following section, 
the right modes of representation might lead audiences to respond in ways that contrast directly 
with their normal responses. 
 
3.3.1 Aesthetic space  
According to what I have said so far, instances of fictional immorality allow for appreciators 
to engage with radically different moral views because the deviant claims are quarantined in 
the fictional world: as said before, instances of merely fictional immorality only prescribe a 
make-believe moral outlook in which deviant prescriptions are directed at fictional events and 
entities. This quarantining effect of fictional immorality is what allows appreciators to ignore 
normal moral and practical considerations. It is in this sense that these narratives open up an 
aesthetic space that erases everyday considerations. Reconstructing the fictional context is of 
utmost relevance for engaging with counter-moral fictions precisely because only by 
establishing whether a narrative presents merely fictional immorality, and thus includes a 
quarantining effect, can appreciators determine whether they can ignore everyday 
considerations. The reconstruction of the fictional context allows appreciators to arrive at a 
correct interpretation of the work as an instance of either fictional or actual immorality, and 
this interpretation of the work creates the possibility of an aesthetic space in instances of 
fictional immorality. 
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The aesthetic space provides the necessary aesthetic distance to allow for the discontinuity of 
appreciators’ evaluative attitudes. The aesthetic distance refers to appreciators’ awareness of 
the fictional character of the prescriptions. This is possible thanks to the distinction between 
internal and external levels of appreciation noted by Lamarque and Olsen.19 Even more so, it 
seems that without the aesthetic distance provided by the internal and external points of view, 
our engagement with radically different worldviews in fiction would be impossible. The 
interaction between these two perspectives is what allows appreciators to get ‘caught up’ in the 
fictional world while, at the same time, remaining aware of the fictional character of the 
narration. In this sense it is possible to say that the interaction between these two perspectives, 
and the resulting aesthetic distance, opens up an aesthetic space that will set up the limits to the 
fictional prescriptions and the responses. The aesthetic space refers to the locus of the 
imaginative engagement with fiction that eliminates moral and practical considerations. 
As I said at the beginning, the fact that in instances of fictional immorality we can identify a 
fictional perspective that prescribes a make-believe moral outlook exclusively allows us to say 
that the deviant prescriptions are quarantined in the fictional world. In this sense the narrative 
opens an aesthetic space in which appreciators can ignore normal moral and practical 
considerations. As Kieran notes, this aesthetic space annuls our capacity to intervene and so 
“we are freed from practical reasons to intervene and thus respond emotionally to aspects of 
what is represented in ways we might or could not were we to be present at the actual scene” 
(Kieran, 2010, 686). 
What I want to note is that the aesthetic space proposed by Kieran is only possible in instances 
of fictional immorality. Contrary to Kieran, I argue that the aesthetic space is not opened merely 
in virtue of the fictional nature of the narrative. That is, the aesthetic space is not opened simply 
because appreciators are unable to intervene when engaging with a work of fiction because it 
is fiction, as opposed to real life. The aesthetic space is opened when appreciators can ignore 
moral and practical considerations due to the scope of the fictional prescriptions. For this reason 
the possibility of the aesthetic space depends on the reconstruction of the fictional context. In 
instances of merely fictional immorality, authors are not trying to make deviant claims outside 
the realm of their fictional worlds. On the contrary, in cases of actual immorality the interaction 
between the readers’ internal and external points of view finds that the fictional perspective is 
                                                          
19 As Lamarque and Olsen note, the interaction of these two different types of points of view not only accounts 
for the pleasure we get from imaginative engagement, but it explains puzzling questions such as the 
incompleteness of fictional characters, pleasure from negative emotional experiences, and our interest in fiction 
(Lamarque & Olsen, 1994). 
93 
 
actually coupled with an extra-fictional perspective. This means that, along with the deviant 
make-believe moral outlook, narratives prescribe a deviant real-world moral outlook. This real-
world moral outlook is directed at actual events and entities: the author-narrator is trying to 
make claims that demand standing in the actual world as well. Precisely because the 
prescriptions are not quarantined in the fictional world, instances of actual immorality do not 
open the aesthetic space that removes moral and practical considerations. And in these cases 
appreciators import their evaluative framework and dismiss the deviant real-world moral 
outlook prescribed by the narrative. 
 
3.4 The discontinuity thesis 
As we have just seen, the elements of the fictional context allow appreciators to determine 
whether a narrative constitutes an instance of fictional or actual immorality. The fictional 
context thus helps appreciators in deciding whether the narrative opens up an aesthetic space 
in which they can ignore moral and practical considerations. In those cases where the narrative 
opens such an aesthetic space, appreciators’ evaluative attitudes can be discontinuous with their 
actual real-world attitudes. The discontinuity thesis claims that appreciators do not necessarily 
import their evaluative attitudes during their imaginative engagement with fiction. The 
advantage of the discontinuity thesis is that it can explain the variations in our engagement with 
different types of counter-moral fictions. Contrary to the continuity thesis, the discontinuity 
thesis can explain why some counter-moral fictions cause imaginative difficulties and others 
do not. In what follows I examine what this discontinuity thesis entails for our engagement 
with different types of counter-moral content in fiction. 
To explain the variations in our engagement with the diversity of counter-moral fictions, the 
discontinuity thesis argues for an asymmetry in the import principle for fictional and actual 
immorality. Instances of actual immorality break the quarantining nature of fiction because 
they include claims about the actual world, while instances of fictional immorality do not. 
According to the discontinuity thesis, this difference explains an asymmetry in the import 
principle for instances of fictional and actual immorality. In instances of merely fictional 
immorality, appreciators adopt the prescribed deviant fictional perspective because the 
counter-moral attitudes are quarantined in the fictional world. This means that the deviant 
perspective is directed at fictional events and entities exclusively. In instances of fictional 
immorality appreciators adopt the deviant framework that is prescribed by the narrative with 
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the corresponding responses, and they bypass their actual evaluative framework. So, for 
instances of fictional immorality, the import principle can be formulated as follows: 
Import principle: for fictional immorality, appreciators import their evaluative 
attitudes unless prescribed otherwise by the fictional perspective. 
Instances of actual immorality, however, present what Gendler called ‘clamour for 
exportation’. Appreciators do not adopt the prescribed perspective because the extra-fictional 
perspective found in the narrative prescribes an immoral real-world outlook that concerns the 
actual state of the world. Because the deviant claims are directed at real events and entities, 
appreciators favour their actual evaluative attitudes and import them during their imaginative 
engagement. For instances of actual immorality the import principle can be formulated as 
follows: 
Import principle1: for actual immorality, appreciators import their evaluative 
attitudes regardless of what is prescribed by the narrative.  
This asymmetry in the import principle explains that instances of actual immorality cause 
imaginative difficulties and instances of fictional immorality do not. Affect-based allegiance 
to fictional counter-moral perspectives is possible in instances of fictional immorality precisely 
because appreciators ignore their actual evaluative attitudes in favour of the deviant perspective 
prescribed by the narrative. This means that the asymmetry in the import principle causes an 
asymmetry in our affective responses. This asymmetry in the affective responses in turn 
explains that appreciators engage with deviant perspectives in fiction because they ground a 
non-moral affect-based allegiance to counter-moral perspectives. 
Matthew Kieran identifies what he calls ‘emotional asymmetries’ in our engagement with 
fiction. According to Kieran, these emotional asymmetries occur in those cases where the 
aesthetic distance and the modes of representation cause a discontinuity in our emotional 
responses. The discontinuity can be of two different types: 1) appreciators can have the same 
emotions but with asymmetric valences, that is, they value in fiction an emotion that they would 
not enjoy in an actual scenario; 2) and appreciators can have asymmetric emotions, that is, 
appreciators allow themselves to have emotions they wouldn’t normally have in a given 
scenario. According to this view, affect-based allegiance is possible because “the narrative 
artistry that is often concerned with soliciting empathy and sympathy can facilitate the 
suspension of moral judgement, norms, and values” (Kieran, 2012, 683).  
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To account for these emotional asymmetries, Kieran turns to Daniel Jacobson’s (2000) 
distinction between the criteria of ‘fittingness’ and ‘appropriateness’ of emotional responses. 
Fittingness refers to the conditions of warrant: reasons to think that X is Y. That is, fittingness 
refers to epistemological considerations. Appropriateness, on the other hand, refers to “what to 
feel, all things considered”. This means that the notion of appropriateness includes prudential 
and moral reasons as well. Jacobson uses offensive jokes as an example:  
even if it is granted that a joke is offensive, and that it would therefore be 
wrong to be amused by it, it does not follow that the joke cannot be funny. 
The judgement that an emotion is wrong to feel, or that it would be bad for 
you to feel it, is logically distinct from the judgement that the response is 
unwarranted (that X isn’t Φ) (Jacobson, 1997, 173).  
Kieran is right in arguing that these emotional asymmetries explain much of our engagement 
with deviant works of fiction. But as I said in the previous section, to be able to account for the 
complexity of our engagement with different types of counter-moral fictions, it is important to 
explain why the aesthetic space is not always opened, and why emotional asymmetries do not 
always occur. The discontinuity thesis that I’m proposing agrees with Kieran in noting the role 
of the aesthetic space and emotional asymmetries in our engagement with some types of 
counter-moral fictions. But at the same time, it acknowledges the importance of other 
contextual considerations as part of the conditions of possibility for emotional asymmetries 
and the discontinuity of appreciators’ evaluative framework. I believe Kieran is wrong in 
placing too much weight on the modes of representation to explain emotional asymmetries. 
The aesthetic space does not simply depend on how the content of the fiction is represented. 
Other considerations are relevant to determine whether appreciators can ignore moral reasons 
not to engage with immorality in a work of fiction. As such, the discontinuity thesis I defend 
depends on all the elements of the fictional context to explain the cases in which appreciators 
can identify an aesthetic space that removes moral considerations and that allows for emotional 
asymmetries, and the cases in which moral considerations remain. So, contrary to Kieran, I 
argue that the emotional asymmetries in our engagement with immorality in fiction are only 
possible for instances of fictional immorality. 
Instances of actual immorality preclude the emotional asymmetries that ground non-moral 
allegiance because the aesthetic space is not opened. In these cases appreciators do not ignore 
moral and practical considerations, and, as a result, non-moral allegiance is not possible. That 
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is, in instances of actual immorality, although the modes of representation of the narrative 
might give us reasons to think that a deviant response is fitting, the fact that the perspective 
includes claims about the actual world means that the aesthetic space is not opened, and this 
forces us to consider moral and practical reasons as well. So although the prescribed 
perspective is such that a deviant response might be fitting given how the fictional scenario is 
framed, appreciators acknowledge that (1) the response is nevertheless inappropriate due to 
moral reasons, and (2) the inappropriateness of the response is relevant because the lack of 
aesthetic space means moral considerations remain. In these cases, the inappropriate nature of 
the response precludes a strong imaginative engagement with the narrative. Affect-based 
allegiance is not achieved in instances of actual immorality precisely because appreciators do 
not allow non-moral considerations to impact their sympathies during the imaginative 
engagement. 
Narratives that constitute instances of fictional immorality, on the other hand, open up an 
aesthetic space that removes moral and practical considerations. In these cases, affect-based 
allegiance is achieved precisely because the fictional nature of the prescriptions allows 
appreciators to let their sympathies be contaminated by non-moral factors. In these cases, 
appreciators only take into account whether a prescribed response is fitting given how the 
fictional prescriptions are framed in the narrative by the modes of representation. That is, when 
it comes to fictional immorality, appreciators only take into consideration whether the 
prescribed perspective gives them reasons to respond in determined ways. The fact that Walter 
White is portrayed as an intelligent and resourceful man gives us reasons to ally with him 
regardless of his moral character. This ultimately means that, when it comes to instances of 
fictional immorality, the fact the counter-moral prescriptions are quarantined in the fictional 
world means that the notion of ethical appropriateness becomes irrelevant. Appreciators can 
ignore moral considerations to ally with deviant fictional perspectives. 
 
In this chapter I have explored how the difference between fictional and actual immorality 
impacts appreciators’ engagement with narratives. Appreciators imaginatively engage with 
certain types of counter-moral fictions because there is discontinuity in their evaluative 
attitudes. I have argued that certain elements of a fictional narrative provide a fictional context 
that enables this discontinuity in the cognitive-affective responses to counter-moral content. 
The emotional asymmetries that result from this discontinuity guarantee the non-moral 
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allegiance to counter-moral perspectives in instances of fictional immorality that ground a rich 
imaginative engagement. The following chapter focuses on emotional responses to fiction to 
further explore how emotional asymmetries are possible, and how the notions of fittingness 
and appropriateness of emotional responses operate differently for the different types of 
counter-moral fictions. 
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4. Emotional realism and the discontinuity thesis 
 
The previous chapter examined the discontinuity thesis as an explanation for how appreciators 
engage with different types of counter-moral content in works of fiction. The discontinuity 
thesis I defended claims that appreciators do not necessarily import their evaluative attitudes 
in their engagement with counter-moral fictions. According to this discontinuity thesis, the 
fictional context of the narrative provides appreciators with a framework of responses that can 
be discontinuous with appreciators’ normal set of responses to a given scenario. By the end of 
the chapter I examined what Matthew Kieran calls “emotional asymmetries” to show how, 
contrary to what is predicted by the continuity thesis examined in the second chapter, 
appreciators’ affective responses do not always follow the responses they would have when 
faced with an actual scenario. Contrary to Kieran, however, I argued that these asymmetries 
are possible not only thanks to the modes of representation of fictional narratives, but to other 
contextual considerations that allow appreciators to ignore moral and practical reasons in 
certain cases. The distinction between fictional and actual immorality proposed in the first 
chapter explains how the quarantining effect of fictional immorality opens an aesthetic space 
that removes moral considerations and that allows for emotional asymmetries. Moreover, I 
concluded that the fact that the aesthetic space removes moral and practical considerations 
means that the notion of ethical appropriateness becomes irrelevant for emotional responses to 
merely fictional immorality.  
The aim of this chapter is to examine emotional responses to fiction to explore how emotional 
asymmetries are possible, and how the notions of fittingness and appropriateness of emotional 
responses to fiction operate differently for different types of counter-moral content. The main 
question is whether the emotional asymmetries imply a difference in the type of emotions we 
experience; that is, it is important to answer whether emotional asymmetries are possible 
because the ‘emotions’ we experience during the imaginative engagement are not in fact 
instances of genuine emotions, as some theorists claim. I argue that emotions toward fiction 
are instances of genuine emotions, but that their criteria of appropriateness depend on the 
fictional context examined in the previous chapter. This chapter sides with realist accounts of 
fictional emotions to explain both the emotional asymmetries noted by Kieran, and those 
instances where emotional asymmetries do not occur thus causing imaginative difficulties.  
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To do this, in the first section of the chapter I examine some of the solutions to what has been 
called “the paradox of fiction”. Because it seems that the easiest way to explain emotional 
asymmetries is to claim that ‘emotions’ toward fiction are not instances of genuine emotions, 
I begin by examining the accounts that argue in favour of emotional irrealism, that is, accounts 
that claim that emotional responses to fiction are only quasi- emotions. In particular, I examine 
Kendall Walton and Stacie Friend’s accounts. I then go over the criticisms that can be advanced 
to emotional irrealism to show that an account that claims that emotional responses to fiction 
are genuine emotions provides a more satisfactory account of our engagement with fictional 
narratives. The second part of this section focuses on realist solutions to the paradox of fiction, 
that is, those accounts that claim that emotional responses to fiction constitute genuine 
emotional responses. I examine some of the accounts that have been advanced to see how they 
overcome the criticisms made to irrealist accounts, and how they can explain emotional 
asymmetries. The second section of the chapter examines the criteria of appropriateness of such 
genuine emotional responses directed to fictional scenarios. The aim of this section is to 
determine how a realist account can account for emotional asymmetries by alluding to 
differences between the criteria of appropriateness of emotions directed toward fictional and 
actual scenarios. Finally, the third section explores in depth the discontinuity of genuine 
fictional emotions. I examine Jonathan Gilmore’s discontinuity of the criteria of 
appropriateness of emotions in fiction, and argue that his criticism fails because he 
mischaracterises the notion of perspective and framing. To conclude, I present an argument in 
favour of discontinuity that solves the problems found in Gilmore’s account. 
  
4.1 In favour of emotional realism 
How can we be emotionally involved in fiction if we know in advance that the events we are 
witnessing are not real? Aristotle already noted in his Poetics that the aesthetic pleasure we get 
from artistic representations depends on us knowing we are safely watching from a distance. 
However, at the same time he was convinced that for catharsis to work, fear or pity would have 
to be genuinely felt by appreciators as if they were part of the tragic events. That is to say that 
being aware of the distance that separates them from the fictional world does not mean 
appreciators can establish a contemplative distance from their own immersion in the artwork. 
Those who participate in tragedy can only purge themselves from the negative emotions by 
yielding to them; participation is in this sense a true pathos. 
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The paradox of fiction refers to the problem that arises from this peculiar feature of our 
engagement with fictional narratives. According to Tamar Gendler and Karson Kovakovich, 
the problem noted by Aristotle shows that audiences respond to fictional scenarios in two 
different ways: cognitively, they acknowledge that the scenarios presented in the fictional 
narrative are not actual; emotionally, however, they respond as if they were (Gendler & 
Kovakovich, 2006). The paradox of fiction presents a triad of propositions that seem plausible 
when considered individually, but which result in an inconsistency when considered together. 
Gendler and Kovakovich formulate the paradox as follows: 
1) The response condition: We have genuine rational emotions toward certain characters (and 
situations) in works of fiction. 
2) The belief condition: We believe these characters (and situations) to be purely fictional. 
3) The coordination condition: In order for us to have genuine and rational emotional responses 
towards a character (or situation), we must not believe that the character (or situation) is purely 
fictional. 
Dissolving the paradox requires us to abandon one of the three conditions. Jerrold Levinson 
(1997) has provided a useful breakdown of the solutions that have found adherents in the 
philosophical literature. Among the solutions that deny the response condition we can find the 
surrogate-object solution, the irrationalist solution and the make-believe solution. The 
surrogate-object solution20 claims that it is not the fiction that is the object of the emotional 
responses, but rather other entities that exist or that are believed to be existent.21 The 
irrationalist solution denies the response condition by arguing that when responding 
emotionally to the fictional narratives, appreciators are actually being irrational for responding 
to something they know does not exist.22 The make-believe solution denies the response 
condition by claiming that the emotional responses appreciators experience in their engagement 
with fictional narratives are not actual emotional responses, but only imagined or make-believe 
                                                          
20 Currie calls this the “transfer strategy” (Currie 1990, 188). 
21 Levinson identifies different versions of the surrogate-object solution. The thought theory, defended by 
Lamarque (1981), Carroll (1990), and Smith (1995), claims that the objects of emotional responses are the thought 
contents afforded by the fictional narrative. Charlton (1984), on the other hand, claims that the responses are in 
fact directed at real individuals or events that are similar to the events presented by the fictional narrative; this is 
what Levinson calls the shadow object solution. 
22 Colin Radford’s account (1975) is an irrationalist solution to the paradox inasmuch as he argues that, while the 
emotional responses can be said to be genuine, they are irrational for being responses to what is not believed to 
be real. 
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emotions.23 Make-believe accounts of emotional responses toward fiction can be labelled as 
irrealist accounts because they argue that these responses are not genuine emotions. 
The paradox could also be dissolved by denying the belief condition. This type of solution 
argues that appreciators respond emotionally to the narrative because during their imaginative 
engagement they do not believe the events and characters to be fictional. Levinson calls this 
the suspension of disbelief solution.24 Advocates of this solution argue that during the 
imaginative engagement with the fictional narrative, appreciators get carried away and they 
temporarily forget they are witnessing events they know not to be real.25    
Finally, the paradox could also be solved by denying the coordination condition. This group of 
solutions to the paradox claims that it is possible to have full-fledged emotional responses 
without believing the character or situation to exist.26These solutions have been called 
‘antijudgmentalist accounts’ because they deny that emotional responses to fiction require 
existential judgements. Antijudmentalist accounts of emotional responses toward fiction can 
be labelled as realist accounts, contrary to make-believe solutions, because they defend that 
they are genuine emotions. 
I only focus on the debate between the make-believe and the antijudgmentalist solutions 
because I am interested in examining whether it is possible to say that the emotions toward 
fiction are genuine, full-fledged emotional responses, and on the implications of the nature of 
these emotional responses for explaining emotional asymmetries. In the following paragraphs 
I examine the arguments in favour of a make-believe solution to the paradox, that is, the 
arguments advanced in favour of an irrealist account of fictional emotions, and the arguments 
in favour of a realist solution. For this reason, this section does not address whether having 
                                                          
23 Walton’s quasi-emotions (1990; 1997) are the most influential version of the make-believe solution. Levinson 
(1990; 1997) also claims that the emotional responses toward fiction cannot be regarded as full-fledged emotions. 
More recently, Stacie Friend has also defended a make-believe solution by articulating an interesting defence of 
Walton’s quasi-emotions (Friend, 2003). 
24 Carroll refers to this solution to the paradox of fiction as “the illusion theory of fiction” (Carroll 1990, 63). 
25 As many authors have noted, this solution has not been popular in recent years.  Currie notes that such an 
account is not attractive because, not only does it seem implausible to claim that audiences get momentarily 
confused, but those moments of confusion would be too brief to underwrite the emotional responses experienced 
toward fiction (Currie 1990, 188). David Suits, however, seems to defend a version of this view. He argues that it 
is possible to say that appreciators believe in the events narrated in the work of fiction, since it is possible to say 
that believing is not an all-or-nothing attitude (Suits, 2006). 
26 The antijudgmentalist position seems to be the most popular version of the solution to the paradox of fiction. 
Authors defending a version of an antijudgmentalist solution include Richard Moran (1994), Derek Matravers 
(1998), Berys Gaut (2007), Jenefer Robinson (2005), Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Weinberg (2003), Greg Currie 
and Ian Ravenscroft (2002).     
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emotional responses toward fiction is rational; section two focuses on the issues of the 
rationality and appropriateness of emotional responses to fiction.27  
The debate between realist and irrealist accounts of emotional responses to fiction is relevant 
for the discontinuity thesis because we need to determine how appreciators can experience 
radically different emotional responses to counter-moral content in fictional narratives and in 
real life scenarios. The previous chapter examined what Kieran calls “emotional asymmetries”. 
These emotional asymmetries referred to the differences found in appreciators’ emotional 
responses toward fictional scenarios and their real life counter-parts. Deviant emotional 
responses ground what I have called affect-based allegiance to counter-moral perspectives in 
fiction. That is, the radically different emotional responses to counter-moral content in fiction 
are what sustain the non-moral pro-attitudes toward immoral characters prescribed by deviant 
perspectives in fiction. These emotional responses drive appreciators to overlook morally 
undesirable traits and to adopt what they consider a counter-moral perspective.  
As I said, it would seem that the easiest way for the discontinuity thesis to explain emotional 
asymmetries, and the resulting affect-based allegiance to counter-moral perspectives in fiction, 
would be to argue for emotional irrealism. One could argue that emotional responses to 
immorality in fiction are sometimes radically different to appreciators’ actual perspective 
because they are only make-believe emotions. This line of argument could claim that if 
appreciators actually lack the relevant evaluative attitudes that would ground the deviant 
responses in fiction, their emotional responses during their imaginative engagement are not 
instances of genuine emotions. However, in what follows I argue that irrealist accounts are 
flawed, and that they cannot successfully explain our emotional engagement with fictional 
narratives. Given that emotional realism is more successful in explaining the imaginative 
engagement with fiction, this chapter examines how a realist account can accommodate the 
emotional asymmetries to explain our imaginative engagement with radically different 
perspectives in works of fiction. 
                                                          
27 I also leave aside the discussion on the surrogate-object solutions to the paradox. In what follows, I take as a 
given that the object of the emotional responses are the fictional events and characters. Thus, I do not examine 
Levinson, Carroll, and Smith’s suggestion that the emotions are actually directed at the thought content afforded 
by the fictional narrative. Finally, I do not address in depth the objections against the suspension of disbelief 
either. As I have mentioned, Currie notes that, even if it was the case that audiences get momentarily confused, 
this brief confusion would not be able to ground the complex emotional responses that appreciators seem to 
experience toward fiction. It is interesting to emphasise, however, that, as Jenefer Robinson notes, the momentary 
confusion might be better interpreted as a “selective focus of attention”, in which appreciators do not pay attention 
to the fact that the events are not real (Robinson 2005, 149). 
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4.1.1 Irrealist accounts of emotional responses toward fiction 
In the previous chapters I examined whether the engagement with counter-moral fictions 
depends on the continuity of our evaluative attitudes, or whether it is possible to say that 
appreciators are willing to leave behind their evaluative framework for the sake of fiction. In 
the last chapter I argued that emotional asymmetries support the discontinuity of our evaluative 
framework insofar as emotional responses ground non-moral allegiance to counter-moral 
perspectives in fiction. But if it is possible to say that appreciators respond emotionally to 
fiction in ways they would not respond to actual scenarios, the first question that needs to be 
answered is whether the ‘emotions’ they experience during the imaginative engagement are 
genuine emotions. 
As I have said, the accounts identified as make-believe solutions to the paradox of fiction deny 
the response condition. These accounts claim that the responses experienced during the 
imaginative engagement with fiction are not full-fledged emotions. For this reason, Berys Gaut 
refers to these accounts as emotional irrealism. It is important to note from the start that these 
accounts do not deny that appreciators genuinely feel something in their engagement with 
fiction; but they argue that the responses felt by appreciators cannot be identified literally as 
instances of emotions. Walton thus argues for the negative claim that the “genuine emotional 
responses to works of fiction do not involve, literally, fearing, grieving for, admiring fictional 
characters” (Walton 1997, 38). As Levinson puts it, “The issue is not whether make-believe 
can cause various emotional reactions, but whether those reactions, given that certain cognitive 
conditions are not satisfied, qualify as full-fledged emotions of the ordinary sort”(Levinson 
1997, 27). 
For Levinson, the main problem with emotional responses toward fictions is that they lack the 
necessary existential belief that grounds genuine emotional responses. As a consequence, these 
emotion-like responses also lack the relevant motivational force or behavioural consequences 
that follow genuine emotions (Levinson 1997, 26). The lack of these two features is also what 
drives Walton to classify emotional responses toward fictional narratives as quasi-emotions. It 
is important to note, however, that Walton worries less about the lack of an existential belief, 
and more about the lack of motivational force. This is because Walton does not want to endorse 
a cognitivist account of emotions. So, according to Walton, quasi-emotions lack the 
motivational force that characterises genuine emotional responses. Quasi-emotions are, 
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nevertheless, really felt. Even though they lack an existential belief at their core and they lack 
the motivational force, Walton notes that quasi-emotions are phenomenologically similar to 
actual emotions (Walton 1990, 251). 
So, what exactly are quasi-emotions? Walton defines them as fictional truths referred to the 
appreciator as a reflexive prop (that is, props that generate other fictional truths about 
themselves) in the game of make-believe; these fictional truths are generated by her mental 
state. Since these emotions refer only to fictional truths about us as appreciators, they cannot 
be thought to be genuine. Again, Walton does not mean to say that appreciators are pretending 
to feel: they do actually experience something that fictionally is the experience of the emotion 
(Walton 1990, 247). So, according to Walton, it is fictional that Charles fears the slime, but he 
does not feel fictional or pretend-fear. Quasi-emotions are caused by the psychological 
participation in the game of make-believe: “Participation involves imagining about ourselves 
as well as about the characters and situations of the fiction – but not just imagining that such 
and such is true of ourselves. We imagine doing things, experiencing things, feeling in certain 
ways” (Walton 1997, 38). Think for example of Stephen King´s Cujo. The novel tells the story 
of Cujo, a St. Bernard dog who is bitten by a rabid bat and goes mad, killing several people. 
According to Walton, the quasi-fear I experience while reading the novel is explained by my 
imagining from the inside. During my imaginative engagement, I imagine myself inhabiting 
the same world as Cujo, I imagine myself seeing Cujo as it goes on a murderous rampage. As 
a result, I experience certain feelings: my palms start sweating, my heart races. And so it is 
fictionally true that I fear Cujo, I experience quasi-fear.   
To explain why this imagining from the inside does not cause actual but quasi-emotions, 
Walton turns to simulation theory. According to Walton, the psychological participation in 
fiction can be understood as a simulation because the relevant inputs are not beliefs, but 
imaginings. And if it is possible to say that the inputs are just pretend versions of the states that 
are simulated during the imaginative engagement, it is also possible to say that the outputs of 
the simulation are pretend versions of the simulated states. The outputs are just simulated states 
because they are run off line, that is, they lack the relevant link to behavioural manifestations 
(Walton 1997, 43). So, while these simulated states might be phenomenologically similar to 
actual emotions, it is necessary to say that they only occur in imagination inasmuch as they are 
not manifested in changes in behaviour.  
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However, as we will see in the following section, Greg Currie and Ian Ravenscroft argue that 
simulation theory is compatible with emotional realism (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, 189). 
They agree with Walton that imagination takes as its inputs counterpart states to perception, 
belief and desire. But they also note that emotions can take as their input these counterpart 
states as well. Moreover, Currie and Ravenscroft do not think that the lack of behavioural 
manifestations is enough to claim that emotions have counterpart states in imagination. While 
they agree that simulation is run off line, and therefore it remains disconnected from action, 
this does not mean that the affective states that result from that simulation are not cases of 
genuine full-fledged emotions. 
Like Gendler and Kovakovich, Currie and Ravenscroft use Antonio Damasio’s work to show 
that merely imagined scenarios cause genuine emotional responses. Damasio’s experiments 
show that patients with damage to their prefrontal cortex are incapable of reacting emotionally 
to imagined situations (and even images), and therefore find it difficult to avoid high-risk 
actions by anticipating the emotional responses and bodily changes. This means that genuine 
emotional responses to imagined scenarios are an important part of practical reasoning. Currie 
and Ravescroft also note that emotional responses to imagined scenarios have important 
consequences for thinking about the world as others think about it. Emotional responses to 
imaginings that assist in planning and in understanding others are not different to emotional 
responses to fictional scenarios, but rather form a single psychological kind (Currie and 
Ravenscroft 2002, 197-199). While these emotions toward imagined scenarios might not have 
actual behavioural manifestations, they do have a motivational force in that they impact 
practical reasoning, they are an important part of planning future actions and of understanding 
others. 
The main argument against Walton’s quasi-emotions, is that there are many instances of 
genuine, full-fledged emotions that do not have behavioural manifestations. We can find many 
cases where we experience strong, genuine emotions, and yet fail to act on them. For example, 
I might experience anxiety before giving a talk in a conference, and yet I manage not to storm 
out of the room; or I might experience anger when my dog destroys an important document, 
and yet I manage not to yell at him. If this is so, then it would mean that behavioural 
manifestations cannot be a necessary condition for emotions to count as genuine. And, if 
behavioural manifestations are not a necessary condition for emotions being genuine, it cannot 
be said that emotions toward fiction are not instances of genuine emotions due to the lack of 
behavioural manifestations. 
106 
 
The notion of behavioural manifestation itself is worth examining. Walton argues that genuine 
emotions carry a motivational force, and that this motivational force has behavioural 
manifestations. Because emotions toward fiction do not present behavioural manifestations 
they do not seem to have motivational force and, therefore, are not instances of genuine 
emotions. But the motivational force of emotions should not be understood simply as 
behavioural manifestations, that is, as visible immediate changes in behaviour. On the contrary, 
it looks like the motivational force of emotions would be better understood as a disposition to 
behave in certain ways. And this disposition need not be manifested in immediate actual 
behaviours. Damasio’s experiments show that emotional responses to imagined scenarios do 
have an impact on the agent’s disposition to behave in certain ways: patients who are incapable 
of reacting to imagined scenarios fail to avoid high-risk actions. Emotional responses to 
imagined scenarios feed into practical reasoning even if they do not display immediate 
behavioural manifestations. 
We can say, therefore, that emotional responses to imagined scenarios do have a motivational 
force, even when this motivational force is not displayed in actual behavioural manifestations 
during the imaginative engagement. Richard Moran notes that emotions toward fiction fit the 
pattern of genuine emotions directed at modal facts: things that could have happened, things 
that could have been different, things that we might have done differently (Moran 1994, 78). 
In these cases, the lack of behavioural manifestations might be better explained, not by the lack 
of a motivational force, but by a context that is considered unsuitable for action (e.g. the fact 
that I’m reacting to something that could have been, but that wasn’t). Or, as Gaut suggests, we 
could also explain the lack of behavioural manifestations during the imaginative engagement 
by the absence of desires and appropriate existential beliefs (Gaut 2007, 36). For example, the 
fear I experience while reading Cujo might dispose me to run and hide; but at the same time I 
do not believe Cujo exists, and thus decide it is absurd to hide under the bed. 
On the other hand, the motivational force of emotions could also be manifested in certain bodily 
changes that dispose the agent to react in certain ways, and that are definitely present in 
emotional responses toward fiction. For example, the bodily changes that we undergo when 
experiencing fear actually prepare us for the fight or flight response, and so they reveal a 
disposition to behave in certain ways. And we can actually see these bodily changes in 
responses to merely fictional scenarios: I experience muscular tension and an accelerated heart 
rate when reading Cujo. 
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Finally, it is interesting to note that the motivational force of emotional responses toward 
imagined affairs might also be manifested in what Gendler calls contagion or affective 
transmission, that is, “cases where mere contemplation of an emotionally charged situation 
causes the thinker to behave in a way consistent with the belief that the situation is sufficiently 
probable so as to influence prudent behaviour” (Gendler 2003, 131). Engaging with fictional 
narratives that trigger intense emotional responses often causes this type of affective 
transmission. For instance, even when I know Cujo to be fiction, if my fear is intense I might 
avoid contact with my dog after reading the novel, or I might be particularly attentive to signs 
of rabies or a potential attack. In these cases, the emotions I experience during my imaginative 
engagement with the fictional narrative display their motivational force in actual temporary 
changes in behaviour.  
If quasi-emotions are really felt and they have a motivational force, why should we think that 
they are not instances of genuine, full-fledged emotions? 
Stacie Friend argues in favour of quasi-emotions on cognitivist grounds. While Walton refuses 
to endorse the principle that emotions require beliefs, Friend holds that propositionally 
contentful belief states constitute an essential part and individuate emotions (Friend 2003, 38). 
And precisely because emotions directed at fictional scenarios are not grounded in beliefs but 
imaginings, it is necessary to say that they are not instances of genuine emotions. According to 
Friend, the cognitivist claim is necessary to explain both the motivational force and the 
rationality of emotions. And since emotions toward fiction lack these two features, there is 
good reason to think of them merely as quasi-emotions.  
Friend acknowledges that, as noted by Moran, emotional responses to fiction are similar to 
emotional responses to other entertained scenarios. But she argues that neither of these cases 
should be considered genuine emotions. While it might be that the thought is causally related 
to the response, Friend claims that unless it can be established that the propositional content 
constitutes a component, the response cannot be said to be a genuine emotion (Friend 2003, 
39-40). The phenomenological similarities between responses to imaginings and responses to 
beliefs are not sufficient to claim that they are both cases of genuine emotions.  
Friend notes that appreciators’ dispositional beliefs28 form a belief stock. But she also notes 
that it is possible for appreciators to imagine things that contrast with their belief stock. In fact, 
                                                          
28 Friend distinguishes between dispositional and occurrent beliefs (Friend, 2003, 42). Beliefs are occurrent when 
the subject is consciously aware of them, when she is actively entertaining them. Beliefs are dispositional when 
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the practice of fiction depends on appreciators being capable of bracketing their beliefs to 
participate in the imaginings prescribed by the fictional narrative. This is possible because 
appreciators are capable of compartmentalizing the imaginings. Those imaginings that contrast 
with the belief stock remain attached to the content of the fictional narrative, and are not 
incorporated into the belief stock.29 The same thing happens with emotions toward fiction. 
According to Friend, it is possible to identify both occurrent and dispositional emotions; 
dispositional emotions form an emotional stock that is consistent with our belief stock (Friend 
2003, 44). On her view, emotional responses to fiction are not consistent with the belief stock 
because they do not have beliefs, but imaginings, as their constitutive element. To explain these 
emotions, not only would we need to accept that emotions sometimes are not constituted by a 
belief state, but we would need to accept contradictions within the emotional stock (Friend 
2003, 43-44). 
Even if we denied the claim that emotions are constituted by beliefs, and, therefore, we denied 
that our emotional stock needs to be consistent with the belief stock, it would still be necessary 
to account for the inconsistencies within the emotional stock that would derive from the 
emotional asymmetry in our engagement with some instances of counter-moral fictions. For 
example, we would need to account for the fact that we feel strong sympathy for Walter White 
but not for Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. Friend claims that “Avoiding contradictions among 
our emotions can be just as important to rationality as avoiding contradictions among our 
beliefs, because they too play a role in practical reasoning: inconsistent desires will prevent us 
from attaining our goals” (Friend 2003, 44). For this reason, Friend claims that emotional 
responses to fiction are never incorporated to the emotional stock because they cannot be 
detached from the make-believe. And this is explained by the fact that emotional responses to 
fiction are not instances of genuine emotions. Inasmuch as they cannot be detached from the 
representation, and be incorporated into the emotional stock, it must be said that such responses 
are only quasi-emotions.  
Friend’s argument for quasi-emotions looks like a tempting way to explain asymmetric 
emotions and the discontinuity thesis. As I said before, if it is true that the engagement with 
counter-moral fictions is possible because of an asymmetry between emotional responses to 
                                                          
the subject possesses a belief, but she is not actively and consciously thinking about it. The subject’s set of beliefs 
about the world forms her belief stock; these beliefs are dispositional while they are not being actively used by 
the subject. 
29 Friend takes the notions of incorporating and compartmentalizing from Richard Gerrig (1993). She notes that 
it is also possible to add beliefs to our belief stock as a result of our imaginative engagement.  
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fictional and real scenarios, it might be better to say that we experience radically different 
emotional responses to fiction because these responses are not instances of genuine, full-
fledged emotions. Moreover, the discontinuity thesis seems to endorse the claim that there is 
an important distance between imagining and believing. Inasmuch as imaginings can remain 
attached to the fictional narrative, appreciators do not need to import their belief stock, thus 
allowing for important differences between their evaluative attitudes in fiction and in their 
everyday lives. At the same time, the fact that imaginings are not incorporated into the belief 
stock allows appreciators to engage with what they recognise as immorality in fiction, as it 
happens in cases of fictional immorality. And, if this is so, it is tempting to say that the 
emotional asymmetry is enabled by the difference between imaginings and beliefs. 
Appreciators would then allow themselves to respond to fiction in ways they would not 
normally allow because the quasi-emotions do not require them to modify their belief and 
emotional stocks. Emotional responses to fiction would then be liberated from appreciators’ 
actual affective responses. 
However, there is an important difficulty in Friend’s account. According to her, the link 
between emotions and practical reasoning requires that the emotional stock does not contain 
inconsistencies. It is, therefore, necessary to claim that emotional responses to fiction are not 
incorporated to the emotional stock, as they would be inconsistent, which is why they can only 
be regarded as quasi-emotions. But she overlooks the fact that our emotional stock, that is, the 
set of our everyday genuine emotional responses, often includes conflicting emotions. Patricia 
Greenspan notes that rational subjects often experience contrary emotions. For example, I 
experience both happiness and sadness when I realise my daughter has grown and is no longer 
a baby. It would follow from Friend’s argument that either I have to be regarded as irrational, 
or some of my responses are not instances of genuine, full-fledged emotions. 
Friend argues that, just as the belief stock must remain without contradictions and depends on 
an effort to represent the world correctly, the emotional stock needs to remain without 
contradictions to fulfil its role in practical reasoning. Quasi-emotions are only quasi-emotions 
because they cannot be incorporated to the emotional stock; and they cannot be incorporated 
to the emotional stock because that would cause important inconsistencies. However, 
Greenspan argues that the appropriateness of emotions is not quite the same as truth. So, while 
beliefs aim at representing the world correctly, emotions have different criteria of rationality. 
In the case of emotions, appropriateness “depends on the adequacy of certain reasons for an 
emotion, the facts that make it suited to its object” (Greenspan 1980, 236). For an emotion to 
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be appropriate, therefore, it needs to be justified. Contrary to truth that depends on the correct 
representation of the world, appropriateness allows for conflicting emotions inasmuch as two 
different emotions can be appropriate for different reasons.30 
The second section of this chapter will go over the notions of rationality and appropriateness 
of emotional responses toward fiction in more detail, but I would like to point out here that the 
emotional asymmetry and the discontinuity found in the engagement with counter-moral 
fictions might be explained precisely because the fictional context provides a different 
justification for otherwise inappropriate emotions. As Friend rightly argues, the emotions 
toward fiction remain attached to the fictional narrative. But this is not because they cannot be 
incorporated into the emotional stock, but because it is the fictional narrative that provides the 
necessary justification to hold conflicting emotions.31 
So, if the presumed asymmetry between quasi-emotions and emotions can be explained away 
by showing that conflicting emotions are common (and rational), and if the lack of either an 
existential belief and behavioural manifestations can also be explained without alluding to 
quasi-emotions, it looks like there are no good reasons to claim that emotional responses to 
fiction are instances of quasi-emotions, and not instances of genuine, full-fledged emotions.  
 
4.1.2 Realist accounts of emotional responses toward fiction 
While irrealist accounts of emotional responses toward fiction initially seemed like an 
attractive candidate to explain the emotional asymmetries that ground non-moral allegiance to 
certain types of counter-moral fictions, the difference between ‘quasi-emotions’ and genuine 
emotions was unsupported by either the lack of behavioural manifestations or emotional 
inconsistencies. Therefore, there do not seem to be good reasons for defending that emotional 
responses toward fiction are not instances of genuine emotions. Realist solutions to the paradox 
of fiction claim that emotional responses toward fiction are instances of genuine, full-fledged 
                                                          
30 Friend acknowledges that her account of quasi-emotions depends on a cognitivist account of the emotions. The 
idea of an emotional stock clearly depends on emotions being constituted by a propositionally contentful belief 
state. But Greenspan’s argument for the different criteria of rationality of emotions and beliefs aims precisely at 
showing that cognitivism is wrong. Without cognitivism, Friend’s account of quasi-emotions is subject to the 
same criticisms advanced against Walton. 
31 As was just said, the justification of emotions works unlike truth: while truth depends on judgements to fit the 
facts, the justification for emotional responses depends only on having reasons to experience those emotions. 
When it comes to emotions toward fiction, the fictional narrative is just what provides appreciators with the 
reasons to experience certain emotions over others. These reasons, nevertheless, can only be found in the narrative 
and our experience of it, and thus remain attached to it. 
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emotions. As said before, these accounts deny that genuine emotional responses require beliefs. 
And because they argue that genuine emotional responses toward fiction are possible because 
emotions do not require the corresponding belief, Gaut refers to them as realist accounts of 
emotion. Contrary to the make-believe solutions examined above, these accounts argue that it 
is possible to say that appreciators experience genuine emotions during their imaginative 
engagement.  
Realist accounts of emotional responses toward fiction seem to be intuitively attractive because 
they take into consideration the phenomenological robustness of the emotional experience 
during the imaginative engagement. They need to explain, however, (1) how it is possible for 
these responses to feel genuine without the necessary beliefs, and (2) what happens to the 
motivational force of emotion if it does not lead to behavioural manifestations. In the following 
paragraphs I examine some examples of realist accounts of emotions toward fiction32 to show 
that they can successfully accommodate an answer to the above questions, and that they are, 
therefore, better candidates to account for a rich imaginative engagement with fiction. The 
emotional asymmetries noted in the previous chapter will, therefore, need to be explained from 
emotional realism as well. I do not argue in favour of a particular version of emotional realism. 
Instead, in examining some realist accounts, I argue that emotional realism can accommodate 
the discontinuity thesis by explaining emotional asymmetries. 
As I said in the previous section, unlike Walton, Greg Currie and Ian Ravenscroft argue for 
emotional realism from simulation theory. They argue that, while it is necessary to posit 
imaginative counterparts of mental states, it is not necessary to posit an imaginative counterpart 
of emotions, such as quasi-emotions. According to them, emotions should be understood as 
“perception-like sensitivities to what we might call, generally, degrees of congruence. There is 
a high degree of congruence between the world, or some aspect of it, and myself when the 
world is, roughly speaking, the way I want it to be” (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, 193-194). 
Emotions thus depend on other mental states to respond to the degrees of congruence. When it 
comes to emotions in response to imagined scenarios, emotions take as their input the 
imaginative counterparts of the relevant mental states (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, 196). 
                                                          
32The chapter focuses on antijudgmentalist solutions to the paradox of fiction, although there are other types of 
realist accounts. I do not examine thought theories (Carroll, 1990; Lamarque, 1981; Smith, 1995b). I take as a 
given that emotional responses toward fiction are actually directed at the fictional characters and events. I do not 
examine Alex Neill’s amendment to the coordination condition either, although it can be regarded as a version of 
an antijudgmentalist solution. Neill argues that emotional responses to fiction do not depend on the judgement 
that something is the case, but rather they depend on the judgement that something is fictionally the case (Neill, 
1993). 
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Appreciators respond to the degree of congruence between the fictional world as presented by 
the narrative and how they want it to be. In this sense, they argue that imagination is 
“transparent to emotion”: actual emotions take imaginative counterparts of the relevant mental 
states as their input. Emotional responses toward fiction are genuine emotions, and they feel 
like genuine emotions, even in the absence of belief, because actual emotions can take 
imaginings as their input, not just beliefs.  
According to simulation theory, appreciators respond emotionally to fiction because they 
simulate a hypothetical reader who learns about the events narrated in the work of fiction. The 
imaginative engagement thus consists in this role-playing in which appreciators form off-line 
versions of the states (or I states) of this hypothetical reader. These I states are the input 
necessary for emotional responses (Currie, 1997). The reason why emotions toward fiction lack 
behavioural manifestations is because they are run off-line. They do, nevertheless, have a 
motivational force insofar as they play an important role in practical reasoning. As we saw 
before, Currie and Ravenscroft take Damasio’s findings on the relevance of emotional 
responses to imagined scenarios, to show that their role in practical reasoning gives simulation 
theory important reasons to hold these emotions are genuine.  
Aaron Meskin and Jonathan Weinberg argue33 that Currie and Ravenscroft’s account fails, 
among other reasons, because it is egocentric: simulation theory requires that appreciators use 
their own beliefs to model the beliefs of someone else (Meskin and Weinberg 2003). This 
would seem problematic for explaining the emotional asymmetry found in our imaginative 
engagement with deviant perspectives in fiction. Emotional asymmetries are so called because 
some of the responses we experience when engaging with fiction significantly contrast with 
the attitudes we would normally have in an actual scenario. So, if this simulation model is 
necessarily egocentric, it is not clear how it would be able to explain those cases where 
responses toward fiction significantly depart from the responses appreciators would normally 
                                                          
33 Meskin and Weinberg do not take posture in the realist/irrealist debate, although they do provide an explanation 
for the phenomenological robustness of emotional responses to fiction and for the lack of behavioural 
manifestations. They use the cognitive architecture developed by Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich to advance an 
explanation for the emotional responses to fiction. According to them, emotional responses to fiction can be 
explained by alluding to the Possible Worlds Box (PWB). This box takes input from perceptual systems and it 
contains representations that mimic beliefs. The PWB is connected to the affect system, the same system attached 
to the belief box, and can thus cause emotional responses that are phenomenologically robust. In their account, 
the lack of behavioural consequences is explained because the PWB is not connected to the action system (Meskin 
and Weinberg 2003, 30-31). While they do not want to argue in favour of emotional realism, their account might 
be seen as an argument against positing quasi-emotions. As we saw in the previous section, Walton’s main 
argument for quasi-emotions was the lack of behavioural manifestations. So if we can explain why emotional 
responses to fiction lack this feature, it might be enough to show that it is not necessary to distinguish between 
quasi and genuine emotions. 
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have. Meskin and Weinberg are nevertheless wrong in claiming that Currie and Ravenscroft’s 
account is necessarily egocentric. Currie explicitly characterizes simulation as role-playing; 
and this role playing “involves a substantial departure from my normal, real-life mental set” 
(Currie, 1997, 73). Currie and Ravenscroft’s simulation account can explain emotional 
asymmetries from a realist perspective by claiming that during their imaginative engagement 
appreciators simulate someone with a radically different perspective; and this simulation works 
as an input for genuine emotional responses that are run off-line. 
Tamar Gendler and Karson Kovakovich’s solution to the paradox of fiction is also a realist 
account that can solve the problems that irrealist solutions could not. They argue that emotional 
responses to fiction can be explained because “we tend to initially interpret all cognitive and 
sensory input as indicative of the presence of the ordinary source of phenomena of its type. 
Such instantaneous interpretations are not robust enough to be properly considered beliefs” 
(Gendler and Kovakovich 2005, 247). For example, if I watch Cujo’s 1983 film adaptation, the 
sudden appearance of rabid Cujo in my screen is enough for me to interpret it as the presence 
of an actual rabid dog, thus triggering an affective response. So, while their solution to the 
paradox of fiction depends on preserving the belief (in the fictional character of the scenario) 
and the response condition, they still note that those who deny the belief condition, the illusion 
theorists, are right in showing that appreciators seem to treat fictional characters and events in 
the same way as real characters and situations (Gendler and Kovakovich 2005, 243). 
Gendler and Kovakovich, like Currie and Ravenscroft, use Damasio’s experiments to show 
that fictional emotions are instances of genuine, rational emotions. The imaginative experience 
of potential consequences of our actions triggers automatic responses, and it is crucial for 
practical reasoning that these responses exhibit the same characteristics as emotions toward 
real events. Gendler and Kovakovich refer to these emotions as simulated emotions, and they 
argue that they are indirectly connected to action precisely because of their role in practical 
reasoning. Thus, they argue that the differences between actual and simulated emotions are 
found in the way the emotions are processed, but not in their motivational structure (Gendler 
and Kovakovich 2005, 249-250). According to them, simulated emotions are instances of 
genuine emotions. Because simulated emotions are responses to imagined events, Gendler and 
Kovakovich argue that simulated and fictional emotions, emotional responses to fiction, are 
similar.34 While the former refer to projections, the latter refer to situations we believe to be 
                                                          
34 Robert Stecker argues against Gendler and Kovakovich that there are important differences between fictional 
and simulated emotions to be noted. So, while it might be true that simulated emotions are instances of genuine 
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fictional. But they are both genuine because they are genuinely felt. Fictional emotions are 
genuine and rational emotional responses toward characters and events we believe to be 
fictional. Actual and fictional emotions differ in their subject-matter. But, just as simulated 
emotions, they are essential to our practical reasoning. And this is not new: Gendler and 
Kovakovich note that many authors have defended the importance of engaging with fictional 
scenarios to broaden our range of simulated encounters that would help in our practical 
reasoning (Gendler and Kovakovich 2005, 252). 
Gendler and Kovakovich’s account is compatible with emotional asymmetries. They argue that 
emotional responses toward fiction are genuine because imagination works like a simulation: 
the imaginative engagement with a work of fiction is simply like engaging with a simulated 
event the agent knows to be fictional. If the work of fiction should be understood as a simulated 
scenario, the modes of representation that inform the fictional perspective shape the simulation 
and our responses to it. The importance of framing is clear when we consider that, according 
to Gendler and Kovakovich, appreciators interpret the input presented by the simulation as 
                                                          
emotions, fictional emotions are not. He argues that simulated emotions are strongly bound to action, since they 
are part of deliberation, but that fictional emotions are dissociated from action because they do not seem to imply 
a behavioural disposition. The main reason for this difference is that fictional emotions are effectively distanced 
from the fictional scenario. This distance “occurs when one both lacks an inclination to act on and has an 
inclination to reflect on one’s emotional response to a state of affairs as well as to the state of affairs itself” (Stecker 
2011, 305). Because appreciators are distanced from fictional scenarios, they are actually capable of reflecting on 
and learning from their emotional responses. The phenomenological similarities between genuine emotions and 
fictional emotions disappear when we consider that, according to Stecker, the distance causes emotions toward 
fiction to be voluntary: “(…) whether and how we respond to fiction seems much more optional than whether and 
how we do so in the face of real events. People have blamelessly different emotional responses to the same 
fictional events” (Stecker 2011, 305-306). 
I believe, however, that Stecker’s criticism is flawed on three grounds. First, it is not clear why the distance from 
action characteristic of fictional emotions cannot be found in simulated emotions as well. While it is true that 
simulated emotions play an important role in deliberation, and are therefore connected to action, it does not follow 
that simulated emotions are necessarily followed by an immediate behavioural manifestation. Second, and more 
importantly, it does not seem clear to me that fictional emotions imply a reflective distance from our emotional 
experience. Our capacity to reflect on our emotions toward fiction can only be said to occur on a reflection on our 
imaginative engagement with the fictional narrative, but not during the emotional experience itself. That is, in a 
later reflective exercise of my imaginative engagement with Cujo I might realise that my fear is absurd given that 
rabid dogs do not go on murderous rampages. But it might be difficult to do so while I am being carried away 
with fear during my imaginative experience of the novel. The emotional responses toward fiction are often so 
intense that it is difficult to distance ourselves from what we are feeling. Moreover, my capacity to reflect on my 
emotional experience is not exclusive to emotional responses toward fiction. On careful reflection I might come 
to see that my fear of daddy longlegs spiders is just as absurd as my fear of Cujo.  This means that it is not clear 
that our emotional response toward fiction can be subject to a simultaneous reflective revision any more than 
genuine emotions are. Third, fictional emotions can be as overwhelming as genuine emotions. The variations of 
the intensity of emotional responses might be explained by the expressive features of the narrative and its aesthetic 
merits. But in any case, it does not seem like emotional responses in fiction are voluntary. It could be, however, 
that when Stecker talks about the voluntary nature of emotions to fiction he is trying to account for the emotional 
asymmetry. In this sense, he is right to point out that there seem to be differences in how appreciators allow 
themselves to respond emotionally to fictions in ways they would not normally respond. And, as I said before, a 
realist account of fictional emotions needs to be able to explain these differences. 
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“indicative of the presence of the ordinary source phenomena of its type”. This means that if 
the narrative frames the fictional events as having certain evaluative properties, and the 
simulation is adequate, appreciators will interpret the fictional scenario as having just such 
evaluative properties and will respond accordingly.   
Jenefer Robinson also advances a realist solution to the paradox of fiction that emphasizes the 
role of a narrative’s formal devices and a subject’s interests, and that is thus a successful 
explanation of emotional asymmetries. Like Gendler and Kovakovich’s account, her 
characterisation of fictional emotions does not depend on a propositional counterpart of belief 
in imagination. Robinson denies the coordination condition inasmuch as she argues that a belief 
is not necessary for an emotional response. Instead, she argues that emotional responses are 
processes. The process begins with an affective appraisal, a non-cognitive evaluation that 
triggers a set of physiological responses, and that is followed by a cognitive monitoring of the 
situation (Robinson, 2005). Some processes might be more complex that others, so that the 
affective appraisal might be triggered by a perception or a thought. What is attractive about 
Robinson’s account is that she can easily accommodate the cognitive element found in some 
emotional responses, without claiming that a propositional attitude is in fact a constitutive 
element of the emotion. The most complex cases of emotion might be those where there is 
“cognitive activity prior to the affective appraisal, but it is only after there is an affective 
appraisal that there is an emotional response. (…) To put the point dramatically, what turns a 
cognition into an emotion is an affective appraisal and its concomitant physiological changes.” 
(Robinson 2005, 62) 
What are the consequences of this approach to emotion for emotions toward fiction? Robinson 
claims that the emotional processes in fiction are the same as when appreciators respond to an 
actual scenario. Depending on the type of fictional narrative, appreciators are responding either 
to perceptions, as it would be the case of visual narratives, or thoughts, as it would be the case 
of literary fictions; in addition to this, appreciators also respond to the aesthetic features or 
formal devices of the narrative. If everyday emotional processes start with an affective 
appraisal of a situation that puts the subject’s interests, or those she feels close to, at stake, 
fictional narratives trigger the appraisal by getting appreciators involved with the characters 
and the situations narrated via the prescribed perspective. This non-cognitive appraisal in turn 
triggers in appreciators physiological responses that focus the attention on the emotional 
situation even further. Finally, appreciators carry out a cognitive monitoring of the situation 
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that confirms or disconfirms the original appraisal, and that influences the action tendencies 
(Robinson 2005, 113-116). 
According to Robinson’s account, therefore, the phenomenological similarities between actual 
and fictional emotions are explained by the fact that the affective appraisal triggers the same 
physiological responses as in real life scenarios. Fictional emotions are really felt because the 
bodily changes appreciators feel are the same. The behavioural differences, on the other hand, 
are explained by the results of cognitive monitoring. The cognitive monitoring tells 
appreciators that the events are fictional, and that they have no control over them. What is 
important to note is that this says nothing about the genuineness of the emotional response, 
since the behavioural output is not part of the emotional process, even in cases of emotions 
toward real events. The motivational force of emotions toward fiction is manifested differently 
because the cognitive monitoring of the emotional process shows that the situation assessed is 
in fact fictional. The cognitive monitoring of the emotional process helps in solving another 
issue highlighted by Friend. The reason why fictional emotions do not have a direct and 
immediate impact on practical reasoning, as actual emotions do, and on appreciators’ belief 
stock, is because the cognitive monitoring directs the right behavioural consequences. 
Emotional responses toward fictional narratives are instances of genuine emotions as they 
involve an affective appraisal, certain physiological changes, and a cognitive monitoring.  
Robinson’s account can, in addition to this, explain the emotional asymmetries found during 
our imaginative engagement with deviant narratives. As said before, she emphasizes the role 
of a work’s formal devices, the modes of representation, in manipulating appreciators’ 
responses. But this feature can also be found in Gendler and Kovakovich’s view. What is most 
interesting in Robinson’s account, and what makes it more attractive for explaining not only 
genuine emotions toward fiction but asymmetric genuine emotions toward fiction, is the 
emphasis she puts on a subject’s interests and their role in triggering affective appraisals.  
In chapter 3, I argued that familiarity is important when prescribing deviant non-moral 
allegiance because it is this familiarity that drives appreciators to overlook moral judgements 
in favour of other non-moral considerations. Robinson’s account helps in explaining how 
familiarity grounds affective-allegiance to deviant perspectives in fiction. The prescribed 
perspective of a work of fiction shapes appreciators’ interests by getting them involved with 
the characters and situations narrated. As such, the prescribed perspective shapes emotional 
responses by showing that the characters appreciators’ feel close to, and their interests, are at 
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stake. Familiarity is important for the engagement with fictional narratives because it makes 
appreciators feel that the characters’ interests are their interests as well. This triggers affective 
appraisals that have at their core not our regular interests, but our interests as shaped by the 
fictional perspective. It is important for appreciators to feel like immoral characters endorsed 
by the narrative are one of their own because making them feel close brings their interests in 
line. The reason why we find asymmetric genuine emotions toward fiction is because the 
narratives trigger affective appraisals of appreciator’s interests as they were shaped by the 
fictional perspective.  
 
Irrealist accounts of emotional responses toward fiction had only the lack of appropriate beliefs 
and behavioural consequences as a motivation to suggest that emotional responses to fiction 
cannot be understood as instances of genuine emotions. The accounts presented above, 
however, are able to explain how fictional emotions are instances of genuine emotions even in 
the absence of those features. Realist accounts, therefore, seem more attractive to explain the 
emotional experience during the imaginative engagement as they can account for the 
phenomenological similarities without having to propose a counterpart of an existing state. 
Moreover, the realist accounts examined above can explain why emotional asymmetries occur 
when engaging with some instances of counter-moral fiction.  
 
4.2 Appropriate responses to fiction 
So far I have argued that audiences engage with fictional counter-moral perspectives because 
the emotional responses they experience during their imaginative engagement ground non-
moral allegiance. Appreciators experience emotional responses to fictional counter-moral 
perspectives that they would not normally approve in actual scenarios; and, in turn, this means 
that they ally with counter-moral perspectives they would not normally support. The 
discontinuity thesis that claims that appreciators do not necessarily import their evaluative 
attitudes during their imaginative engagement, needs to be able to account for such emotional 
asymmetries to explain the discontinuity of evaluative attitudes. In the previous section I 
claimed that, although it seems attractive to explain emotional asymmetries by arguing that 
responses toward fiction are only quasi-emotions, emotional irrealism does not provide a 
satisfactory account of our emotional engagement with fictional narratives. On the contrary, 
emotional realism has proven to be a more attractive account of emotional responses toward 
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fiction. It can explain the phenomenological robustness of the emotional experience; and it can 
account for the presumed lack of motivational force. In addition to this, we have seen that 
realist accounts can explain emotional asymmetries. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to 
determine whether genuine asymmetric emotions in fiction can be evaluated under the same 
criteria of appropriateness. In the previous chapter, I concluded that the notion of ethical 
appropriateness becomes irrelevant for emotional responses to merely fictional immorality. 
However, if fictional emotions are instances of genuine emotions, it would seem that the 
criteria of appropriateness should remain the same. That is, if these asymmetric emotions are 
genuine emotions, why is ethical appropriateness irrelevant in instances of fictional 
immorality? This section examines the notions of rationality and appropriateness when applied 
to emotional responses to fiction to determine why the notions of fittingness and 
appropriateness can be said to work differently for different types of counter-moral fictions. 
As I mentioned in the discussion of Friend’s account of quasi-emotions, while rationality in 
beliefs seems to depend on truth and consistency, Patricia Greenspan argues that emotions do 
not follow these criteria of rationality. According to Greenspan, the difference between truth 
and appropriateness is that truth depends on judgements to fit the facts, while appropriateness 
of emotions depends only on the notion of justification. That is, emotional responses are not 
appropriate insofar as they represent the state of the world correctly, but in that the subject has 
reasons to experience such responses. Greenspan thus argues that the difference between 
fittingness and justification disappears when it comes to emotions: emotions are fitting when 
they are justified. Appropriateness of emotions, thus, depends only on having certain reasons 
for experiencing an emotion; these reasons are what make the emotions suited to their object. 
If reasons are what determine the fittingness of emotions to their objects, Greenspan notes that 
it might be possible to have reasons to feel conflicting emotions to the same object: two 
conflicting emotions might both be appropriate for different reasons (Greenspan 1980, 236).  
But even if it is possible to say that two conflicting emotions are appropriate in this sense to 
their object, we might still want to argue that a set of reasons should outweigh the other. So, 
while both emotions might be appropriate for different reasons, the conflict in emotions should 
be resolved by comparing their justification. Greenspan notes that while it is possible to solve 
a conflict in our emotions by comparing reasons, it is not necessary to do so. Emotions involve 
an evaluative attitude. Even the reasons a subject might have against having an emotional 
response are not enough to cancel the reasons she has for experiencing the emotion. Emotions 
“are based on reactions to particular facts, as they come into consciousness, rather than 
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consideration of all the relevant reasons” (Greenspan 1980, 237). Robinson agrees that each 
appraisal focuses on specific salient features of the situation according to the subject’s interests: 
“Our emotional pathways are fast and dirty, emphasizing the situation as perceived in terms of 
my interests and desires. I get not a dispassionate picture of the total situation, but a partial 
picture based on what appeals to my interests.” (Robinson 2005, 53)  
This suggests that it is not necessary to propose different criteria of rationality and 
appropriateness for actual and fictional emotions to account for the asymmetry. If Greenspan 
is right and emotions’ appropriateness is determined by the reasons that justify the emotion, 
the fictional narrative, and its fictional context, might give appreciators different reasons to 
experience asymmetric emotions. That is, the fictional narrative, with its fictional context, 
might give appreciators reasons to respond emotionally in ways they would not normally 
respond when facing an actual scenario. Moreover, in instances of fictional immorality, the 
quarantining effect of the fictional prescriptions might give appreciators license to favour a 
certain set of reasons over others, and to include others altogether; it might give them license 
to favour considerations of fit over moral considerations.  
 
4.2.1 Rationality and appropriateness of fictional emotions 
According to Greenspan, the criteria of appropriateness of emotional responses to fiction 
depends on the notion of justification. That is, an emotional response toward a fictional 
narrative is appropriate if we have reasons that would make the response fitting. So, if our aim 
is to determine whether appropriateness works differently for genuine emotions toward fiction 
and genuine emotions toward real scenarios, it is necessary to examine what counts as a 
legitimate reason to say a given emotion is justified.  
It could be that both emotions toward fiction and emotions toward real scenarios are justified 
by actual attitudes. The problem, however, is that emotional responses being justified by actual 
attitudes would fail to explain the emotional asymmetries explored in the previous chapter. 
Instead, it seems that imagined attitudes provide reasons for an emotional response to fiction 
being fitting. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be the case that any imagined attitude can count 
as a reason during our emotional engagement with fictional narratives. As Gaut rightly notes, 
we can assess appreciators’ responses to fiction. We can say that some responses to fictional 
narratives are not warranted by the narrative, while some others are. So this means that fictional 
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emotions must also be guided by a criterion of rationality, even if this criterion does not refer 
to actual beliefs that would serve as reasons to justify an emotion (Gaut 2007, 218-219).  
The criterion of rationality for appreciators’ emotional responses must refer to their capacity to 
identify reasons, and to respond appropriately to these reasons. In the case of fictional 
emotions, these reasons must be found in the imaginings prescribed by the fictional narrative. 
So, while fictional emotions are instances of genuine emotions, the reasons that make them 
rational are found in the imaginings prescribed by the narrative, rather than in appreciators’ 
actual attitudes. Gaut thus proposes the following criterion of rationality for fictional 
emotions35: “The rationality of fear of objects believed to exist requires one to believe that they 
are dangerous; and the rationality of fear of objects merely imagined to exist requires one 
(correctly) to imagine that they are dangerous.” (Gaut 2007, 220) It is important to note that 
the differences in the rationality conditions of actual and fictional emotions could be used as 
an argument in favour of the make-believe accounts of fictional emotions, but Gaut argues that 
this difference “need not be traced to a difference in the emotion: the difference can be traced 
to a difference in the mode of cognition of their objects – that is, to whether they are imagined 
or believed to exist.” (Gaut 2007, 223) 
It is possible to say, therefore, that appreciators’ emotional responses to fiction are justified by 
what I have previously identified as the fictional context. Appreciators follow the fictional 
prescriptions to determine which emotional response would fit the scenario presented by the 
narrative. But it is important to note that the reasons to feel a fictional emotion are not just 
found in a set of propositions made true by the narrative. As argued by Greenspan and 
Robinson, the appraisal involved in the emotional response depends on the subjects’ interests. 
The rationality of fictional emotions is not just a matter of what response is merited all things 
considered, but it depends on a partial consideration of the fictional scenario according to 
appreciators’ interests. And, again, it is important to remember that appreciators’ interests in 
the fictional narrative are moulded by the perspective. As we saw in the first chapter, the 
narrative unveils the fictional world from a specific point of view that frames not just the 
narrative, but appreciators’ responses. So, while the rationality of actual emotions depends only 
on the subject’s actual interests (her beliefs and desires), the rationality of fictional emotions 
                                                          
35 Gaut proposes two other criteria of rationality for fictional emotions that I will not examine in this chapter: a 
motivational criterion and an affective criterion. Under the motivational criterion, “An emotion is irrational if it 
motivates action, though its subject lacks motivation-relevant beliefs.” (Gaut 2007, 223) The affective criterion, 
on the other hand, claims that an emotion is irrational “if experiencing it involves suffering to no point” (Gaut 
2007, 225).  
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depends on appreciators’ interests according to the narrative’s prescribed perspective. The key 
to the asymmetry that appreciators allow in their responses to fiction and real life might be in 
how their interests are manipulated by the fictional perspective.  
Precisely because emotional responses do not only attend to what is true in the fiction, Currie 
introduces the notion of congruency as a criterion for the appropriateness of emotional 
responses to fiction. Emotional responses to fiction are appropriate if they are congruent with 
the narrative. Congruency here refers not only to the events narrated, but to the emotion 
expressed, to the perspective that frames the narration (Currie 1990, 213). The notion of 
expression is not unproblematic, but Currie tackles the issues by alluding to the author-narrator. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, hypothetical intentionalism seems essential in trying to 
identify the prescribed perspective. In this sense, the audience is not trying to reconstruct the 
intentions of the actual author, but they aim at the best reconstruction of the author given all 
the available evidence. Applied to emotional responses and the notion of congruency, 
appreciators’ fictional emotions are appropriate if they are congruent with the emotions 
expressed by the author-narrator, that is, the emotions expressed by the perspective and 
prescribed by the framework. According to Currie, a sensitive reader is that who responds 
according to what the perspective prescribes.  
In the case of fictional narratives, however, the reasons to feel are not exhausted by the fictional 
truth and the fictional perspective. As said in the previous chapter, the fictional context also 
includes the formal aspects of the narrative. Appreciators’ responses are partly shaped by the 
aesthetic devices deployed by the narrative. Robinson rightly notes that in the case of artworks, 
affective appraisals are manipulated by the aesthetic features of the work. An appropriate 
response to the fictional narrative, therefore, will also have to consider the formal features and 
the aesthetic merits of the work. Currie claims that a refined response is one that is not only 
congruent, but also aesthetically justified by the formal features of the work: “The sensitive 
reader is one who knows what emotion is expressed in the work and is therefore able to respond 
congruently to it; the refined reader is one who responds congruently only to works that have 
a certain kind of merit.” (Currie 1990, 214)  
 
4.2.2 Ethical appropriateness of emotions toward fiction 
It could be argued, however, that the criteria examined in the previous paragraphs refer only to 
the criteria of rationality of fictional emotions, and that the notion of appropriateness of 
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emotions should include further considerations beyond the considerations of fit. So if the goal 
is to determine whether it is possible to say that asymmetric emotions to fiction are governed 
by different criteria of appropriateness, the analysis should take into account moral 
considerations and not just fittingness. Paisley Livingston and Alfred Mele argue that moral 
considerations are relevant for whether certain emotional responses to fiction are appropriate. 
They argue that, in addition to congruency and the aesthetic merits of the work, appreciators 
should consider the moral content of the narrative when determining whether a response is 
artistically merited (Livingston and Mele 1997). According to the authors, the criteria of 
appropriateness of emotional responses to fiction should take into consideration the artistic 
merits of the work, rather than only the aesthetic features; and they argue that moral 
considerations are an important part of the artistic value of an artwork. If, as we saw in the 
previous section, the appropriateness of emotion was determined solely by the fictional 
prescriptions, the perspective, and the formal devices, it would be possible to defend what 
Livingston and Mele call the “autonomy of fictional events thesis”: the thesis that only fictional 
events are relevant in determining the appropriateness of emotional responses (Livingston and 
Mele 1997, 166). However, they argue against the autonomy of fictional emotions, and claim 
instead that the criteria of appropriateness of emotional responses to fiction follow the criteria 
of actual emotions, and that the moral considerations need to be taken into account to determine 
whether a response is appropriate to its object.  
In the previous chapters I argued that the fictional context includes also contextual 
considerations, not only regarding the origin of the work (as this is necessary to reconstruct the 
author-narrator, and determine whether a work is an instance of fictional or actual immorality), 
but also regarding the reception of the fictional narrative. It should not be surprising, therefore, 
that these contextual factors need to be considered when determining what are the appropriate 
responses to a given fictional scenario. And if these considerations are part of the fictional 
context and, therefore, of the artistic identity of the work, it should not be surprising either to 
claim, as Livingston and Mele do, that the artistically justified emotional response needs to 
account for moral considerations as well:  
Moral factors, we claimed above, are also directly relevant to an artistic 
appreciation of a work of fiction. This is the case because people can skilfully 
devise fictions that we have good reasons to deem immoral, in which case 
we should not want, for a variety of reasons, to be the kind of people who 
experience congruent emotions. Although the objectionable emotions are 
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congruent to the fiction, they are not congruent to the kind of life we value 
and want to lead.(Livingston and Mele 1997, 172)  
According to this view, fictional emotions are artistically justified and, therefore, appropriate, 
only when they are morally justified. 
Livingston and Mele further argue that if the moral criterion is decisive for the appropriateness 
of emotional responses to fiction, some appropriate responses are those that in fact violate 
Currie’s criterion of congruency. In some cases, appropriate emotional responses are not those 
that are congruent with the emotions expressed by the narrative, but rather those that are 
contrary to the emotions expressed by the narrative on account of its moral defects (Livingston 
and Mele 1997, 173). Thus, when it comes to counter-moral fictions, a fictional emotion would 
be appropriate when it fails to follow the framework prescribed by the narrative. 
The problem with Livingston and Mele’s account, however, is that presents the same 
difficulties noted in the chapter on the continuity thesis: it is not clear why moral considerations 
always need to be imported to the fictional narrative. In the second chapter I argued that it is 
not enough to claim that moral considerations are special, so that appreciators need to import 
to the fictional world the stock of moral reasons that would be part of the criteria of 
appropriateness of actual emotions. The discontinuity thesis argued, on the contrary, that the 
aesthetic distance, that is, the lack of practical consequences of the engagement with a fictional 
narrative, is what allows appreciators to leave behind their evaluative framework to adopt the 
perspective prescribed by the narrative. The discontinuity thesis needed an explanation for the 
possibility of manipulating appreciators’ evaluative framework; and if the narrative, through 
the perspective and the aesthetic features, manages to make otherwise unacceptable responses 
fitting within the boundaries of the fictional context, it is not clear why moral reasons would 
not fall under the scope of this discontinuity. 
Livingstone and Mele’s account would only work for showing that in instances of actual 
immorality appreciators need to take into account moral and practical reasons in determining 
the appropriateness of their emotional responses. They are right in noting that in some cases 
contextual considerations should make us ignore the prescribed responses, and thus make the 
criterion of congruency irrelevant. But as I have argued in previous chapters, this only is the 
case for those narratives whose fictional prescriptions include claims about the actual world. 
Only in these cases we can say that the necessary aesthetic space was not opened, and thus 
moral and practical considerations remain. The fact that in instances of fictional immorality the 
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deviant claims are quarantined in the fictional world is what allows us to say that moral 
considerations can be ignored.  
Peter Goldie rightly distinguishes between narrative appropriateness and ethical 
appropriateness, and notes that these two senses of appropriateness can diverge (Goldie 2003, 
61-64). Narrative appropriateness refers to the sense highlighted by Currie, that is, to the 
congruence of the responses to the prescribed perspective and to their fit according to the 
relevant aesthetic considerations. Ethical appropriateness refers to the appropriateness of 
responses according to moral and prudential considerations. But, like I said, in some narratives 
these considerations can be ignored because the deviant perspective entails fictional immorality 
only. Emotional responses to fiction, according to Goldie, can be radically different to the 
emotional responses appreciators normally experience precisely because the two senses of 
appropriateness can diverge. Goldie argues that the discordance between narrative and ethical 
appropriateness is possible thanks to the expressive qualities of the work, its aesthetic features, 
and the aesthetic distance. The aesthetic distance, in turn, is made possible by the quarantining 
effects of some fictional narratives, namely, those that are instances of fictional immorality.  
Therefore, in cases of fictional immorality, the notion of appropriateness does not include 
ethical appropriateness; in instances of actual immorality, on the other hand, because of the 
lack of aesthetic distance, appropriateness includes both narrative and ethical appropriateness. 
The criteria of narrative appropriateness of emotional responses to fictional immorality are 
different to the criteria of our everyday responses precisely because the framework manipulates 
our perspective to adopt the prescribed point of view. And the reason why appreciators allow 
for this manipulation is because the responses to the fictional scenario are dissociated from 
action.  
Daniel Jacobson and Justin D’arms also argue that moral considerations should not be taken 
into account when assessing emotional responses to fiction. Contrary to Goldie who 
distinguishes between narrative and ethical appropriateness, Jacobson and D’arms distinguish 
between criteria of fittingness and criteria of appropriateness. In “The moralistic fallacy”, they 
argue that the fittingness of emotional responses refers merely to whether it is right to ascribe 
a certain property to an object, and in this sense to the epistemological conditions that warrant 
a response, rather than considerations that would include moral and prudential reasons 
(Jacobson & D’Arms, 2000, 66). The notion of fittingness they use refers to what Goldie 
identified as narrative appropriateness, that is, it refers to considerations relating to the 
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endorsement of warrant of the responses in the fictional narrative. In this sense, to engage with 
a fictional perspective means to react as dictated by the framework. And to react as required 
by the point of view of the narrative means simply to recognise that a certain response is fitting 
or merited: “Judgements of warrant merely establish what there is most evidence to feel, desire, 
or believe; they focus on epistemic, as opposed to moral or prudential reasons” (Jacobson, 
1997, 173).  
According to Jacobson and D’arms, appropriateness, on the other hand, includes what Goldie 
calls ethical appropriateness. In their view, appropriateness refers to what to feel, all things 
considered. That is, appropriateness includes prudential and moral reasons as well. They argue 
that there are different questions we can ask regarding our responses:  
One can ask a prudential question, whether it is good for you to feel F; or a 
moral question, whether it is right to feel F; or one can ask the all-in question 
of practical reason, whether F is what to feel, all things considered. But none 
of these questions is equivalent to the question of whether F is fitting in the 
sense relevant to whether its object X is Φ. (Jacobson & D’Arms, 2000, 71)  
The important thing to note is that while ethical appropriateness, the all-things-considered 
version of appropriateness, might be relevant for actual emotions, the fictional character of the 
narrative in some cases removes the need for prudential and moral considerations. It is, 
therefore, necessary to emphasise again the asymmetry between fictional and actual 
immorality. Instances of actual immorality require appreciators to evaluate the prescribed 
responses all-things-considered because the relevant aesthetic space is not opened. Emotional 
responses toward actual immorality should be assessed under criteria of appropriateness that 
includes ethical, not just narrative, appropriateness. Instances of fictional immorality, on the 
other hand, allow for criteria of appropriateness that only includes narrative appropriateness  
precisely because the prescriptions do not include claims about the actual state of the world, 
and they are quarantined in the fictional narrative.  
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4.3 The discontinuity of genuine fictional emotions 
Jonathan Gilmore distinguishes between a continuity thesis and a discontinuity thesis36 
regarding the criteria of appropriateness of emotional responses to fiction (Gilmore, 2011). The 
thesis of the continuity of the criteria of appropriateness of fictional emotions claims that these 
criteria remain identical for fictional and actual emotions; the thesis of the discontinuity of the 
criteria of appropriateness claims that fictional and actual emotions are governed by different 
criteria of appropriateness. Livingston and Mele’s account would fall under the scope of the 
continuity thesis, inasmuch as they argue that moral considerations relevant for the 
appropriateness of actual emotions are imported to the imaginative engagement. On the 
contrary, Gilmore argues that “there is a difference in what sorts of considerations would 
qualify as potential reasons for an emotion when the emotion is directed at what is supposed to 
be, alternatively, real and imagined” (Gilmore 2011, 470).  
Gilmore focuses on the representational aspect of emotions. While he acknowledges that it 
might not be an essential component, he notes, like Robinson, that this representational aspect 
might work as the epistemic means to identify or individuate emotions. With this 
representational aspect in mind, he focuses the analysis of appropriateness in terms of 
considerations of fit, or narrative appropriateness. He thus argues that an emotion is appropriate 
if it rightly represents its object:  
Thus, I propose, it is a necessary and sufficient condition of an emotion being 
apt (rational, fitting, or otherwise warranted, in the narrow representational 
sense) that it correctly represents its object as having the value-relevant 
properties that are criterial for that emotion, and that the emotion is 
experienced in virtue of that representation being correct. (Gilmore 2011, 
474)  
Moral considerations, therefore, are not included in the notion of appropriateness unless the 
emotion concerns the morally evaluable qualities of its object (as it is the case with emotions 
such as remorse) (Gilmore 2011, 472). 
                                                          
36 As I said before, it is important to note the differences in the continuity and discontinuity theses identified by 
Gilmore and those examined in the previous chapters. Gilmore’s analysis has a narrower scope: the continuity 
and discontinuity theses he identifies refer only to the continuity or the discontinuity of the criteria of 
appropriateness of fictional emotions. As I have argued, however, the continuity and discontinuity theses that 
have been examined so far in this work refer to the continuity or discontinuity of appreciators’ evaluative attitudes, 
and how this impacts the engagement with counter-moral fictions. 
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As emphasised in the first chapter, fictional narratives always present the events from a specific 
perspective, and they use the aesthetic features to manipulate appreciators responses. It thus 
seems more relevant for the analysis of the appropriateness of emotional responses to fiction 
to focus on how the events are represented, rather than only looking at what is true in the 
fictional world. The considerations of fit in the fictional world would therefore refer to how the 
events are represented (Gilmore 2011, 479). For this reason, the notion of framing is relevant 
for the discussion. Framing refers to the way fictional events are represented so as to elicit 
specific emotional responses. From these differences in representation, that is, differences in 
framing, it might be easy to see how the criteria of appropriateness vary from fictional to actual 
scenarios. It can be argued that in fictional scenarios the object of the emotion is in fact 
represented as having different evaluative properties that warrant a contrary emotion. Gilmore 
argues, however, that the problem with this defence of discontinuity is that it only shows that 
the appropriate emotions change when the objects themselves change. The real question that 
the discontinuity thesis needs to answer is, according to Gilmore, “Can we have contrary but 
apt responses to a scenario as-presented-in-a-fiction and that scenario presented in the same 
manner – that is, identically framed – in real life?” (Gilmore, 2011, 479). 
The problem with Gilmore’s criticism of this version of discontinuity is that he 
mischaracterises how framing works. According to him, the fictional framing modifies the 
object of the emotion. And so, this would not show that contrary emotions are appropriate for 
the same object, it would only show that contrary emotions are appropriate to different objects. 
This, however, would only be the case for fictions that I have identified as cases of immoral 
fictional worlds: in these cases the fictional worlds make it true that the object of the emotion 
possesses evaluative properties we would not normally ascribe. If this was the case, it could be 
argued that these are not contrary emotional responses to the same scenario, but contrary 
emotions to different scenarios, that is, to scenarios that are presented as having different 
evaluative properties. On the contrary, what Gilmore fails to see is that the difference between 
fictional truths and framing, is that the latter refers not to what is the case in the fictional world, 
but to the perspective that qualifies the events narrated. In this sense, it is possible to say that 
framing does not alter the object, but rather alters the subject and her appraisals insofar as it 
prescribes specific responses to the events narrated. The relevant question that the discontinuity 
thesis needs to answer is, therefore, “how can the same subject experience contrary emotions 
in virtue of contrary appraisals of the same object?” And the answer is that she experiences 
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contrary emotions precisely because they same object is framed differently, presented in 
different manners. 
As I said in the first chapter, the role of the perspective in the narrative is to guide appreciators’ 
responses to the fictional events. As noted by Gilmore, the perspective or framing refers to how 
the fictional events are represented. But this how should not be understood as changing the 
events that are narrated. The how aims at asking appreciators to respond in certain ways to what 
is narrated; it is thus possible to imagine two different fictions that narrate the same events 
from different points of view. But, again, this wouldn’t entail a change in the objects of the 
representation. Framing doesn’t modify the objects it represents, but aims at modifying the 
subject inasmuch as it aims at guiding how the subject should view and respond to what is 
narrated. This is what makes the cases of fictional immoral perspectives interesting. As said in 
the first chapter, narratives that present an immoral fictional perspective do not make deviant 
evaluations true in the story. In these cases the imaginative engagement is not sustained by the 
object possessing the opposite evaluative properties, but by the subject ignoring these negative 
evaluative properties as reasons not to feel the emotions prescribed by the narrative. Walter 
White is not represented in Breaking Bad as anything but despicable; the narrative does not try 
to convince appreciators that what he is doing is laudable. What the narrative does is portray 
Walter White in such a way that his attractive qualities are emphasised; and, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, the sympathy elicited by the attractive qualities makes appreciators ignore 
their moral judgements. Appreciators ally with Walter White not because he is portrayed as the 
good guy, but because he is represented in such an attractive way that the moral considerations 
lose relevance. 
What the discontinuity thesis argues is that framing modifies the subject’s interests, so that the 
objects fit the subject’s interests differently. And this is what causes genuine asymmetric 
emotional responses. In the previous sections I argued with Greenspan and Robinson that the 
appraisals involved in emotions are directly related to the subjects’ interests. And Gilmore fails 
to see this. His criticism depends on understanding emotions as the ascription of evaluative 
properties that are independent from the subject making the attribution. But taking into 
consideration that emotions depend on appreciators’ interests, and the role of perspective in 
manipulating those interests, it is possible to present a good argument in favour of the 
discontinuity thesis. The criteria of appropriateness are discontinuous because appreciators’ 
interests are not the same in fictional and actual scenarios. This makes it possible to defend a 
robust version of the discontinuity thesis that explains contrary emotions to the same objects. 
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This version of the discontinuity thesis grounds the criteria of appropriateness in the 
representation because the narrative’s perspective is what determines appreciators’ interests. 
This is also why it is important to frame the problem of the discontinuity of the criteria of 
appropriateness in terms of what Currie (1997) calls “the problem of personality”: the reason 
why there seems to be an asymmetry in the criteria of appropriateness of actual and fictional 
emotions is because appreciators’ interests in the imaginative engagement do not follow their 
everyday interests.  
So how can the discontinuity thesis explain the personality problem that ultimately explains 
the asymmetry in the emotional responses? Gilmore is right in arguing that some of the contrary 
reactions can be explained by automatic and subdoxastic tendencies, such as priming, 
emotional contagion, mirroring or resonance mechanisms, or empathy (Gilmore 2011, 482). 
All these mechanisms seem to help in manipulating appreciators’ interests and, therefore, 
appraisals during the imaginative engagement. Robinson, on the other hand, emphasises the 
role of the narratives’ formal devices as coping mechanisms that guide and manage fictional 
emotions:  
In general, then, formal devices guide our emotional responses to literary 
works, focusing attention and influencing both out initial affective appraisals 
and subsequent cognitive evaluations of content. But in addition they guide 
our cognitive reappraisals, helping us to cope with the unpleasant aspects of 
the content. (Robinson 2005, 207) 
Finally, I want to note that there are limits to the discontinuity of emotional responses to fiction 
that I think ground the limits to the discontinuity in appreciators’ moral attitudes in fiction. 
First, if, as Robinson argues, emotional responses are constituted by non-cognitive affective 
appraisals that cause physiological responses and that are later monitored cognitively, I believe 
we might find some cases where the initial negative affective appraisal is too strong and where 
the necessary coping mechanisms for a reappraisal are not displayed. For example, I believe 
that Breaking Bad never showed Walter White poisoning Brock, a child, because the impact 
would be too strong and the audience would fail to sympathise with White again. I suggest that 
in these cases appreciators are incapable of carrying out the necessary cognitive monitoring of 
the situation according to what the fiction requires, and they thus fail to respond accordingly.  
Second, I believe in instances of actual immorality appreciators do not accept the manipulation 
of their interests during the imaginative engagement that would make deviant emotional 
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responses appropriate. In these cases, as I said in the previous chapter, because appreciators 
realise that the prescriptions include claims about the actual world, they import their evaluative 
attitudes and, thus, their interests remain unchanged. Moreover, in these cases it is not just that 
appreciators import their interests, but that they realise that moral and prudential considerations 
stand in assessing the appropriateness of the responses because the relevant aesthetic space is 
not opened.  
 
In this chapter I argued that it is not necessary to claim that appreciators sometimes experience 
emotional responses to fiction that they would not normally allow because they are only quasi-
emotions. I argued that realist accounts of emotions toward fiction can accommodate these 
asymmetric emotions. Moreover, I argued that these deviant emotional responses are possible 
because the criteria of appropriateness of emotional responses depends on the narrative’s 
prescribed perspective; and, in instances of fictional immorality, appropriateness of emotions 
toward fiction do not include ethical appropriateness due to the quarantining effect of the 
prescriptions. In the following chapters I explore how fictional narratives should be assessed 
in virtue of the considerations of appropriateness of emotional responses to fiction, and how 
appreciators’ responses should be assessed when responding with deviant responses that do not 
conform to what they normally consider appropriate.  
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5. The diversity of counter-moral fictions and the ethical criticism of art 
 
In the first chapter I noted that HBO’s television series The Wire has been widely praised for 
how it explores the complex interaction between race and poverty in inequality in the United 
States. The show has even been used by lecturers at Harvard, University of California – 
Berkeley, and Duke in courses on sociology and social anthropology. I noted, however, that 
critics have largely ignored that the show also contributes to the erasure of black women from 
public narratives, in that it completely overlooks the specific structural injustices faced by black 
American women. How do The Wire's moral strengths and failings impact its aesthetic value? 
Advocates of the ethical criticism of art claim that considerations of ethical value are relevant 
to considerations of aesthetic value, in virtue of the link between the aesthetic experience and 
the moral experience that some artworks provide. To say that a work of fiction is ethically 
criticised means that its ethical defects have an impact on its aesthetic value. In previous 
chapters I examined how counter-moral fictions prescribe the adoption of deviant perspectives 
by appreciators, so that their evaluative attitudes during their imaginative engagement with 
fiction are discontinuous from their actual evaluative framework. I argued that counter-moral 
fictions prescribe a framework that includes emotional responses appreciators would normally 
consider inappropriate, and that this is possible because fictions emphasise non-moral features 
that lead appreciators to ignore morally relevant considerations. This chapter examines how 
counter-moral fictions can be ethically criticised in virtue of their deviant prescriptions. I do 
not deny that these fictions have a moral dimension, but I argue that we should take into 
consideration the distinction between fictional and actual immorality proposed in the first 
chapter to determine the legitimacy of the ethical assessment of works. I claim that only 
instances of actual immorality are relevant for ethical criticism inasmuch as only in these cases 
appreciators participate in actual deviant views.  
Cases like The Wire have hardly caught ethical critics’ eye.  The discussion on the interaction 
between a narrative’s ethical and aesthetic values has centred on moral flaws endorsed by the 
narrative’s perspective. A narrative like The Wire is not regarded as problematic because, as I 
said on the first chapter, its perspective does not seem to endorse the erasure of the issues faced 
by black American women. The ethical critic is interested in an ethical evaluation of a 
narrative’s intrinsic features, to see how the intrinsic ethical value interacts with the aesthetic 
value of the work. This chapter, however, examines the possibility of an intrinsic moral 
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judgement of counter-moral fictions by questioning what should be regarded as a narrative’s 
intrinsic moral flaws. I argue that, even among those fictional narratives whose counter-moral 
content is intrinsically related to the prescribed perspective, not all fictions with counter-moral 
content can be legitimate candidates for ethical assessment; and that among those narratives 
that could be legitimately ethically assessed, the real target of the ethical judgement is not the 
fictional narrative itself. I argue that we cannot properly speak of ethical demerits of a work of 
fiction, and that thus we can only aspire to an extrinsic ethical assessment of a narrative that 
depends entirely on contextual considerations: in certain contexts, we have reasons to regard 
certain works of fiction as morally defective and to reject them, but these reasons are external 
to the narratives. Precisely because of this, I argue that it is cases like The Wire that are truly 
relevant, and that should be the main focus of the ethical critic. However, since the ethical 
assessment can only be extrinsic and context dependent, I conclude that ethical considerations 
cannot systematically bear on the aesthetic value of a narrative. 
The first section of the chapter examines two arguments in favour of the ethical assessment of 
fictions: the merited response argument advanced by Berys Gaut, and the Ethical Fittingness 
Theory advanced by Alessandro Giovannelli. The second section goes back to the distinction 
between fictional and actual immorality, and examines how these two different types of 
counter-moral fictions fit the requirements of the ethical critic. I argue that, in principle, only 
actual immorality is a legitimate candidate for ethical assessment. However, in the final section 
I argue that in instances of actual immorality the ethical assessment is not directed at the 
narrative’s intrinsic features, but at actual views held by real people. I claim that the only 
legitimate ethical assessment of a narrative is an extrinsic assessment that examines the 
contextual matrix of the creation and reception of a work of fiction. I conclude by advancing 
the consequences of an extrinsic ethical assessment for the discussion on the interaction 
between the ethical and aesthetic value of a work.  
 
5.1 The ethical criticism of fiction 
To say that a fictional narrative is subject to ethical criticism means not only that we can 
morally judge it, but that its ethical defects or merits have an impact on its aesthetic value.37 
                                                          
37 Berys Gaut refers to aesthetic value as “the value of an object qua work of art” (Gaut, 1998, 183). Robert 
Stecker, on the other hand, distinguishes between aesthetic and artistic value, and claims that the notion of 
aesthetic value refers to the capacity to deliver an aesthetic experience, that is an “experience valued for its own 
sake in virtue of being directed to forms, qualities, and meaning properties of an object” (Stecker, 2005, 139). 
Because this chapter does not focus on the value interaction claim, I will not examine the interaction between the 
133 
 
This means that an account of the ethical criticism of fiction includes two different claims: first, 
that fictional narratives are subject to ethical evaluation (amenability claim38); and second, that 
considerations of ethical value are relevant for considerations of aesthetic value (value 
interaction claim39). This chapter focuses on the amenability claim to see whether an ethical 
assessment of fictions that prescribe counter-moral imaginings is legitimate.40 
So what does the ethical critic have in mind when speaking of an ethical assessment of works? 
There are several ways in which an artwork can be ethically assessed. We can evaluate an 
artwork, for example, for the consequences it has on its context and for the effects it has on its 
audience. We can also morally evaluate the conditions under which an artwork was produced. 
We can even assess an artwork in the light of how it reflects the artist’s moral character. The 
ethical critic notes, however, that all these types of evaluation are directed at extrinsic features 
of the work, and so they are not really cases in which we genuinely ethically evaluate the work 
itself. The relevant assessment when inquiring about the intrinsic value of an artwork qua 
artwork, must be an intrinsic assessment of the work’s features. An artwork can be ethically 
assessed according to whether we can identify intrinsic moral merits and demerits: "Intrinsic 
ethical flaws are ethical flaws in the attitudes that works manifest toward their subjects" (Gaut, 
2007, 229). Thus, given that ethical criticism is interested in the interaction between an 
artwork's ethical and aesthetic value, the amenability claim refers to an intrinsic ethical 
assessment that has the artwork itself, and its features, as its object. 
For works of fiction to be intrinsically ethically assessed they would have to be so assessed in 
virtue of their moral content. Fictions with moral content can be legitimately ethically judged 
because it is the artist herself who encourages the audience to consider certain ethical issues 
during the engagement with the narrative. According to Noël Carroll, in these cases the ethical 
evaluation is valid because it “is not invoking criteria alien to its value as the kind of artwork 
                                                          
aesthetic and the artistic value of a fictional narrative. Therefore, like Gaut, I will refer to aesthetic value in its 
more general sense. 
38 I use this term following Alessandro Giovannelli (Giovannelli, 2013). 
39 Robert Stecker identifies two different types of interaction between ethical and aesthetic value: ethical-aesthetic, 
and aesthetic-ethical interaction. The ethical-aesthetic interaction refers to the effects of the ethical defects or 
merits on the aesthetic value of a work. The aesthetic-ethical interaction refers to the impact of a work’s aesthetic 
value on its ethical value (Robert Stecker, 2005, 138). The discussion on the ethical criticism of art has mainly 
focused on the ethical-aesthetic interaction. 
40 For a discussion on the accounts that focus on the interaction claim see Noël Carroll’s ‘Art and Ethical Criticism: 
An Overview of Recent Directions of Research’ (Carroll, 2000), and Alessandro Giovannelli’s ‘The Ethical 
Criticism of Art: A New Mapping of the Territory’ (Giovannelli, 2007). While I do not examine the different 
arguments that have been advanced in favour of ethical demerits having an impact on a work’s aesthetic value, 
the final section of this chapter does explore the consequences of my arguments against the amenability claim for 
the value interaction claim. 
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it is; it is a matter of evaluating the work in terms of the norms (genre norms) of the kind of 
artform to which it belongs” (Carroll, 2000, 359). However, it is not enough to say that these 
narratives are subject to ethical evaluation merely in virtue of their content; after all, we can 
find, for example, several cases of fictional narratives that contain scientific claims but that are 
not judged in terms of their scientific value. Rather, certain fictions with ethical content invite 
audiences to engage in a moral experience that is directly related to the aesthetic experience of 
the narrative. In these cases not only can we identify an ethical content in the narrative, but it 
is possible to say that the imaginings prescribed are intrinsically related to the ethical dimension 
of the narrative. This is to say that the aesthetic pleasure appreciators get from participating in 
these fictional narratives is directly tied to a moral experience of the fictional events. But how 
is it possible to say that audiences undergo a moral experience during their engagement with 
the fictional narrative, and how could it be argued that this moral experience allows for the 
ethical evaluation of fiction? 
A work of fiction prescribes a perspective that guides the narration of the fictional events. This 
perspective necessarily implies an attitude toward the narrated events. As we saw in the first 
chapter, Berys Gaut argues that fictional narratives express a manifested attitude as the 
perspective displays “pro or con attitudes toward some state of affairs or things, which the work 
may do in many ways besides explicitly stating an opinion about them” (Gaut, 1998, 183). 
Robert Stecker also emphasises the role of the perspective in the ethical criticism of art as the 
exploration of the perspective allows for works to express ethical judgements or points of view 
(Robert Stecker, 2005). Furthermore, because the work prescribes a perspective that implies an 
attitude toward the narrated events, it is possible to say that the work endorses the point of view 
it presents. 
The prescribed perspective brings with it a set of prescribed responses to the point of view 
advanced by the narrative. That is, not only does the narrative endorse the attitudes it expresses, 
but it prescribes the assent to the manifested attitude by appreciators responding in the ways 
prescribed. For this reason, according to Gaut, the attitudes of the works are manifested in the 
responses they prescribe to the audience: “the novel does not just present imagined events, it 
also presents a point of view on them, a perspective constituted in part by actual feelings, 
emotions, and desires that the reader is prescribed to have toward the merely imagined events.” 
(Gaut, 1998, 193) Appreciators allow cognitive-affective attitudes that endorse the point of 
view advanced by the narrative because the responses are the result of this perspective-taking. 
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The fact that appreciators assent to the manifested attitudes of the work by responding in the 
ways prescribed is part of an overall moral experience that, according to the ethical critic, 
impacts the audience’s actual moral powers. According to Noël Carroll, narratives with the 
relevant moral content exercise appreciators’ moral capacities. Works of fiction “expand our 
emotional powers of discrimination” and they “sensitize us to, as Aristotle would say, the right 
reasons and objects for the emotions in question” (Carroll, 2000, 367). Fictional narratives can 
also “amplify our morally relevant powers of perceptual discrimination”, and this “enhances 
our ability to reflect on further moral situations”. So, in summary, fiction “can contribute to the 
enlargement of our capacity for moral understanding” not because it teaches moral norms and 
concepts, but because it teaches “how to apply them to concrete cases, engaging and exercising 
our emotions and imagination, our powers of perceptual discrimination, moral understanding 
and reflection, in ways that sustain and potentially enlarge our capacity for moral judgement” 
(Carroll, 2000, 368-369). Gaut argues that works of fiction possess cognitive-affective value 
because a narrative gets the audience to engage vividly with the points of view it explores, so 
that we are more disposed to “reordering our thoughts, feelings, and motivations in light of it” 
(Gaut, 1998, 195). Stecker also argues that some works engage their audience in a meaningful 
moral experience in virtue of,  
what they can do for their audience: advance moral understanding, 
comprehend points of view previously unavailable to us, empathize with 
those who find value in a certain practice. (…) A morally insightful or 
sensitive work has the capacity to deliver moral insight or enhance the moral 
sensitivity of at least some of its audience. (Stecker, 2005, 144) 
But just as fictions can engage their audience in a positive moral experience that advances 
appreciators’ moral powers, they can also confuse their moral understanding. Artworks with a 
counter-moral dimension “encourage audiences to indulge in morally flawed emotional 
responses for the wrong objects and/or the wrong reasons” (Carroll, 2000, 367) and they 
“encourage confusion by misdirecting moral perception and emotions by proffering distorting 
instantiations of moral maxims and concepts” (Carroll, 2000, 369). Counter-moral fictions can 
be ethically assessed precisely because they encourage this negative moral experience that can, 
in principle, corrupt appreciators’ moral capacities. 
Given this moral experience provided by the narrative, two different elements of fictional 
narratives are relevant for the arguments in favour of the amenability claim: the prescription of 
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the fictional perspective, and the prescribed responses to the perspective. To reiterate, a work 
prescribes a set of imaginings concerning the state of the fictional world as seen under a specific 
perspective. This perspective implies an attitude towards the narrated events. In this sense it is 
possible to say that fictional narratives express attitudes toward the moral content they explore. 
By prescribing a perspective under which the fictional events are narrated, the work also 
prescribes a set of cognitive-affective responses to the fictional events narrated in the work. 
Because appreciators respond in the ways prescribed by the narrative, we can say that they 
assent to the attitude manifested in the work. 
In what follows I examine two different arguments in favour of the amenability claim: what 
Giovannelli has called the Ethical Fittingness Theory (EFT), and the merited response 
argument advanced by Gaut. Giovannelli’s EFT focuses on the manifested attitudes expressed 
in the prescribed perspective, while Gaut’s argument focuses on the prescribed responses to 
the work’s manifested attitude. As I said at the beginning, in this chapter I do not examine the 
arguments in favour of the interaction claim because I want to focus on the legitimacy of the 
amenability claim for the different types of counter-moral fictions. In the third section, 
however, I do explore the consequences of the legitimacy of the amenability claim for the value 
interaction claim, and I discuss how my account fits into the wider debate on the ethical 
criticism of fiction. 
 
5.1.1 Ethical fittingness theory  
According to the amenability claim, works of fiction are subject to ethical assessment. 
Alessandro Giovannelli argues that works of fiction are ethically judged in terms of how their 
ethical perspective fits the extra-fictional reality, that is, they are assessed in terms of whether 
their ethical perspective is correct or true. He calls this argument for the amenability claim 
Ethical Fittingness Theory (EFT).  
As I said before, Giovannelli’s argument focuses on the narrative’s prescribed perspective to 
ground the legitimacy of ethical criticism. He notes that works of fiction express an ethical 
perspective insofar as they express a perspective concerning the events they represent. This 
ethical perspective should be understood as “what [the works] seem to ‘say’, recommend, 
commit themselves to, and sometimes attempt to persuade audiences of” (Giovannelli, 2013, 
337). It is the judgement of this perspective that serves as the basis of the ethical judgements 
of the works; all the other types of ethical judgement mentioned above depend on the 
137 
 
judgement of the work’s perspective. According to EFT, “evaluating a work for its ethical 
perspective amounts to (1) assessing the perspective's fittingness with respect to extra-fictional 
reality and doing so by extra-fictional criteria, and (2) attributing such a perspective to the 
work.” (Giovannelli, 2013, 338) To explain why a work’s ethical perspective can be evaluated, 
EFT focuses on what Giovannelli calls a work’s fittingness commitments. We can identify two 
different fittingness commitments in a works perspective. First, a work’s commitment to 
embody the ethical perspective. Second, a work’s commitment to the ethical perspective fitting 
the extra-fictional reality.  
Giovannelli’s EFT claims that an ethical assessment of a work of fiction is legitimate if we can 
be justified in attributing the perspective to the work, and, more importantly, if we are justified 
in attributing to the work a commitment to the perspective’s fittingness to extra-fictional reality 
according to extra-fictional criteria. The ethical assessment in these cases is legitimate because 
the work’s commitment to the perspective’s fittingness to extra-fictional reality implies what 
Gendler calls ‘clamour for exportation’: “A work is racist, sexist, or instead morally uplifting 
for its targeting, in incorrect or correct ways, our world made of actual people and events, albeit 
often in indeterminate ways.” (Giovannelli, 2013, 339) Giovannelli acknowledges that if we 
remove this exportation and we restricted the scope of the prescriptions to their fictional 
application exclusively, namely, if the prescriptions were quarantined, we could not say that 
we can ethically judge the work, even if we use ethical vocabulary to assess it.  
Thus, it is important to note that according to EFT, the ethical assessment of narratives, 
although grounded on the work’s commitment to embody the perspective, is legitimised by the 
work’s commitment to extra-fictional fittingness. The thing is that, according to Giovannelli, 
every artwork with an ethical perspective should be taken to having the two fittingness 
commitments mentioned above: “Yet any artwork that has an ethical perspective in the sense 
spelled out above thereby has ethical commitments. Because of this, the supergenre of works 
with fittingness commitments is pervasive and easily established” (Giovannelli, 2013, 341). 
That is, every fiction with an ethical perspective can be legitimately ethically assessed in virtue 
of EFT.  
 
5.1.2 Merited response argument and the affective-practical ethical assessment of fiction 
As I said before, if the fictional narrative indeed endorses the attitudes expressed by the 
perspective, then it also prescribes appreciators to assent the manifested attitude by responding 
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in the ways prescribed. Appreciators allow cognitive-affective attitudes that endorse the point 
of view advanced by the narrative because the responses are the result of this perspective-
taking. According to Berys Gaut’s merited response argument, the object of the ethical 
assessment of counter-moral fictional narratives is the fact that they prescribe unmerited 
responses towards the attitudes manifested in the work. By prescribing an immoral perspective, 
the narrative invites appreciators to respond with a set of cognitive-affective responses that are 
inappropriate. 
The argument goes like this. A work of fiction prescribes a set of imaginings and a perspective 
that guides these imaginings. A counter-moral fiction counts as counter-moral because of the 
counter-moral character of the imaginings and the perspective it prescribes. Along with the 
imaginings and the perspective, the counter-moral fiction also prescribes a set of deviant 
cognitive-affective responses that matches the counter-moral attitude manifested by the work. 
The prescription of the perspective and the corresponding responses in a counter-moral fiction 
implies the prescription of a deviant evaluation of the state of affairs narrated by the work. That 
is, the evaluations implied in the responses do not match the events narrated in the work. Thus, 
the narrative prescribes an unmerited response toward the manifested attitude inasmuch as it 
requires the acceptance of a deviant evaluation (Gaut, 1998, 195). 
Stecker also emphasises the normative aspect of the merited response argument. Precisely 
because the fictional perspective prescribes an unworthy response, audiences have moral 
reasons to reject the prescribed responses. So, even when we might find examples of 
appreciators who respond to the fictional perspective in the ways prescribed, the fact is that the 
work is subject to ethical criticism in virtue of the unmerited responses prescribed (Stecker, 
2005, 145-146). 
Furthermore, Gaut notes that these unmerited responses are not just imagined, but actual 
responses, as I argued in the previous chapter. The responses appreciators have toward the 
fictional events narrated presented under the prescribed perspective are genuine responses that 
occur during the imaginative activity. Gaut claims that these responses would have an impact 
on the audience’s attitudes toward a similar state of affairs in the real world. According to Gaut, 
“the attitudes people (and works) manifest toward imagined scenarios have implications for 
their attitudes toward their real-life counterparts, for the attitudes are partly directed toward 
kinds, not just individuals.” (Gaut, 1998, 187) This means that for Gaut the responses 
appreciators have toward the fictional narrative have as their object not just the fictional state 
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of affairs explored by the perspective, but the actual state of the world: "works that manifest 
certain attitudes towards fictional entities implicitly manifest the same attitudes to real entities 
of that kind" (Gaut, 2007, 236). Thus we can say that for Gaut the prescribed responses are 
actual responses in two ways: they are real, not merely imagined responses; and their object is 
the actual state of the world, not just a set of fictional prescriptions presented by a work of 
fiction. If all this is true, then the fictional narrative endorses the actual attitudes it expresses, 
and it prescribes appreciators to assent to the manifested attitude by responding in the ways 
prescribed. Because of this, the ethical criticism of art relies on what Gaut calls the affective- 
practical conception of ethical assessment. This claims that “not just actions and motives, but 
also feelings that do not motivate, are ethically significant” (Gaut, 1998, 186). 
Gaut thus claims that fictions can be legitimately ethically assessed on two grounds: the 
prescribed responses are unmerited, and they are real responses that are directed at real events 
and characters. The responses are unmerited insofar as they imply the acceptance of a deviant 
evaluation; that is, the responses are unmerited because they fail to take into account moral 
considerations in determining whether the prescribed response is appropriate to the narrated 
events. Moreover, these unmerited responses are not only prescribed toward the fictional events 
narrated in the work, but they are directed at the actual world because emotional responses are 
directed at kinds, and not just individuals.  
 
5.2 Fitting the requirements of the ethical critic 
The two arguments examined above allow us to say that a legitimate ethical assessment of 
fictional narratives is sustained on three grounds: (1) on the expression of an immoral 
perspective, (2) on the assent to the manifested attitudes of the work via the cognitive-affective 
responses to the perspective, and (3) on the fact that the object of those responses are not just 
the fictional entities, but an actual state of affairs. To examine the legitimacy of the amenability 
claim, I believe it is important to bring back the distinction between the two types of counter-
moral content in counter-moral fictions: fictional and actual immorality. This distinction has 
important consequences for when the counter-moral content of a narrative can be regarded as 
an intrinsic moral flaw that can be legitimately ethically assessed; and, therefore, it has 
consequences for how we can say that the narrative’s moral features interact with its aesthetic 
value.  
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As I said before, fictional immorality refers to the prescription of content-immoral imaginings, 
imaginings that involve a perspective the agents (both the author and the audience) take to be 
immoral. These fictional narratives prescribe appreciators to adopt a deviant fictional 
perspective with the corresponding deviant responses. However, I have argued that fictional 
immorality is quarantined to the fictional world inasmuch as it only refers to fictional 
prescriptions: the author is not trying to make a claim about the actual world. These fictional 
narratives are created as deviant. In these cases the author prescribes counter-moral scenarios 
as counter-moral; and she intends for the audience to recognize the counter-moral nature of the 
prescriptions.41 Cases of actual immorality in fiction, on the other hand, also involve the 
prescription of counter-moral imaginings. However, I have argued that actual immorality is not 
confined to the imaginative activity, inasmuch as its immoral prescriptions include actual 
immoral views that the author holds in the actual world. In this sense, these narratives 
normalize counter-moral prescriptions. The counter-moral fictional prescriptions are not to be 
regarded as deviant, but are prescribed in a perceived continuity with (deviant) moral claims 
about the actual state of the world. 
So how do these different types of counter moral fictions fit the requirements of the amenability 
claim to say that they are legitimate candidates for ethical assessment? 
 
5.2.1 Actual immorality 
Because cases of actual immorality include claims about the actual world, it is possible to say 
that the prescription of an immoral fictional perspective expresses an immoral extra-fictional 
perspective, and actual immoral attitude held by the author or normalized in an immoral social 
context. In these cases we could say that the assent to the fictional perspective entails the assent 
to the extra-fictional perspective. The fictional perspective expressed in the work is coupled 
with an actual perspective, and they are inseparable. In these cases, therefore, the assent to the 
fictional perspective would mutate into an endorsement of the extra-fictional perspective 
expressed in the work via a fictional perspective. Actual immorality in fictional narratives 
closes the aesthetic space inasmuch as it is no longer possible to identify the differences 
between prescriptions that only concern the fictional world, and prescriptions that refer to the 
                                                          
41 It is important to note that, since the relevant ethical assessment focuses on the evaluation of the work, I do not 
address instances where certain members of the audience fail to recognize the limited scope of the fictional 
prescriptions. This failure of uptake cannot be blamed on a narrative that is clearly created as deviant. But it is 
important to note cases I have previously identified as borderline instances of actual immorality, where the failure 
of uptake leads us to revise the categorisation of certain narratives. 
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actual world as well; as a result, the prudential and moral reasons remain, and the narrative 
could be legitimately subject to ethical evaluation.  
Instances of actual immorality are plausible candidates for ethical criticism as per 
Giovannelli’s EFT inasmuch as the fictional perspective is coupled with an extra-fictional 
perspective. In this sense we can say that the fictional perspective is committed to its 
application to extra-fictional reality as well, and thus it should be measured by extra-fictional 
criteria (Giovannelli, 2013, 338-339). The fittingness commitments at the core of instances of 
actual immorality in fiction allow us to say that the imaginative activity includes not merely 
fictional entities but the actual state of the world.  
Because instances of actual immorality include what Giovannelli calls extra-fictional 
fittingness commitments, the prescribed responses are directed not only at the narrated events, 
but at the actual extra-fictional reality. In this sense, instances of actual immorality are 
legitimate candidates for ethical assessment as per Gaut’s affective-practical ethical assessment 
as well. The responses prescribed by the narrative’s perspective are unmerited because they 
require appreciators to endorse a deviant evaluation that is unsupported by the narrated events. 
Moreover, because of the narrative’s extra-fictional fittingness commitments, the notion of 
appropriateness of responses should include moral considerations. The prescribed responses 
are unmerited precisely because moral considerations render them inappropriate.  
So far it looks like actual immorality could be legitimately ethically assessed inasmuch as its 
fictional perspective is coupled with an actual perspective that is committed to its extra-
fictional application. However, I’ve identified some instances of actual immorality that import 
immoral attitudes found at their context of origin, but which the narrative's perspective does 
not seem to effectively endorse, such as The Wire and True Detective: the immoral attitudes 
can be found in the background, and they certainly impact the construction of the narrative. 
What should we do about these cases? Should we not consider them morally relevant when 
assessing the narrative? The views reflected in these narratives are certainly committed to an 
extra-fictional application. So while the fictional perspective does not seem to endorse them, 
the actual perspective displays an unexamined immoral attitude. And this should be relevant 
for the ethical critic since this short-sightedness definitely tampers with our aesthetic 
enjoyment of the narrative. I come back to these cases in the final section of the chapter, but 
what I want to note here is that these cases would be dismissed by the ethical critic because the 
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lack of endorsement from the perspective would imply an extrinsic ethical assessment, instead 
of an intrinsic evaluation. 
 
5.2.2 Fictional immorality 
Instances of fictional immorality, however, do not satisfy the conditions for the ethical 
assessment of fiction established by both Giovannelli and Gaut on three grounds: (1) in 
fictional immorality we can identify a distinction between fictional and extra-fictional 
perspectives, (2) in instances of fictional immorality the aesthetic space implies that the notion 
of appropriateness of responses does not include moral considerations, and (3) in instances of 
fictional immorality, the objects of the responses are the fictional events and entities only. In 
what follows I argue against the intrinsic ethical assessment of fictional immorality on these 
three grounds. 
 
Against Giovannelli’s EFT: The distinction between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives 
As I argued in the first chapter, it is important to distinguish between fictional and extra-
fictional perspectives. The fictional perspective refers to the prescribed pro or con attitudes 
toward the narrated events as they are represented in the work. The fictional perspective refers 
to the author-narrator’s attitude toward the events in the fiction. As such, I said that the fictional 
perspective prescribes a make-believe moral outlook. The extra-fictional perspective refers to 
a real-world moral outlook that is directed toward the actual state of the world. This is the 
perspective the author-narrator would hold toward real events and people. As I said in previous 
chapters, it is this extra-fictional perspective that can present a ‘clamour for exportation’ in that 
it invites appreciators to adopt a real-world moral outlook as a result of their engagement with 
the narrative.  
I argued that the work’s manifested attitude should be identified with the fictional perspective 
that concerns a make-believe moral outlook only, while the extra-fictional perspective concerns 
a real-world moral outlook directed not only at the fictional events, but at an actual state of 
affairs. The extra-fictional perspective can be regarded as a meta-perspective because not only 
does it involve a real-world moral outlook, but it is often directed at the responses prescribed 
by the fictional narrative: the extra-fictional perspective can invite appreciators to reflect on 
the prescribed make-believe moral outlook in light of a real-world moral outlook. 
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The argument for the amenability claim advanced by Giovannelli conflates the distinction 
between fictional and extra-fictional perspective because it conflates an important difference 
between fictional prescriptions and the ulterior claims about the world that the author could be 
putting forward. The difference between these two types of perspectives is emphasized by those 
cases, noted by authors like Stecker, Kieran and Jacobson, where the engagement with a 
deviant perspective in fiction is aimed at highlighting problematic aspects of our actual moral 
beliefs.42  
Giovannelli’s EFT argued that the ethical assessment of narratives is legitimate because we can 
attribute the ethical perspective to the work, and more importantly, because we can attribute to 
the work a commitment to the perspective’s fittingness to extra-fictional reality. However, 
fictional immorality does not fulfill neither of these conditions. Due to the distinction between 
fictional and extra-fictional perspectives we can say that it is the extra-fictional perspective that 
is relevant for ETF. In instances of merely fictional immorality we cannot attribute a counter-
moral extra-fictional perspective to the work. And, precisely because these works do not 
include a counter-moral extra-fictional perspective it is not possible to attribute to the work a 
commitment to the perspective’s extra-fictional fittingness. As Giovannelli himself notes, the 
ethical evaluation ceases to be legitimate if we can restrict the scope of the perspective’s 
commitments to the fictional reality. The ethical evaluation of fictional immorality is thus 
illegitimate precisely insofar as we are not justified in attributing fittingness commitments to 
the work of fiction. So, while we are right in attributing the commitment to extra-fictional 
fittingness to instances of actual immorality, it is certainly not the case for fictional immorality.  
What I want to argue in distinguishing between merely fictional and actual immorality in 
counter-moral fictions is that we can have instances of narratives that embody a counter-moral 
perspective without any commitment to the exportation of such views. Fictional immorality 
has no extra-fictional commitments because it makes no extra-fictional claims. The problem 
with Giovannelli’s account is that, given that he argues that every work with an ethical 
perspective includes fittingness commitments, he would not agree that fictional immorality is 
not a legitimate candidate for ethical evaluation. I believe Giovannelli would argue that the 
lack of a counter-moral extra-fictional perspective in cases of fictional immorality would mean 
that they cannot count as a counter-moral ethical perspective. That is, Giovannelli’s account 
                                                          
42 While I agree that some instances of fictional immorality present an immoral perspective only to further a moral 
claim, I don’t think it is necessary (or indeed possible) to sanitize immoral perspectives. Eaton presents a 
compelling criticism to Kieran’s cognitive immoralism on these grounds (Eaton, 2012, 289). 
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seems committed to the claim that without fittingness commitments a work of fiction cannot 
be said to embody a counter-moral perspective. However, as I have argued in the first chapter, 
I believe that instances of fictional immorality should count as cases of counter-moral 
perspectives, even without extra-fictional fittingness commitments. As I said before, these 
works do prescribe a counter-moral perspective because they prescribe content-immoral 
responses to the events narrated. And, more importantly, I have argued that these are not merely 
provisional prescriptions. 
 
Against Gaut’s affective-practical ethical assessment of fiction: Aesthetic space and 
appropriateness of responses 
As I have argued, instances of fictional immorality include only a deviant fictional perspective 
that prescribes a counter-moral make-believe outlook. Because the works do not include an 
extra-fictional perspective, their deviant prescriptions are quarantined in the fictional world. In 
the chapter on the discontinuity thesis I argued that due to their quarantining nature, instances 
of fictional immorality open an aesthetic space that removes moral and practical considerations. 
For this reason, in the previous chapter I claimed that Livingstone and Mele’s argument in 
favour of including moral considerations in the notion of appropriateness of emotions only 
works for instances of actual immorality insofar as in these instances we cannot speak of an 
aesthetic distance. Only in these cases we can say that the necessary aesthetic space was not 
opened, and that thus moral and practical considerations remain.  
While I agree with Gaut that the emotional responses prescribed to appreciators during their 
imaginative engagement should be understood as instances of genuine emotions, I argued in 
the previous chapter that in cases of fictional immorality the notion of appropriateness does not 
include moral considerations. I argued, following Peter Goldie, that in instances of fictional 
immorality the notion of narrative appropriateness of responses does not include ethical 
appropriateness. Narrative appropriateness refers only to whether the prescribed responses fit 
the prescribed perspective; that is, it is concerned only with whether appreciators have reasons 
to respond in the ways prescribed according to what the narrative represents and, more 
importantly, how it represents it. I argued that the criteria of appropriateness of emotional 
responses to purely fictional perspectives are different to normal criteria of appropriateness 
because the latter include ethical appropriateness, while the former do not. Narrative 
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appropriateness in cases of fictional immorality is concerned with the framing of the fictional 
events.  
Daniel Jacobson has argued that the merited response argument conflates two different kinds 
of considerations: considerations over the endorsement of warrant of the responses, and 
considerations over the ethical endorsement of the fictional perspective. As said in the previous 
chapter, Jacobson argues that whether a narrative merits a response depends on “what there is 
most evidence to feel, desire, or believe; [judgements of warrant] focus on epistemic, as 
opposed to moral or prudential reasons” (Jacobson, 1997, 173). Jacobson argues that Gaut, on 
the other hand, confuses whether a response is merited with whether it is appropriate all things 
considered (Jacobson & D’Arms, 2000). Taking this distinction into account, while it might be 
true that these deviant responses are not appropriate to feel all things considered, Jacobson 
argues that they are merited; that is, given how the perspective represents the narrated events, 
appreciators do have epistemic reasons to say that the prescribed response fits the perspective. 
However, while I agree with Jacobson’s criticism of Gaut’s merited response argument, what 
I want to note is that in instances of fictional immorality the problem with Gaut’s argument is 
not merely that the responses are merited even if inappropriate all things considered. But rather 
that in instances of merely fictional immorality there is no appropriateness all things considered 
because the aesthetic space removes the moral, practical and prudential considerations that are 
included in the notion of appropriateness all things considered. That is, my claim is that the 
prescribed deviant responses to fictional immorality are not only merited but appropriate. 
Gaut’s argument for the ethical assessment of works of fiction ignores the aesthetic space 
opened by the quarantining nature of fictional immorality. While Gaut’s argument shows that 
actual immorality is a legitimate candidate for ethical assessment because it prescribes 
unmerited responses that fail to comply with ethical appropriateness, he fails to show why this 
is also the case for fictional immorality. Gaut does not argue for why narrative appropriateness 
should include ethical appropriateness even when, as Matthew Kieran argues, the aesthetic 
space removes practical concerns. The fact that the prescriptions are only meant to stand in the 
fictional narrative allows us to say that the moral and the prudential considerations for the 
appropriateness of responses can be ignored. In the following chapter I argue that it is in this 
sense that the responses are only content-immoral. Without the prudential and moral questions, 
it is not possible to say legitimately that the response is bad to feel, or wrong.  Given that 
fictional immorality does not imply the expression of an actual immoral attitude, and given that 
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the responses to the fictional perspective have only the fictional events as their objects, we have 
to say also that the imaginative engagement with fictional immorality occurs in an aesthetic 
space that eliminates moral and prudential considerations. It is in this sense that the engagement 
with fictional immorality is quarantined to the fictional world, and it is why the moral 
experience provided by the counter-moral narrative cannot be subject to an affective-practical 
ethical assessment. And it is not clear why we should ethically evaluate counter-moral 
narratives that prescribe only content-immoral responses, and that are not committed to the 
export of such responses. 
 
The object of the cognitive-affective responses in fictional immorality 
If in cases of merely fictional immorality the counter-moral perspective is only a fictional 
perspective, and we cannot identify an extra-fictional perspective, there is no reason to claim 
that these works are committed to extra-fictional fittingness. That is, if the fictional perspective 
concerns only the fictional events, there is no reason to think that the set of cognitive-affective 
responses prescribed to the audience is directed at actual events or people. As we saw above, 
according to Gaut, the affective-practical ethical assessment of art stands because affective 
responses are directed towards kinds and not just individuals (Gaut, 1998, 187). In the 
following chapter I present in detail a criticism of Gaut’s argument regarding the objects of the 
responses. But what I want to note here is that even if we granted that affective responses are 
directed at kinds, it does not seem clear why the quarantining effect of fiction would not be 
enough to neutralize the ethical assessment of appreciators’ responses.  
Giovannelli seems to agree with Gaut when he argues that we are justified in ethically assessing 
fiction because there is a risk of exportation that comes with the extra-fictional fittingness 
commitments (Giovannelli, 2013, 339). But, again, this seems to work only for fictional 
counter-moral perspectives that include an actual perspective committed to extra-fictional 
application. So in cases of fictional immorality there is no reason to think that our responses 
are directed are real events or people. Now, if the responses are only directed at fictional events 
and characters, as is the case with fictional immorality, it is not clear why they would be subject 
to an affective-practical ethical assessment. While I agree that we might be ethically judged for 
holding an attitude, even if it does not motivate to action, it is less clear why we would be 
subject to ethical judgement for merely fictionally endorsing a deviant attitude during the 
imaginative engagement with a fictional narrative. 
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The following chapter explores in depth the arguments against assessing emotional responses 
directed at fictional events and characters. For the time being, it is enough to show that the 
object of the prescribed responses in instances of fictional immorality include only fictional 
events and characters, and are not directed at the actual state of affairs. 
 
5.2.3 Borderline cases  
As I said before, it is important to note that the distinction between fictional and actual 
immorality is not straightforward. We can find what may be considered borderline cases of 
fictional immorality: narratives that were created by the artist as instances of fictional 
immorality, that are regarded by the reader as instances of fictional immorality, but whose 
context of reception is susceptible to take the fictional prescriptions as an invitation to believe. 
This happens when the deviant scenario is still part of what William James calls a ‘live option’, 
that is, when a significant number of people in the context of reception still believe the immoral 
claim to actually hold. In these cases, regardless of authorial intentions, we might consider an 
instance of fictional immorality as actual immorality because the perspective explored is still 
considered a live option in the context we inhabit. So, although we recognize that the fictional 
nature of the prescriptions is meant to neutralise the export of the perspective to the actual 
world, we might also realize that other readers would take the immoral perspective to stand in 
the actual world. The fact that these narratives can be regarded as instances of actual immorality 
would give us reasons to treat them as such, and thus these narratives are also plausible 
candidates to ethical evaluation. 
 
So far I have argued that only instances of actual immorality are, in principle, legitimate 
candidates to be ethically criticised because only these include an immoral extra-fictional 
perspective. However, the argument that I have presented so far does not show that the 
amenability claim is invalid. Rather, so far I have only showed that the scope of works that can 
be legitimately ethically criticised is limited to instances of actual immorality. As I said at the 
beginning, the ethical criticism of works of fiction depends on an ethical assessment of a work's 
intrinsic features. In the following section I examine whether it is possible to say that a work's 
extra-fictional perspective counts as an intrinsic moral defect that can ground the intrinsic 
ethical assessment. 
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5.3 The extrinsic ethical assessment of fiction 
Instances of fictional immorality involve a counter-moral perspective because they prescribe 
content-immoral imaginings and responses to the audience. However, contrary to instances of 
actual immorality, narratives that are fictionally immoral are created and received as deviant: 
they depend on the recognition of the deviant nature of the prescriptions. Thus, appreciators 
are aware at all times that if the aesthetic distance was removed, moral considerations would 
become relevant, and they would override aesthetic considerations. I have argued that fictional 
immorality cannot be legitimately ethically assessed precisely because the perspective and the 
responses are quarantined in the fictional world. So, although we use moral terms to refer to 
the content of the narratives and their perspective, we cannot ethically assess them in the 
relevant way. 
On the contrary, according to what was said in the previous section, cases of actual immorality 
would seem to be legitimate candidates for ethical evaluation. In these cases, the prescribed 
perspective, and therefore the prescribed responses, include, in Giovannelli’s terms, extra-
fictional commitments: the fictional perspective is coupled with an extra-fictional perspective 
that includes actual attitudes, and that is therefore committed to the accuracy of the moral 
claims endorsed by the perspective. The extra-fictional commitments come from this actual 
extra-fictional perspective that informs the fictional perspective. We can say that in these cases 
the participation in the fictional perspective is really a participation in an actual immoral 
perspective. This is why narratives that are instances of actual immorality seem to be legitimate 
candidates for ethical assessment. 
However, if we look closely we can see that the only reason actual immorality could be 
legitimately assessed is because it includes an actual extra-fictional perspective. It is this actual 
perspective that includes the extra-fictional commitments. And so, it seems that what is being 
ethically evaluated is not the fictional narrative itself, but rather actual immoral views that are 
held by real people. The ethical assessment of actual immorality in fiction assesses something 
else through the narrative: the author’s moral character, the artistic practices, the socio-
historical context. The fictional perspective in instances of actual immorality is itself only 
content-immoral: it voices counter-moral views. And what is properly immoral, that is, what 
is intrinsically properly morally defective is the extra-fictional perspective that accompanies 
the fictional perspective. I do not claim that the content in instances of actual immorality is not 
counter-moral, it certainly is morally inaccurate. What I claim is that, like instances of fictional 
immorality, works that present actual immorality are only content-immoral themselves: their 
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moral content can be judged as accurate or inaccurate. But this seems to be a weaker claim than 
to say that they are intrinsically morally defective. The proper moral judgement is directed at 
the agents and the institutions that hold and perpetuate the immoral views, and so the moral 
defects stem from extrinsic features, namely, the actual immoral attitudes held by real agents. 
The ethical judgement of these narratives is thus extrinsic, not intrinsic as required by the 
ethical critic.43 
If this is true, however, not only is the ethical judgement extrinsic to the narrative, but it is also 
context dependent: these fictional narratives are only plausible candidates for ethical evaluation 
inasmuch as we have an immoral context that would couple the fictional perspective with an 
actual perspective with extra-fictional commitments.  
 
5.3.1 Contextual autonomism  
What does this mean for the value-interaction claim? I have tried to show that the amenability 
claim only obtains for instances of actual immorality. Moreover, because the legitimacy of the 
ethical assessment of the works depends on the extra-fictional perspective, I have claimed that 
the ethical assessment of the works is not an intrinsic assessment of the work’s features, but an 
extrinsic assessment of the work’s features in the light of views held by real people in an actual 
context. Because the assessment depends on these contextual factors, the ethical assessment of 
the works is unsystematic. In some contexts we can say that the fictional perspective is coupled 
with an extra-fictional perspective that makes the works a legitimate subject of ethical 
assessment. 
Why should this be relevant for the ethical critic? Because if the intrinsic features of the 
narrative only acquire moral relevance due to extrinsic features that are context dependent, we 
cannot say that there is an intrinsic relation between the ethical and the aesthetic value of a 
narrative. The interaction between the ethical and the aesthetic value of works of fiction is 
unsystematic as well. In some contexts, certain instances of counter-moral fictions yield a 
deficient aesthetic experience. Not because of intrinsic features of the work, but because in 
                                                          
43 Eileen John argues that it would be simplistic to evaluate art in its own terms only. Rather we take art to be the 
kind of thing that has broader implications in human life. In this sense, “there is something structurally similar in 
the ways a person or an artwork asks to be valued. As people, whatever the evaluative standards we actively strive 
to meet (…), we are open to evaluation on criteria that we don’t necessarily acknowledge or even understand” 
(John, 2006, 339). While I agree with her, what I argue is that the ethical evaluation of counter-moral fictions is 
only an extrinsic evaluation, contrary to what the amenability claim requires. 
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certain contexts we have overriding moral considerations that lead us to refuse to participate in 
the fictional narrative.  
Thus, my discussion on the amenability claim has important implications for the value-
interaction claim. When it comes to ethical criticism, I believe that we should favour a version 
of moderate autonomism that I call Contextual Autonomism. According to contextual 
autonomism ethical considerations are relevant for aesthetic considerations only in certain 
contexts, namely, when the context is such that we can regard the work as an instance of actual 
immorality. The view is a version of what Giovannelli identifies as moderate autonomism 
because it argues that the ethical assessment on occasion impacts the aesthetic value of a work, 
but in an unsystematic way (Giovannelli, 2007, 123-124). It is contextual because both the 
amenability and the value-interaction claim depend on contextual considerations; it is 
unsystematic because it does not depend on intrinsic features of the work that can guarantee 
that the legitimacy of the assessment and the interaction between ethical and aesthetic value 
remain the same at all times.  
Moderate moralism and moderate immoralism44 seem prima facie plausible, and compatible 
with the view I have defended in this chapter. These moderate accounts are consistent with one 
another insofar as they both argue that ethical considerations systematically bear on aesthetic 
considerations in certain kinds or genres of works: in certain kinds of works, whenever there 
is an ethical defect or merit, it counts as an aesthetic defect or merit. For instance, moderate 
moralism would argue that in works of realist fiction, ethical considerations have a bearing on 
works’ aesthetic value. Moderate immoralism, on the other hand, argues that a work being 
ethically blameworthy systematically bears positively on its aesthetic value in certain kinds or 
genres of works. For example, moderate immoralism would argue that in works that present 
rough heroes, the ethically blameworthy features have a positive impact on their aesthetic 
value. So, as Giovannelli notes, these two positions are compatible as long as the relevant 
genres do not overlap. 
However, the contextual autonomism I have put forward argues that, insofar as the ethical 
assessment depends on contextual factors, it is extrinsic and unsystematic. Thus, the value-
interaction claim cannot depend on intrinsic features such as genre, as moderate moralism and 
immoralism would argue. Contextual autonomism could be made compatible with these 
                                                          
44 To identify moderate moralism and immoralism, I follow Alessandro Giovannelli’s taxonomy of the debate on 
ethical criticism of art . 
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moderate positions if they accept that the “kinds of works” they are referring to consists not on 
an intrinsic feature, such a genre, but on whether the work is an instance of fictional or actual 
immorality. But they would have to accept that ethical criticism depends on an extrinsic 
contextual assessment of works.    
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6. Fictional emotions and the ethical assessment of imagining. In favour of response 
amoralism 
 
The previous chapter examined the possibility of ethically assessing counter-moral fictional 
narratives. As we saw, according to the ethical critic, fictional narratives would be subject to 
ethical criticism because they invite audiences to participate in a moral experience that is 
directly related to the aesthetic experience of the narrative. If it is true that audiences participate 
in a moral experience prescribed by counter-moral narratives, then not only are the narratives 
subject to ethical criticism, but audiences who engage in this moral experience are equally 
subject to ethical assessment. That is, if we can say that fictional narratives can be ethically 
assessed for inviting audiences to imaginatively engage with certain scenarios, it is surely 
because the imaginative engagement itself is subject to ethical evaluation. According to the 
arguments I examined, a legitimate ethical assessment of fictional narratives is sustained on 
three grounds: (1) on the expression of an immoral perspective, (2) on the assent to the 
manifested attitudes of the work via the cognitive-affective responses to the perspective, and 
(3) on the fact that emotional responses toward fiction are instances of genuine emotions, and 
their objects are not just the fictional entities but an actual state of affairs. 
In the previous chapter I showed, however, that it is necessary to take into consideration the 
distinction between fictional and actual immorality in counter-moral fictions. With this 
distinction in place, it is possible to say that fictional immorality in counter-moral fictions is 
not subject to an intrinsic ethical assessment inasmuch as it does not include an extra-fictional 
perspective that includes actual immoral attitudes concerning the real world. This being the 
case, assenting to the fictional perspective does not entail assenting to an immoral manifested 
attitude, and the objects of the emotional responses elicited by the narrative are only the 
fictional events and characters. On the other hand, actual immorality in counter-moral fictions 
seemed to be the only plausible candidate to an intrinsic ethical assessment. It is in instances 
of actual immorality in fiction that we can find the expression of attitudes that concern the 
actual state of the world. However, this should be identified as an extra-fictional perspective. 
As I said at the end of the last chapter, in instances of actual immorality it is the artist and her 
socio-historical context that are ethically assessed, not the narrative itself. Certain features of 
the work of fiction become morally relevant only in certain contexts, namely in those contexts 
where we can identify an extra-fictional perspective coupled with the fictional perspective. The 
ethical assessment of actual immorality in counter-moral fictions is thus extrinsic to the 
153 
 
narrative. The intrinsic ethical criticism of fiction loses purchase on both kinds of counter-
moral content. 
It is still possible, nevertheless, to claim that, while narratives are not subject to ethical 
assessment themselves, audiences who imaginatively engage with these counter-moral fictions 
are. In the end, Gaut’s claim is that the affective practical ethical assessment concerns feelings, 
even those that do not motivate. The ethical assessment of fictional narratives could be derived 
from the ethical assessment of appreciators’ engagement with the counter-moral content. Last 
chapter showed that (1) the expression of an immoral perspective, and (2) the assent to the 
manifested attitudes of the work do not apply to cases of fictional immorality. But chapter 4 
argued that emotional responses to fiction are instances of genuine emotions. It could still be 
argued, therefore, that fictional narratives are subject to ethical assessment inasmuch as the 
audience’s imaginative experience can be ethically assessed. If emotional responses toward 
fiction are instances of real emotions, regardless of whether a narrative is an instance of actual 
or fictional immorality, appreciators might be assessed for pleasurably participating in counter-
moral fictions by adopting the prescribed perspective.  
This chapter focuses on the moral value of content-immoral imaginings and affective 
responses. I focus on two lines of argument that can be advanced in favour of the ethical 
assessment of our imaginative engagement with counter-moral fictions. The first focuses on 
the moral value of imagining with feeling. It can be argued that content-immoral imaginings 
and their corresponding affective responses have either an intrinsic or an extrinsic moral value. 
The second line of argument focuses on the motivational force of fictional emotions. This can 
be regarded as a consequence-based argument. If, as I have argued, emotional responses toward 
fiction are instances of genuine emotions they must carry a motivational force; the motivational 
force of deviant emotional responses to fiction can therefore serve as the basis for an argument 
in favour of the ethical assessment of the imaginative engagement with counter-moral fictions.  
I argue that none of these approaches can ground the ethical assessment of our responses to 
counter-moral fictions. On the contrary, by the end of the chapter I claim that deviant responses 
to fictional scenarios are so dissociated from practical and moral concerns that it is possible to 
defend response amoralism, namely, that our responses during imaginative engagement with 
fiction cannot be ethically assessed. In light of the distinction between fictional and actual 
immorality, I argue that only responses to actual immorality can be ethically assessed because 
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they cannot be quarantined. But I argue that in these cases they are assessed qua responses to 
actual events and entities.  
The first section of the chapter focuses on the arguments for ethically assessing the imaginative 
experience of counter-moral fictions that track the moral value of such imaginings and their 
corresponding responses. I first examine the extrinsic argument, which claims that imaginings 
and responses can be ethically assessed in virtue of their objects. In this section I examine Allan 
Hazlett and Berys Gaut’s arguments to reiterate how they fail in accounting for the ethical 
assessment of the engagement with fictional immorality. I categorise these arguments as 
extrinsic because they ground the ethical assessment on the fact that the objects of emotional 
responses to fiction are objects that fall outside the scope of the fictional world. The second 
part of the section examines the intrinsic argument in favour of the ethical assessment of 
engaging with immorality in fiction. I examine two different versions of the argument: the 
Moorean and the Aristotelian version. I show that both of them fail to account for the ethical 
assessment of the imaginative engagement with fictional narratives. I categorise these 
arguments as intrinsic because they claim that the assessment does not depend on entities 
outside the fictional world, but on the imaginative activity itself. The second section of the 
chapter focuses on the motivational force of emotions. I argue that no matter whether we favour 
the desire or the emotion models of motivation, it is not possible to assess emotional responses 
to fiction in virtue of their motivational force. 
 
6.1 The moral value of content-immoral imaginings and content-immoral 
responses 
Counter-moral fictions prescribe that appreciators imagine counter-moral perspectives. 
Appreciators could be ethically assessed, therefore, in virtue of their imagining these counter-
moral perspectives. However, it would be very difficult to argue that what is subject to ethical 
assessment is merely imagining a counter-moral perspective, after all imagination is used in 
other types of mental projects that do not seem to be legitimate candidates for ethical 
assessment. For example, counter-factual reasoning could make use of imagining morally 
deviant perspectives, and yet, it would be hard to argue that someone is at fault for doing so. 
Imaginatively engaging with fictional perspectives, nevertheless, involves something more 
than just imagining, as we have seen in previous chapters. The prescription of a perspective by 
a fictional narrative involves the prescription of cognitive-affective responses as well. This is 
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to say that appreciators are not merely imagining, but they are imagining a deviant perspective 
with the corresponding responses. And, as I argued on chapter 4, these emotional responses are 
not merely imagined responses, but instances of genuine emotions. Appreciators could, 
therefore, be ethically assessed in virtue of imagining counter-moral perspectives with feeling. 
It is these responses that could be subject to ethical assessment.  
Advocates for response moralism argue that our emotional responses to fictional scenarios are 
subject to ethical assessment, that they can be evaluated as bad to feel or wrong. This section 
examines two strategies for arguing for response moralism: an extrinsic and an intrinsic 
argument. An argument for the extrinsic value of imagining with feeling focuses on the object 
of the responses to ground the ethical assessment. As I said above, I regard this argument as 
extrinsic because it depends on the responses to fiction being directed at objects that fall outside 
the scope of the fictional world and the imaginative activity. In this section I show that this 
argument fails because it cannot account for the quarantining nature of fictional immorality. 
An argument for the intrinsic value of imagining with feeling, on the other hand, claims that 
responses toward fiction can be ethically assessed regardless of whether they are directed at 
fictional entities only. This argument counts as intrinsic precisely because the ethical 
assessment depends on the responses to fiction themselves, and thus makes the fictional/actual 
distinction irrelevant. While this argument looks promising, I argue that it also fails insofar as 
the fictional responses do not entail the actual endorsement of the deviant perspective by 
appreciators. 
 
6.1.1 The extrinsic value of imagining with feeling 
As I said, the extrinsic argument for response moralism claims that our responses to fiction can 
be ethically assessed in virtue of their objects; and these objects include entities that fall outside 
the scope of the fictional world. Allan Hazlett and Berys Gaut advance versions of the extrinsic 
argument. As we saw before, Allan Hazlett argues that our responses to fictional scenarios 
involve responses to real events and people. He claims that the engagement with fiction can 
only function under the assumption that a fictional world is similar to the actual world.  The 
similarity assumption specifies that fictional worlds are similar to the actual world in certain 
aspects. These aspects form a similarity class (Hazlett, 2009, 251). 
Hazlett’s version of the extrinsic argument claims that our responses to fiction can be assessed 
because when the objects of our responses are part of the similarity class, they are also 
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responses to real events and people (Hazlett, 2009, 253). However, it doesn’t seem clear that 
the objects of our responses to fiction are always part of the similarity class. Hazlett accepts 
that there are instances of unrealistic fictions, that is, fictions that are dissimilar to the real 
world. In these cases, the objects of our responses are not part of the similarity class, and thus 
our emotional responses are not directed at real entities and events. Think again of Stephen 
King’s Cujo. As I said, the novel follows the story of a dog that is bitten by a rabid bat and 
goes on a murderous rampage. When reading the story, I recognise that rabid dogs are not part 
of the similarity class: I acknowledge that while rabies causes hydrophobia and makes animals 
aggressive, rabid dogs do not engage in murderous rampages in real life. The object of my fear, 
then, is only Cujo45, not real rabid dogs.  
The problem with Hazlett’s argument is that it does not work as a general argument for the 
assessment of responses to fiction. This version of response moralism depends on our counter-
moral responses being directed at objects that are part of the similarity class. But, as we saw in 
previous chapters, the problem with Hazlett’s argument is that it is not clear why the objects of 
our responses should always be taken to be part of the similarity class when they involve moral 
evaluations. That is, it is not clear why there cannot be instances of morally unrealistic fictions, 
in which the objects of the appraisals involved in the emotional responses are not part of the 
similarity class. If instances of fictional immorality are recognised as deviant by both the author 
and appreciators, it is precisely because they recognise that the works are dissimilar to the 
actual world in this aspect. Without the inclusion of the objects of deviant evaluations in the 
similarity class, Hazlett’s response moralism cannot claim that deviant responses to fiction 
entail deviant responses to actual entities. 
Hazlett could still argue that while our responses to fiction cannot be legitimately ethically 
assessed in all cases, his argument works for showing that our responses to fiction can be 
legitimately assessed when their objects are part of the similarity class. Insofar as instances of 
                                                          
45 As we saw before, Tamar Gendler has noted that there are many instances of affective contagion when we 
engage in imaginative activities. In some cases, an emotional response to an imagined scenario is so strong that 
“it causes the thinker to behave in a way consistent with the belief that the situation is sufficiently probable so as 
to influence prudent behaviour” (Gendler, 2003, 131). This affective contagion means that even when I know 
Cujo to be fiction, if my fear is intense I might get scared when I hear my dog coming up the stairs, or when they 
approach me in the dark. However, it is hard to see how this could benefit Hazlett’s argument. The contagion 
refers to responses directed at real-life counterparts. But this says nothing about the object of the responses to the 
fictional scenario. One could argue that our responses to fiction can be ethically assessed in virtue of the 
consequences it could have for subsequent responses. But we would need to first examine the effects of contagion 
to determine how significant it is.  
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actual immorality include claims that concern the actual state of the world, we could say that 
the objects of the deviant prescribed responses include actual events and people.  
However, I believe we need to wonder whether this is enough to ground response moralism. I 
said before that response moralism claims that the emotional responses to fiction can be 
ethically assessed. Hazlett’s extrinsic argument would only allow us to evaluate responses to 
the actual state of the world through the fictional narrative, but not the imaginative engagement 
itself. That is, if responses can be assessed because their objects include claims about the actual 
world, then it would seem that what we are ethically assessing are the responses to the attitudes 
toward real events and people that are presented in the fictional narrative. So it could be said 
that we are not evaluating the responses to a fictional narrative, but the responses to the views 
held by real people. For example, in the case of The Birth of a Nation we are evaluating 
appreciators’ responses to Dixon and Griffith’s white supremacism. And we would have to 
wonder whether this is enough to claim that responses to fictional narratives are bad to feel or 
wrong. 
Berys Gaut’s affective-practical assessment of imaginative engagement can also be read as an 
extrinsic argument for the ethical assessment of responses to fiction. According to Gaut, even 
affective responses that do not motivate to action are ethically significant (Gaut, 1998, 186). 
Responses to fiction can be ethically assessed because “the attitudes people (and works) 
manifest toward imagined scenarios have implications for their attitudes toward their real-life 
counterparts, for the attitudes are partly directed toward kinds, not just individuals” (Gaut, 
1998, 187). When our responses to fiction are directed at kinds that also have instances in real 
life, they have implications for our attitudes toward their real-life counterparts (Gaut, 2007, 
236). Gaut asks us to imagine a man who fantasises about raping imagined women. According 
to Gaut, the reason why his fantasies can be ethically assessed is that the fact he imagines them 
as women, “reveals something about his attitude toward real-life women” (Gaut, 1998, 187-
188). 
Gaut is wrong, nevertheless, to claim that our affective responses are directed at kinds. Rather, 
affective responses are directed at individuals. Only certain dispositional affective states seem 
to be directed at kinds, like my fear of spiders, and even in these cases it could be argued that 
these are dispositions to enter into an affective state that differ from occurrent emotional 
responses. In the following section it will be clear why the notion of dispositional states, and 
how they differ from occurrent emotion, is relevant for response moralism. However, even if 
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we granted Gaut that responses to fiction are directed at kinds, his argument can be objected in 
the same way as Hazlett’s. It isn’t clear why they shouldn’t be simply understood as responses 
toward kinds-in-the-fictional-world. That is, it is not clear why the objects of these deviant 
responses are always taken to be the kinds of objects that are shared between the actual and the 
fictional worlds. Even when our imagining might involve kinds, imaginatively engaging with 
fiction depends on our ability to see when fictional and actual kinds differ. While reading Cujo, 
we might imagine of the rabid-dog-kind that they kill people; nevertheless, we do not believe 
of actual individuals belonging to the rabid-dog-kind that they go on murderous rampages. 
Even when imaginings involve kinds, we do not take imagined kinds to necessarily be similar 
to real kinds. So it is not clear why our responses to imagined kinds should always be taken as 
responses to actual kinds. Again, instances of fictional immorality are created as deviant, and 
so they require audience members to realize that the prescriptions that stand in the fictional 
world do not stand in the real world. As such, the objects of the responses do not include real 
events and entities, but only fictional events and characters.  
Like Hazlett, Gaut could argue that while his argument for response moralism does not apply 
to all responses to fictional scenarios, it does work to show why responses to fiction can be 
legitimately ethically assessed when they include actual entities as their objects. The responses 
to actual immorality would seem legitimate candidates for an ethical assessment because the 
fictional prescriptions include claims about the actual world. But, again, we need to wonder 
whether this is enough to ground response moralism as the assessment of responses to fictional 
narratives. Because, as I said before, in instances of actual immorality we would only be 
evaluating responses to the views held by real people, the extrinsic argument can only claim 
that we can evaluate responses to actual immorality through the engagement with the fictional 
narrative. But this is different than to claim that we can evaluate the imaginative engagement 
itself.  
 
An extrinsic argument for response moralism cannot account for the ethical assessment of our 
imaginative engagement with different types of counter-moral fictions. If our responses can 
only be ethically assessed in virtue of their objects, the imaginative engagement with fictional 
immorality is not a legitimate candidate for ethical assessment. As we said in previous chapters, 
fictional immorality refers to narratives that include counter-moral claims that are quarantined 
in the fictional world, that do not include claims about the actual world, and that are recognized 
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as deviant by both the author and the audience. As such, the objects of the responses do not 
include real events and entities, but only fictional events and entities.  
Hazlett and Gaut are right in noting that not all our responses to fiction are quarantined in this 
sense. The responses to actual immorality would seem to be legitimate candidates for ethical 
assessment under this view precisely inasmuch as the fictional prescriptions include claims 
about the actual world. And yet I do not think this is enough to ground response moralism: the 
extrinsic argument would only allow us to evaluate responses to real events through the 
engagement with the fictional narrative, but not the imaginative engagement itself. That is, if 
the engagement with actual immorality can be assessed in virtue of its objects because these 
objects include actual claims about the actual world, then it would seem that what we are 
ethically assessing are the responses to real events that are simply mirrored in the fictional 
narrative. So it could be said that we are not evaluating the engagement with the fictional 
narrative, but we are evaluating the engagement with real events and people, and our responses 
to these real events and people. And we would have to wonder whether this is enough to claim 
that the responses to fictional narratives are bad to feel or wrong. 
 
6.1.2 The intrinsic value of content-immoral imaginings 
While the extrinsic argument in favour of response moralism focuses on objects that fall outside 
the scope of the fictional world to ground ethical assessment, an intrinsic argument for the 
ethical assessment of our responses to fiction focuses on the imaginings themselves. As we saw 
in the previous section, an extrinsic argument for response moralism can only ground the 
assessment of those imaginings that include real events and people; and even these cases 
emotions are not assessed qua emotions toward fiction. An intrinsic argument for response 
moralism, on the contrary, would be able to show that the imaginative engagement with 
counter-moral fictions can be ethically assessed even when the fictional prescriptions only 
include fictional entities as their object.  
This section examines two different versions of the intrinsic argument. The Moorean version, 
advanced by Aaron Smuts, simply argues that our imaginative engagement with counter-moral 
fictions can be ethically assessed because it is intrinsically bad to pleasurably imagine evil. The 
Aristotelian version argues that our imaginative engagement with counter-moral fictions is 
subject to ethical assessment because content-immoral imaginings and the corresponding 
responses say something about appreciators’ vicious characters. This section argues that the 
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Moorean version of the argument fails because it does not provide an argument for the intrinsic 
badness of imaginings, and that the Aristotelian version proves to be a more plausible candidate 
to defend response moralism. 
 
The Moorean argument 
To solve the difficulties faced by an extrinsic argument that focuses on the object of the 
affective responses, Aaron Smuts defends response moralism by advancing an intrinsic 
argument for the assessment of our responses to fiction. In trying to come up with a convincing 
intrinsic argument, Smuts turns to G. E. Moore. According to Moore, the pleasurable 
contemplation of an evil is intrinsically evil inasmuch as the positive emotion is directed at an 
inappropriate object (Moore, 1993, section 125, 257). Moore argues that neither a cognition 
nor an emotion can be good or bad by itself. However, the admiring contemplation of evil 
includes a positive emotion that does not fit the cognition it accompanies, precisely inasmuch 
as the pleasurable contemplation is unfitting for evil. But this would only show that the positive 
emotion is unfitting, not that it is intrinsically evil. To further illustrate his point, Moore 
presents a thought experiment. He asks us to imagine a universe which consisted only of minds 
occupied with an admiring contemplation of evil:  
If we then consider what judgement we should pass upon a universe which 
consisted solely of minds thus occupied, without the smallest hope that there 
would ever exist in it the smallest consciousness of any object other than 
those proper to these passions, or any feeling directed to any such object, I 
think we cannot avoid the conclusion that the existence of such a universe 
would be a far worse evil than the existence of none at all. (Moore, 1993, 
section 125, 257-258)  
The problem with Smuts’ account is that he doesn’t so much present an argument for the 
intrinsic badness46 of delighting in fictional suffering, as he presents intuition pumps. 
Following Moore, he advances four thought experiments that attempt to show that it is 
intrinsically bad to pleasurably imagine evil. In the first thought experiment he asks us to 
imagine being badly injured after falling at the super market, while the surrounding crowd 
                                                          
46 Smuts claims that the argument he advances for response moralism only wishes to address the evaluative 
question of whether our responses to fiction can be bad to feel, instead of the deontic question of whether they are 
wrong to feel (Smuts, 2016, 381- 382). 
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delights in our suffering (Smuts, 2013, 124) (Smuts, 2015, 26) (Smuts, 2016, 382). According 
to him, this illustrates the intrinsic badness of contemplating evil with pleasure because our 
intuitions would lead us to think that what the crowd is doing is bad, even when no one seems 
harmed by the pleasurable contemplation. Unfortunately, Smuts does not go any further, and 
he fails to present an actual argument to show that our intuitions are right. Moreover, even if 
he showed that our intuitions are right in this case, this clearly fails to show the intrinsic badness 
of pleasurably imagining suffering, since in this thought experiment an imagined crowd is 
taking pleasure in imagined actual suffering.  
Smuts borrows his second thought experiment from Eugene Schlossberger. Here, he asks us to 
imagine a man, Charlie, who enjoys watching animals suffer: “Charlie derives great pleasure 
from the sight of animals in pain. Mind you, he never causes animals to suffer. But when he 
chances upon a wounded animal, the sight affords him much delight.”47 Smuts furthers the 
thought experiment by adding that Charlie enjoys touring slaughter houses and hearing about 
employees torturing the animals. According to Smuts, what is relevant is that, although Charlie 
does not actually enjoy harming animals, our intuitions lead us to think that it is bad for him to 
enjoy the thought of them suffering. However, he again fails to argue further, and he simply 
claims that “The implications are clear. Even though Charlie never causes an animal to suffer, 
his enjoyment is morally bad, but not because it is bad for the animals.” (Smuts, 2016, 383) 
But, again, even if we admitted that this argument is enough to show that it is intrinsically bad 
to enjoy suffering, this thought experiment fails in showing that it is intrinsically bad to enjoy 
imagined suffering. This thought experiment fails because, again, we are imagining a man 
actually delighting in animal suffering. So, while it could be true that both the supermarket 
crowd and Charlie’s pleasurable contemplation of suffering is intrinsically bad, it says nothing 
about pleasurably engaging in an imaginative activity that includes fictional suffering.  
The third thought experiment presented by Smuts is Moore’s universe of cruel minds. 
However, Smuts fails to examine in depth Moore’s recursive principles of good and evil that 
ultimately ground the intrinsic value of admiringly contemplating evil. Instead, he simply 
claims that,  
Although it is difficult to imagine a universe composed only of minds 
occupied with cruel thoughts, it is even more difficult to imagine a good 
reason to think that such universe would be better than an empty one. Just as 
                                                          
47 Schlossberger 1986, 40 in (Smuts, 2015, 27) (Smuts, 2016, 283). 
162 
 
it seems clear that a universe occupied only by a single suffering creature is 
worse than an empty universe, it likewise seems bad if the universe were 
occupied solely by someone thinking cruel thoughts. This suggests that 
enjoying the bad is intrinsically bad. (Smuts, 2015, 28)  
Even if it was clear that an empty universe is better than a universe solely occupied by a 
suffering creature, this would be precisely because this universe would include the actual 
suffering of the one creature. But this differs from Moore’s claim that the existence of a 
universe occupied by cruel minds would be a worse evil than the existence of none at all. And 
even then, as Brandon Cooke notes (2014, 319), to present this thought experiment as an 
argument is clearly to beg the question: why would it be self-evident that an empty universe is 
better than one occupied by cruel minds?    
For the final thought experiment, Smuts asks us to imagine a world A solely inhabited by a 
woman who often imagines cats, and a world B solely inhabited by a man who spends his days 
imagining torturing children (Smuts, 2013, 124) (Smuts, 2015, 28) (Smuts, 2016, 384). The 
fact that, according to Smuts, world A would be preferable shows that pleasurably imagining 
suffering is intrinsically bad:  
We do not have to live in either world. We are merely being asked to decide 
which one is better. If we were given a choice to bring one or the other into 
existence, we should choose A. Most plausibly world B is worse – not 
because we worry that a child might be tortured or that we might be injured 
by this freak but because the child-torturing fantasist enjoys evil. That is bad 
enough. (Smuts, 2015, 28)  
While this thought experiment does concern imagined suffering, Smuts fails again to present 
an argument for why merely pleasurably imagining suffering is bad, and why world B is worse. 
To merely say that it is self-evident that world A is preferable to world B is to beg the question. 
While the thought experiment might work as an intuition pump, it is clearly not enough to argue 
for the intrinsic badness of pleasurably imagining evil. Further, this argument only works if the 
person engaging in the imaginative activity takes a perverse pleasure in imagining suffering, 
which is not the case for the engagement with counter-moral fictions. 48 
                                                          
48 I address this worry below when examining the problems of the Aristotelian version of the intrinsic argument.  
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Smuts’ defence of response moralism fails to explore in depth Moore’s arguments for the 
intrinsic value of imagining evil with feeling. Moreover, his account is unsuccessful because 
he continuously fails to present a convincing argument for why the intuitions advanced by his 
thought experiments are right. He never really presents an argument that would show that 
imagining evil is intrinsically bad, and that our responses to imagined scenarios can be ethically 
assessed.  
 
The Aristotelian argument  
A different argument in favour of the intrinsic badness of enjoying evil is an argument from 
virtue. According to Aristotle, one is virtuous not merely because of how one acts, but because 
of one’s character. This means that a truly virtuous person experiences affective responses that 
follow reason.  Aristotle argues that virtues of character are both behavioural and emotional, 
precisely inasmuch as they are displayed not only in actions but in emotional states (Price, 
2012, 122-123). Moreover, the behavioural and the emotional aspects of the virtues of character 
go hand in hand, “For habituation is not purely the forming of habits of behaviour; rather, it 
influences behaviour through educating the subject ‘both to delight in and to be pained by the 
things that we ought’ (EN II.3 1104b12)” (Price, 2012, 123). 
Affective responses are subject to ethical assessment regardless of their connection to concrete 
action because they reveal a person’s character: a truly virtuous person would not experience 
deviant affective responses. Affective responses to fiction are subject to ethical assessment 
because, like responses to actual scenarios, they reveal something of one’s character. And the 
reason for them being revealing of one’s character is that for Aristotle, the imaginative 
experience of fiction is always self-referential: “what moves one in a play is not particular 
fiction but egocentric truth. That is, not what does happen to a character in a play, but what one 
knows might happen to oneself.” (Price, 2010, 139) In his Poetics, Aristotle claims that tragedy 
arouses “fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves” (1453a5-6). According to Aristotle, 
therefore, affective responses to fictional scenarios follow appreciators’ actual moral character 
because the imaginative activity somehow includes them as part of the imagining, as it is 
always self-referential. In claiming that appreciators empathise with protagonists insofar as 
they are similar to them, Aristotle seems to imply that the perspective that drives appreciators 
to empathise with protagonists must fit the appreciator’s perspective, so that they can relate to 
what is being narrated and respond accordingly. 
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An intrinsic argument from virtue seems more promising as an argument for response 
moralism. Affective responses can be ethically assessed because of their role in virtue, and the 
same can be said of affective responses to merely imagined scenarios, regardless of whether 
the responses are directed at fictional or actual immorality. Thus, the argument Smuts would 
need to put forward for the intrinsic badness of pleasurably imagining evil should follow 
Aristotle instead of Moore. Smuts would need to argue that the man’s child-torturing fantasies 
are bad because they reveal something about his character. It is not that his enjoying evil is bad 
enough, but that his enjoying evil is bad because it is an expression of his evil character. When 
setting out the problem he claims that imagining “is problematic when it involves the 
enjoyment of evil, more particularly, the enjoyment of imaginatively doing evil. This is morally 
problematic because it is bad to take pleasure in imagined suffering. And it is even worse to 
take pleasure in thoughts of doing evil.” (Smuts, 2013, 122) The emphasis on imaginatively 
doing evil would imply the self-referentiality at the centre of the Aristotelian argument. 
Smuts analyses the case of the song “Mind of a lunatic” by Geto Boys, a Houston-based rap 
group (Smuts, 2013). The song describes radically violent actions, such as rape and murder, 
committed by a fictionalised version of one of the singers. He claims that the problem with the 
song is that,  
the song gives the listener the words to be as bad as the persona, to eloquently 
express anger and pronounce their own fierceness with style. The problem is 
that, unlike merely acting out a part on the stage, this kind of listening 
encourages a mode of engagement where audiences visualize the content 
they describe from the first person. (Smuts, 2013, 123)  
He goes on to claim that, 
Listeners are not just hearing someone else’s thoughts; rather, they assume 
the persona of the speaker. (…) When people engage with songs in this 
manner, they tend to visualize acting out the content as they talk themselves 
through the narrative. As a result, the song encourages listeners to imagine 
doing evil. Moreover, it provides an occasion for listeners to enjoy 
imaginatively doing evil. (Smuts, 2013, 123)  
This would illustrate that the imaginative activity can be ethically assessed because 
empathising with the perspective would imply self-referential imaginings; and these self-
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referential imaginings are intrinsically problematic precisely because of what they reveal about 
one's character. 
Nevertheless, my proposal to read Smuts’ claims under the Aristotelian light is problematic. 
Contrary to Aristotle, he explicitly denies that imagining fiction involves imagining of oneself 
(Smuts, 2016, 387). But, at the same time, the thought experiments and examples he uses to 
support his claim that delighting in imagined evil is intrinsically bad, seem to involve self-
referential imaginings: “In world B, the survivor lives a similar life, but rather than imagine 
cats, he has the fantasy life of Bushwick Bill: he spends his afternoons imagining torturing 
children with a pair of pliers and a blowtorch.” (Smuts, 2013, 125) In the end, I am not 
concerned with whether he would accept this version of the argument. What I want to show is 
that, given that Smuts’ Moorean argument begs the question, the Aristotelian version provides 
a better candidate to argue for the intrinsic badness of pleasurably enjoying fictional 
immorality. 
Gaut’s argument for the affective-practical ethical assessment of our engagement with fiction 
is also better read as an Aristotelian argument. Like Aristotle, Gaut argues that an assessment 
of character involves an assessment of feelings, even if these feelings are detached from action 
(Gaut, 1998, 186). This assessment of character is what grounds the affective-practical ethical 
assessment. And the affective-practical ethical assessment includes the assessment of affective 
responses to fictional scenarios as well: “Such an affective-practical conception of ethical 
assessment allows the ethical assessment of the feelings that people have when they respond 
to fictions, even though they cannot act toward the fictional events described.” (Gaut, 1998, 
186-187) In fact, if we go back to Gaut’s example of a man who fantasises about raping women 
we can see that what is problematic about his imaginative activity is not that he is imagining 
women as women, but that he is imagining himself raping women. His imaginative activity is 
thus ethically significant not because of the object of his imaginings, but because of the self-
referential nature of the imaginings. As Gaut rightly claims, this fantasy reveals something 
about the man’s attitudes toward real-life women. But he fails to see that this is not so because 
the women in the man’s fantasy are women, but because the man imagines himself raping 
women. The man’s imagining evil is intrinsically bad because it is an expression of his evil 
character. The affective responses are thus ethically significant when they reveal the subject’s 
disposition to behave in certain ways, even if the imagining is detached from action.  
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If Gaut’s argument read as an intrinsic argument could not account for the assessment of 
responses directed at fictional events exclusively, the Aristotelian version can explain why the 
fictional/actual distinction is irrelevant for evaluating appreciators’ responses. The fact that the 
responses toward fictional narratives are instances of genuine emotions means that “If we 
actually enjoy or are amused by some exhibition of sadistic cruelty in a novel, that shows us in 
a bad light, reflects ill on our character, and we can properly be criticized for responding in this 
fashion.” (Gaut, 1998, 194) 
 
Contrary to the extrinsic argument, this version of an intrinsic argument for response moralism 
could account for the assessment of the responses to the different types of counter-moral 
fictions. Regardless of whether the narrative includes claims about the actual world or not, and 
whether the prescribed imaginings include real objects as their content or not, engaging with a 
deviant perspective in fiction could be ethically assessed because of the self-referential nature 
of the imaginative activity. That is, it would seem that to be able to engage with a deviant 
perspective, to respond in the ways the deviant perspective requires, appreciators would need 
to imagine themselves inhabiting such a perspective; they would need to imagine themselves 
as the kinds of persons that would hold such a deviant perspective. Without this identification 
with the perspective, it seems that appreciators would be unable to respond in the ways 
prescribed. But if this is true, being able to respond in the ways prescribed, identifying with the 
deviant perspective, would necessarily say something about the kinds of persons appreciators 
are. And this would allow us to make an evaluation of their character through their engagement 
with fiction. Responses to fictional narratives can be assessed as bad to feel or wrong precisely 
because of their link to appreciators’ virtue of character.  
 
6.1.3 Against a self-referential notion of content-immoral imaginings 
Although the argument from virtue seems like a plausible argument for why our responses to 
fictional scenarios could be subject to ethical assessment, it is important to note that the 
assessment of the responses depends on the self-referential nature of imaginings. That is, if the 
argument for the intrinsic value of responses to imaginings depends on the assessment of the 
subject’s character, these responses will need to truly reflect the subject’s character. Some 
fantasies might be clear candidates for ethical assessment precisely because of their egocentric 
nature. As I said in the introduction, however, I want to argue that our affective responses to 
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fiction cannot be morally evaluated. And so, to argue for the ethical assessment of our responses 
to fiction, the moralist would need to show that imagining fiction is similar to egocentric 
fantasies at least in the relevant cases.  
The virtue argument only works under the assumption that the imaginings say something about 
our moral character. So while it could be argued that our egocentric fantasies can be ethically 
assessed even when they are dissociated from action because they are revealing of our 
character, it is less clear that the guided imaginative engagement with fiction will be revealing 
of our character in the same way as fantasies are. According to the virtue argument, the 
assessment of our responses to fiction would require that the imaginative activity is self-
referential. And so, this would mean that the imaginative activity would need to include de se 
imaginings for it to be subject of a character assessment. 
It is contested whether the engagement with fiction necessarily involves de se imaginings. So 
the easiest way to argue against the claim that responses toward fictional scenarios are subject 
to ethical assessment is to establish a difference between fantasies, that involve egocentric 
imaginings, and fictive imaginings49, that do not. Noël Carroll, for example, argues that when 
imagining fiction we respond emotionally from the outside. In Carroll’s view, appreciators are 
not participants in the fictional scenario, but merely observers (Carroll, 2001, 311). Our 
responses consist in “assimilating our conception of the character’s mental state into our overall 
response as a sort of onlooker with respect to the situation in which the character finds himself” 
(Carroll, 2001, 312). Peter Alward also denies that de se imaginings are necessarily involved 
in our experience of fiction. He argues that appreciators do not need to engage in de se 
imaginings to respond affectively as the work requires because they respond as one responds 
when hearing someone’s testimony. Appreciators simply need to take the fiction as the product 
of a meticulous informant and “use the information gleaned from the informant’s reports as 
input into his or her affective mechanisms” (Alward, 2006, 456). 
If this is right and the imaginative activity does not involve de se imaginings, it is difficult to 
see how an assessment of the responses can be defended as an affective-practical assessment 
of appreciators’ characters. What appreciators are doing is attuning to the characters’ affective 
responses, in Carroll’s view, or attuning to the informants’ responses to the reported events, in 
Alward’s view. Unlike fantasies, that are spontaneous, our engagement with fiction consists in 
                                                          
49 I borrow the term from Brandon Cooke (2014). Fictive imagining refers to a subcategory of imagining that is 
characterised by its detachment from alethic commitments. 
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a guided imaginative project. We do not simply respond as we would respond in an actual 
scenario, but we respond according to what the fiction asks of us as appreciators. And this 
involves not just attuning to characters’ responses, but to the prescribed perspective that guides 
the narration, and to the aesthetic qualities of the work. As such, it cannot be said that the 
responses are the result of one’s vice or virtue. And so it seems difficult to argue that our 
responses to fiction can be assessed according to the affective-practical conception of ethical 
assessment that derives from the virtue argument. 
However, even if the imaginative engagement with fiction indeed involved de se imaginings, 
it is difficult to argue that these de se imaginings are expressive of appreciators’ character. It is 
important to note that even for those authors who defend de se imaginings as part of the 
imaginative engagement with fiction, such as Greg Currie, imagining de se does not imply 
imagining of ourselves as ourselves. That is, not even de se imaginings can ground the self-
referential nature of imaginative engagement with fiction required for the virtue argument. 
According to Currie, the imaginative activity involves de se imaginings because appreciators 
simulate a hypothetical reader who learns about the events narrated in the work of fiction. The 
imaginative engagement thus consists in this role-playing in which appreciators form off-line 
versions of the states (or I states) of this hypothetical reader. These I states are the input 
necessary for emotional responses (Currie, 1997, 67-68). Imaginings de se are necessary for 
appreciators to take part in this role-playing; that is, appreciators imagine of themselves that 
they are this hypothetical reader. But the key thing is that imagining of themselves that they are 
the hypothetical reader does not imply that they are imagining themselves being the 
hypothetical reader. Significantly, Currie characterizes de se imaginings as role-playing, and 
this role-playing “involves a substantial departure from my normal, real-life mental set; I 
imagine myself not merely reading fact, but to be someone with an outlook different from my 
own one” (Currie, 1997, 73). Indeed this is how Currie explains what he calls “The problem of 
personality”, namely the problem that we “like and take the part of people in fiction whom we 
would not like or take part of in real life” (Currie, 1997, 65). So, even if imaginative 
engagement with fiction involves imaginings de se, these are imaginings of a fictionalized 
version of oneself. 
If Currie is right, imagining fiction, unlike fantasizing, is not egocentric, as the argument from 
virtue requires. And so the assessment of the emotional responses to fiction cannot be grounded 
on an assessment of our character. The distinction between fictional and actual immorality is 
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relevant after all. Fictional immorality involves the recognition by the author and audience 
members of the deviant nature of the prescriptions. If appreciators recognise the deviant nature 
of the prescriptions it is precisely because they contrast with their real attitudes, with their 
character. Emotional responses to fictional immorality cannot be legitimately assessed because 
the responses are not expressive of appreciators’ character. Deviant emotional responses to 
actual immorality in fiction, on the other hand, would reveal something about appreciators’ 
character because they would be responding to real immoral views held by real people. In these 
cases, however, it seems that what is revealing problematic aspects about their character is not 
the fact that they are responding to fiction, but the fact that they are responding to these real 
views. And, again, we have to wonder whether this is enough to say that emotional responses 
to fiction are bad to feel or wrong, as claimed by response moralism. At best, response moralism 
would be stating the obvious: that engaging with immoral people who hold immoral views 
reveals the immoral nature of our character.  
Of course it could be argued that in some cases some appreciators imagine themselves while 
engaging with fictional narratives. But in these cases, the engagement with works of fiction 
should be regarded as an egocentric fantasy instead. Egocentric fantasies are revealing of our 
actual attitudes. What is important to note is that in these cases, the imaginative engagement 
with fiction would not be assessed qua engagement with fiction, but rather it would be assessed 
qua fantasy. Thus, the Aristotelian version of the intrinsic argument for response moralism 
cannot ground the ethical assessment of our responses to fictional immorality either. 
It could still be objected that an argument from virtue for response moralism does not in fact 
need self-referential imaginings. Presumably getting pleasure from immorality in fiction is 
expressive of one's character, even when it does not involve self-referential imaginings. 
However, I want to note that it is important to distinguish between getting pleasure from 
imaginings that involve immorality, and getting pleasure from imagined immorality. Think 
again of Lady Vengeance: appreciators take pleasure in a tale of revenge that includes the 
torturing of the villain, but the torture scenes are still intended to them appreciators shriek. The 
perspective emphasizes the families’ pain from losing their children so that appreciators 
overlook Mr. Baek’s suffering. Getting pleasure from imagined immorality involves a perverse 
pleasure in imagined immorality because appreciators derive pleasure directly from 
immorality. Getting pleasure from imaginings that involve immorality does not involve a 
perverse pleasure because appreciators derive pleasure from the imaginative activity as a 
whole, which happens to include immorality. In the case of fictional immorality, appreciators 
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get pleasure from imaginings that involve immorality, and not from imagined immorality itself. 
Appreciators get second order pleasure from the displeasure generated by the imagined 
immorality, which is why I have emphasised that appreciators acknowledge the deviant 
character of fictional immorality when engaging with the fictional narratives. This is not 
expressive of a vicious character precisely inasmuch as participants acknowledge (and are 
disturbed by) the immoral character of the imagined scenario. But they enjoy the narrative 
engagement because it is dissociated from moral concerns.  
If appreciators did not experience first order displeasure from the counter-moral nature of the 
perspective, it would be because the attitudes prescribed by the deviant fictional perspective 
actually fit their own attitudes. In this case the responses would be expressive of their character 
even if the imaginative activity did not involve self-referential imaginings. But if this was the 
case, the assessment of the responses would not be an assessment of responses to fiction, but 
an assessment of appreciators’ actual immoral perspective that was revealed through their 
engagement with fiction. Again, at best, response moralism only states the obvious: that when 
our responses during the imaginative engagement with fiction reveal our immoral attitudes, 
these attitudes are subject to ethical assessment. But there is a difference between assessing 
actual attitudes, and the corresponding emotional responses, that are revealed and expressed 
during the imaginative engagement with fiction, and assessing fictional attitudes and emotional 
responses toward counter-moral fictional scenarios. 
 
What does this mean for response moralism? The responses during our engagement with fiction 
are not directed at real entities or real events. Deviant responses to fiction do not express 
anything about our moral character. The imaginative engagement with fiction is in this sense 
dissociated from reality. And if this is the case, it seems mistaken to turn to extra-fictional 
criteria to assess them. Rather, it seems like the only valid evaluative criterion of affective 
responses to fiction is whether they fit the perspective presented by the work, as I defended on 
the chapter on emotional realism and the discontinuity thesis.  
 
6.2 The motivational force of fictional emotions 
So far neither the extrinsic nor the intrinsic approach have been able to ground an argument for 
response moralism. Emotional responses to fiction are not directed at real events and people, 
except in instances of actual immorality. And emotional responses to fiction do not seem to say 
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anything about our actual moral character, except in those cases of actual immorality that 
should be understood as fantasising instead. However, in chapter four I argued for emotional 
realism. That is, I argued that emotional responses to fiction are instances of genuine emotions. 
Emotional responses are connected to action. So it could still be argued that the ethical 
assessment of our imaginative engagement with counter-moral fictions is grounded on the fact 
that these responses are instances of real emotions and are thus connected to action. 
As we saw in previous chapters, some authors, like Walton and Friend, defend the view that 
emotional responses to fiction are instances of quasi-emotions, not genuine emotions. As quasi-
emotions, they are phenomenologically similar to emotional responses but they lack the 
motivational force of genuine emotions because they lack behavioural manifestations. I noted 
that one of the problems with irrealist theories is that they understand the motivational force of 
emotions in a very narrow sense. They seem to argue that emotional responses to fiction do not 
have a motivational force because they fail to lead directly to observable behaviour, and thus 
they cannot count as instances of genuine emotions. However, I argued that, given that we have 
many instances of genuine emotions that do not cause immediate behavioural consequences, 
we should understand the motivational force of emotions as a disposition to behave in certain 
ways. Emotional responses to fiction, therefore, need to be understood as instances of genuine 
emotions with the relevant motivational force, but that fail to lead to action due to cognitive 
monitoring.  
If emotional responses to fiction are connected to action inasmuch as they have a motivational 
force, it would seem possible to defend response moralism by advancing a consequence-based 
argument. The ethical assessment of emotional responses to fiction could be grounded on their 
motivational force precisely because of the consequences they could have on appreciators’ 
behaviour. This would not mean that emotional responses to fiction can be ethically assessed 
depending on their actual consequences on behaviour, since we would need empirical data that 
showed how they impact behaviour. However, it seems that we could assess their role in 
motivation even if they don’t culminate in action. 
This section explores the motivational force of emotions to see whether it is possible to assess 
emotional responses to fiction based on their motivational force. In what follows I examine the 
desire model, that argues that the motivational force of emotions comes from desires, and the 
emotion model, that argues that it is a feature of emotions themselves to be connected directed 
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to motivation. I argue that none of these approaches to the motivational force of emotions can 
ground a defence of response moralism. 
 
6.2.1 The desire model 
According to the desire model, emotions have a motivational force insofar as they can explain 
action: they provide the agent with reasons to act. However, emotions cannot be said to cause 
action as such. It is desire, instead, that ultimately moves agents to act. The desire model thus 
assumes a distinction between motives and motivations. Motives give reasons to act, 
motivations move to action. The motivational force of emotions should be understood, 
therefore, as emotions being motives, not motivations.  
Jesse Prinz argues that motivations make agents cease or continue acting, they impel them to 
act. Emotions, however, are not motivations insofar as they are not simply action tendencies 
that directly result in action,  
Being angry provides a reason, ceteris paribus, to flee. But emotions are not 
always motivations. They do not always succeed in impelling us. One can be 
angry, it seems, without being disposed to revenge, and one can be afraid 
without being disposed to flee. (…) The link between emotion and action 
tendencies is weaker than the link between motivations and action (Prinz, 
2004, 193). 
Prinz acknowledges that the physiological aspect of emotions disposes agents for action. 
However the bodily disposition to behave in certain ways that is set in motion by emotions 
does not imply that the agent has selected a course of action. Even when the emotional response 
disposes the agent to act in certain ways, it is up to her not only to decide the course of action, 
but to decide whether she will act at all. According to Prinze, acting on an emotion, therefore, 
is a choice made by the agent after feeding the emotion into the rest of her mental system (Prinz, 
2004, 193-194).  
The emotional response thus gives an agent a motive to search for an appropriate course of 
action. But it is not the emotional response that moves her to act. In Prinz's account, motivations 
are action commands that impel actions. And these motivations can indeed be affected by 
affective states. But, according to Prinz, "when emotions cause motivations, those motivations 
never count as constitutive parts of emotions. The two constructs are thus closely entwined but 
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independent” (Prinz, 2004, 196). To move to action, the agent requires a motivational desire50, 
an action command. 
Peter Goldie seems to assume the same difference between motives and motivations. Emotions 
act as motives for action because they provide reasons for acting, but they are not really 
motivating in the sense that they don’t directly move to action. It is up to desire to move the 
agent to act. Goldie acknowledges that emotions are not just some added-on ingredient that 
helps explain some actions; he agrees that the motivational force of emotions causes the 
experience of action to be different (Goldie, 2000, 40). But this is not so because the emotions 
blindly move agents to act, but because emotions qualify certain desires. Some desires are what 
Goldie calls primitively intelligible if they "cannot be better explained in virtue of anything 
else other than the emotion of which it is a part" (Goldie, 2000, 128). Emotions carry a 
motivational force only inasmuch as the desires that actually move to action are primitively 
intelligible; that is, emotions are motives to act inasmuch as the desires that motivate to action 
can only be explained by the emotions. Actions, nevertheless, still depend on means-ends 
beliefs and desires. Moreover, even the desires that can only be explained by emotions are 
integrated into the agent's overall desire system. As such, emotions should not be understood 
as something disruptive. For an emotion to lead to a desire that moves action, the primitively 
intelligible desire must be consistent with the agent's actual long-term planned actions (Goldie, 
2000, 49). 
If the desire model is right, the motivational force of fictional emotions needs to be understood 
as providing reasons to act. These reasons to act, however, interact with the rest of the agent’s 
mental system. When imaginatively engaging with fictional scenarios, appreciators lack the 
relevant desires that could ultimately motivate them to act. Moreover, fictional emotions are 
subject to cognitive monitoring inasmuch as they are always being contextualised by the lack 
of the relevant existential beliefs. The reasons to act that might be presented by our emotional 
responses to fiction are revised precisely in light of our awareness of the fictional nature of the 
scenario, and, in the case of fictional immorality, the deviant character of the prescriptions.  
The desire model of the motivational force of emotions thus cannot help ground response 
moralism. Deviant emotional responses to fiction would lose all relevance as reasons to act 
inasmuch as these reasons would need to be integrated, as Goldie argues, into appreciators’ 
                                                          
50 Prinz argues that the term ‘desire’ can be used both as an action command and as a description of an attitude 
towards something. When it is the latter it has to be understood as an emotional desire that doesn’t drive to action; 
only the former, desire as motivation, drives agents to act.  
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long-term action plans. If appreciators are aware of the deviant nature of the prescriptions, the 
rest of their mental system will override the deviant emotional responses, and they will cease 
to provide reasons to act. If, however, deviant emotional responses to fiction continued to be 
regarded by appreciators as reasons to act it would be because they fit with other desires that 
can ultimately move to action. And if this was the case, it seems clear to me that what should 
be ethically assessed are not the emotions toward fictional scenarios, but appreciators’ actual 
beliefs and desires that support the deviant emotions as reasons to act. The differences between 
particular desire accounts are irrelevant for my purposes because they accept that emotions 
function as motives for action that interact with other beliefs and desires. Since during the 
engagement with merely fictional immorality audiences lack the relevant beliefs and desires, 
we cannot say that the imaginative engagement is subject to ethical assessment in virtue of 
genuine emotional responses and their role in action.  
If, on the other hand, audiences had the relevant deviant beliefs and desires that support deviant 
emotional responses as reasons to act, it would be necessary to say that what should be assessed 
are appreciators’ underlying immoral desires that act as motivations to act, but not the 
emotional responses to fiction themselves.  
 
6.2.2 The emotion model 
The emotion model claims, on the other hand, that emotions have a motivational force that is 
independent from desire. Sabine Döring disagrees that desires can motivate action because they 
cannot count as normative practical reasons51. She argues that normative practical reasons are 
motivating reasons in that they explain both why an action is right and why it is done. But 
desires have a world-to-mind direction of fit. As such, they do not include evaluations, and so 
they cannot count as normative reasons. Döring claims that if the desire involved a normative 
judgement, then we would have to say that it is the judgement that moves to action, not the 
desire (Döring, 2007, 367-369). Döring argues, on the other hand, that emotions are affective 
perceptions of value. This means that they are perceptions of value whose intentionality cannot 
be separated from their phenomenology: “what an emotion is about – its intentional content – 
is part of its conscious, subjective character, i.e. of what it is like to experience the emotion” 
(Döring, 2007, 375). As perceptions of value, emotions are representational, and thus they are 
subject to a correctness condition (Döring, 2007, 384). More importantly, the fact that they 
                                                          
51 Döring assumes internalism is right, and so only normative practical reasons can explain action. 
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entail evaluations means that they are normative reasons: emotions involve an “ought to be” 
(Döring, 2007, 386-387). And if they are normative reasons, they are also motivating reasons. 
However, Döring recognizes that emotions don’t move to action without some sort of cognitive 
monitoring: if the emotion will count as a normative practical reason, its content must be 
endorsed by the subject, so that she must “make a corresponding judgement, before the emotion 
can make it rational to act in a certain way” (Döring, 2007, 383). Emotions, therefore, have a 
motivational force insofar as there is a justifying relation holding between an agent’s 
judgements and her emotions (Döring, 2007, 386). This doesn’t mean that emotions are under 
the rational control of the agent, or that agents make inferences from emotions, but only that 
emotions count as normative practical reasons insofar as agents endorse them. 
Bennett Helm also disagrees that we need to turn to desire to explain the motivational force of 
emotion, but, like Döring, Goldie and Prinz, he agrees that emotions count as motives, not as 
impulses for action. Emotions as motives, nevertheless, have a motivational force that does not 
depend on desire. Helm argues that desire is not merely goal-directedness; desire presupposes 
import inasmuch as the agent finds the object of desire worth pursuing. Import is in turn 
conceptually connected to emotions. And since import is what moves to action, emotions have 
a motivational force that does not need to presuppose desires: “to have an emotion is to evaluate 
something as having import of some sort, and this just is, at least in many cases, to be moved 
to action by that import” (Helm, 2001, 193). 
But, again, Helm notes that isolated emotions do not move to action. Import is constituted by 
evaluative patterns that include not only emotions, but desires and judgements. Particular 
evaluations, such as those involved in emotional responses, are subject to further evaluation in 
light of their fit in the agent’s overall evaluative patterns. The evaluations involved in emotions 
can thus be either appropriate or inappropriate (Helm, 2001, 205). In this sense, even though 
emotions provide motives for acting because they represent import, only complete evaluations 
motivate inevitably. An evaluation is complete “insofar as it fits into a projectible, rational 
pattern providing one with an unfragmented perspective on, and thus constituting, import” 
(Helm, 2001, 205). Therefore, even if the motivational force of emotions does not need a 
reference to desire, it is important to note that emotions are integrated in the agent’s whole 
cognitive system.  
So even if the emotion model was right, and the motivational force of emotions did not depend 
on the relevant desires, we cannot say that the motivational force of deviant emotions to fiction 
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would be enough to ground response moralism. The motives presented by emotions as a result 
of the engagement with deviant perspectives in fictions would still be subject to cognitive 
monitoring. They can only constitute isolated evaluations that would fail to motivate to action 
inasmuch as they are not integrated with the agent’s actual cognitive system and are not 
endorsed by her. If, on the other hand, deviant fictional emotions moved to action because they 
fit with the agent’s actual evaluative framework, it would seem mistaken to think that it is the 
emotions toward fiction that are subject to ethical assessment instead of the actual beliefs and 
desires that support the deviant responses as reasons to act. 
 
6.2.3 Expressive actions 
So far it seems that even if fictional emotions have a motivational force, they fail to present 
themselves as reasons to act because they lack the relevant support from appreciators’ cognitive 
system. However, we might find some instances of actions that can be explained simply by 
saying that we were in the grip of our emotions, such as punching a wall in anger. So what 
would it mean for response moralism if fictional emotions elicited such expressive actions? 
According to Goldie, these actions can also be explained by a primitively intelligible desire. 
And as such, they can also be accounted for in light of the agent’s overall evaluative framework. 
This means that even in these cases, if the emotion leads to action it is only because it is 
supported by the agent’s whole cognitive system. Expressive actions are explained by a 
primitively intelligible desire, a desire that can only be explained in terms of an emotion that 
is impossible to satisfy. In this cases, it is not that we have an emotion with such a raw 
motivational force that cannot be restrained, but rather we acknowledge that the primitively 
intelligible desire must not be satisfied:  
The civilizing restraints on what an angry, hating person can do – ethical 
restraints perhaps, or knowledge of the force of the law – are just what makes 
Jane perfectly aware that she ought not to do bodily harm to Joan, thus 
leading her, on this occasion, to resort to an expressive action. The symbolic 
nature of the expression takes place as it does partly because the literal action, 
as it were, is not a realistic option (Goldie, 2000, 130).  
So, expressive actions should be understood as symbolic actions that aim at easing the actual 
deviant desire. 
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This means that even if deviant affective responses to fiction elicited expressive actions, this 
would not be enough to ground response moralism. That is, if the reason why we need an 
expressive action to symbolically carry out a desire is because we know we ought not to carry 
it out, then it seems weird to claim that these cathartic responses can be ethically assessed. On 
the contrary, in these cases we could say that the expressive actions are the result of the agents’ 
awareness of the quarantining nature of the deviant prescriptions. 
 
6.3 In favour of response amoralism 
Ultimately, it seems that the motivational force of emotions toward fictional scenarios is not 
enough to ground an ethical assessment of our responses either. As we saw, no matter which 
model of motivation we favour, the motivational force of emotions depends on appreciators’ 
whole cognitive system. If appreciators are aware of the counter-moral nature of the 
prescriptions and the corresponding responses they will not regard the emotions as reasons to 
act, and they will not act on them. If, on the other hand, appreciators are not aware of the 
counter-moral nature of the prescriptions and the responses, they might regard deviant 
emotional responses to fiction as reasons to act, and act on them. But what is important is that 
in these cases the ethical assessment should not be directed at the emotional responses during 
the imaginative engagement, but rather at appreciators’ actual beliefs and desires that provide 
the ultimate support to deviant emotions as reasons.  
Arguments in favour of the moral value of responses directed at counter-moral fictions were 
not able to ground a legitimate ethical assessment either. The extrinsic argument only shows 
that we can evaluate our engagement with instances of actual immorality. But, as I said, in 
these cases we are not evaluating the engagement with the fictional narrative, but we’re 
evaluating the engagement with real events and people, and our responses to these real events 
and people during the imaginative engagement. This is not, however, enough to conclude that 
the responses to fictional narratives are bad to feel or wrong. Response moralism is making a 
trivial claim: that we can be ethically assessed for deviant responses toward actual immoral 
views held by real people. The intrinsic argument, on the other hand, did not prove to be better. 
The intrinsic argument only shows that we can ethically evaluate appreciators’ character during 
the imaginative engagement with fiction when it reveals something about their actual immoral 
attitudes. But, again, at best, response moralism only states the obvious: that when our 
responses during the imaginative engagement with fiction reveal our immoral attitudes, these 
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attitudes are subject to ethical assessment. In the end, both of these strategies fail to account 
for the difference between evaluating actual emotional responses during the imaginative 
engagement with fiction, and evaluating emotional responses toward fiction.  
So how can response moralism be defended? Only instances of actual immorality could be 
assessed by taking into consideration either the extrinsic or intrinsic arguments for the moral 
value of imagining, and the motivational force of the responses. But even in these cases it seems 
that the object of the ethical assessment are not emotional responses toward counter-moral 
fictions, but actually deviant responses that occur during the imaginative engagement with 
fiction, and appreciators’ actual evaluative framework that legitimises the deviant responses.  
On the contrary, responses to fictional immorality are completely dissociated from reality: they 
are not directed at real events or entities, they do not reflect appreciators’ actual attitudes, and 
they don’t impact action inasmuch as their motivational force is rendered irrelevant without 
actual attitudes that support them. If this is so, it seems that responses to fictional immorality 
are completely dissociated from moral concerns. We thus have reason to defend response 
amoralism for instances of fictional immorality. Responses to fictional immorality should only 
be regarded as content-immoral because they cannot be ethically assessed. Without a link to 
the actual world via the object of the responses, appreciators’ actual character, or practical 
reasoning, it is not clear why we should evaluate emotional responses to fiction according to 
the same criteria used when evaluating emotional responses to actual scenarios. And among 
the evaluative criteria, it is not clear why moral considerations should be taken into account 
when evaluating the appropriateness of emotional responses to fictional immorality. It is true 
that moral considerations would apply if the fictional prescriptions included claims about the 
actual world, or if the immoral responses fitted the responses appreciators would have in real 
circumstances. But emotional responses to fictional immorality are so dissociated from real-
life that it is not clear why they should be subject to moral criteria at all. 
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout the thesis I have defended a contextual account of our engagement with and 
assessment of counter-moral fictions. I have argued that to understand the complex relation 
between immorality in fiction and our actual moral attitudes we must recognize a distinction 
between fictional and actual immorality. In turn, this distinction is possible thanks to the 
distinction between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives. 
Fictional immorality endorses a counter-moral perspective, but this endorsement is quarantined 
in the fictional world. That is, fictional immorality only includes a counter-moral fictional 
perspective. Fictional immorality prescribes content-immoral imaginings and responses 
because the prescriptions concern only a make-believe moral outlook. Fictional immorality's 
prescriptions are also quarantined in the fictional world. On the contrary, actual immorality 
endorses an immoral perspective that is not quarantined in the fictional world. In instances of 
actual immorality, the fictional perspective is coupled with an extra-fictional perspective. 
Narratives that include actual immorality prescribe appreciators to adopt an immoral real-world 
outlook as a result of this extra-fictional perspective. The distinction between fictional and 
actual immorality only becomes clear if and when appreciators reconstruct a narrative’s 
fictional context. Through the analysis of authorial intentions, socio-historical context, fictional 
prescriptions, modes of representation, and genre, appreciators determine whether a narrative 
counts as an instance of fictional or actual immorality. 
The account I proposed can be labelled as a contextual account because whether a narrative’s 
features are morally significant depends on contextual considerations, namely, the 
reconstruction of the extra-fictional perspective. This extra-fictional perspective only becomes 
apparent when the narrative is examined in a specific context.  
In the thesis I examined the case of The Clansman as a clear instance of actual immorality 
whose fictional prescriptions carry extra-fictional pretensions. The Clansman is very different 
from Blood Meridian on account of the immoral extra-fictional perspective that accompanies 
the former but not the latter. The importance of the context of creation (and reception) of the 
work becomes clear if we consider the following scenario. Let’s imagine a world, Earth1, where 
there has never been and never will be racial inequality, where people have never been and 
never will be oppressed because of the colour of their skin. In Earth1 oppressing a group of 
people in virtue of their skin is as absurd as it would be absurd in Earth to oppress a group of 
people in virtue of the size of their feet. In Earth1 something like the KKK has never existed 
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and will never exist. Now imagine that someone in Earth1 finds The Clansman, someone for 
whom racial oppression is as absurd as feet-size oppression. As I said in the discussion of the 
work’s fictional context, authorial intentions are decisive in our interpretation of the work; but 
authorial intentions do not refer to the actual intentions of the actual author, but to the best 
reconstruction given all the available evidence. This evidence depends on contextual 
considerations; and this means that a work’s interpretation, which will in turn ground our 
engagement with the narrative and its assessment, depends on contextual factors as well. The 
Clansman in Earth1 would certainly be read as a horrible dystopia, much like we read 
McCarthy’s novels in Earth. Without The Clansman's extra-fictional perspective, the novel is 
nothing but a horrible vision, a vision whose moral significance disappears. The way people in 
Earth1 would read and assess The Clansman is completely different to the way we read and 
assess The Clansman. And these differences depend on contextual considerations that couple 
the fictional perspective with an extra-fictional perspective that has extra-fictional pretensions. 
The contextual account that I put forward allows us to solve what originally seemed like 
puzzling cases where appreciators encounter difficulties engaging with morally deviant 
scenarios. I advanced an account of imaginative resistance based on the distinction between 
fictional and actual immorality in counter-moral fictions. I argued that appreciators encounter 
imaginative difficulties when engaging with instances of actual immorality because the 
fictional perspective is coupled with an extra-fictional perspective that includes what Gendler 
calls a ‘clamour for exportation’. That is, actual immorality is coupled with an extra-fictional 
perspective that includes claims about the actual world. Gendler is right in pointing out that 
appreciators resist participating in certain fictional scenarios that include moral deviance 
because the fictional prescriptions include a ‘clamour for exportation’, but she is wrong in 
thinking this is due to the moral nature of the scenarios; rather, the ‘clamour for exportation’ 
found in some fictional scenarios comes from the extra-fictional perspective. The ‘clamour for 
exportation’ can also be explained in terms of what Giovannelli calls a work’s fittingness 
commitments: instances of actual immorality include a commitment to fit extra-fictional 
reality. Appreciators encounter difficulties because the fictional perspective is coupled with an 
immoral extra-fictional perspective; and so appreciators find that assenting to the fictional 
perspective would entail participating in an immoral perspective that concerns the actual state 
of the world. 
This account of resistance phenomena of course assumes that appreciators have available to 
them the resources to reconstruct the narrative’s fictional context, which would allow them to 
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determine whether a narrative is an instance of fictional or actual immorality. In this sense, the 
contextual account that the thesis has put forward depends not only on an interpretive effort 
from appreciators, but on them having the resources available to carry out such an interpretive 
task. For this reason, the contextual account here defended has attempted to emphasize the 
importance of the context of reception of fictional narratives as well. The context of reception, 
that is, appreciators’ context, definitely determines how an appreciator will reconstruct the 
fictional context to decide whether the narrative constitutes an instance of fictional or actual 
immorality. For example, in chapter three I examined intra-generic variations in resistance 
phenomena: appreciators resist some narratives, but not others belonging to the same genre. 
And I suggested that these variations can be explained by the context of reception of the works. 
In particular, I used the example of rough heroines to show how gender expectations and the 
prevailing attitudes toward women condition how appreciators receive moral deviance in 
fiction, even among instances of fictional immorality. 
To further stress the importance of the context of reception on the reconstruction of a work’s 
extra-fictional commitments, and on resistance phenomena, I would like to go back one last 
time to Walton’s Giselda example, “In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all it 
was a girl”. What I want to suggest is that this example was so convincing in showing that 
appreciators experience imaginative difficulties when facing moral deviance because what 
readers resist are the possible extra-fictional commitments of such an example. The context we 
inhabit is one in which female infanticide and sex-selective abortion are still somewhat 
common practices. The context of gender oppression makes us fear the possible extra-fictional 
commitments of Giselda’s story. It is interesting to wonder whether Walton’s example would 
have been as successful to illustrate resistance phenomena if the baby’s gender was changed. 
A contextual account of our engagement with counter-moral fictions, and their assessment, 
claims that certain features of narratives become morally significant only in certain contexts. 
The fact that Giselda kills her baby daughter because of her gender is morally significant for 
us because of the context we inhabit and because of the context the author inhabits.  
These contextual considerations impact how we receive and engage with fictional scenarios. 
But the contextual moral significance also impacts our assessment of the works. Ethical critics 
have focused on a work’s intrinsic moral flaws. But I have argued that a work’s fictional 
perspective can only be assessed as content-immoral. A merely fictional perspective cannot be 
properly ethically assessed in virtue of its being fictional. In this sense, we do not ethically 
assess counter-factual reasoning. We might describe it as morally inaccurate, that is, we might 
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say that it is content-immoral. For an imaginative project to be properly ethically assessed it 
needs to include what Giovannelli calls fittingness commitments. And I have argued that these 
fittingness commitments can only be found in instances of actual immorality. Further, I have 
argued that these fittingness commitments are found in a narrative's extra-fictional perspective. 
Certain features of the work’s fictional perspective become morally significant in light of the 
extra-fictional perspective. But while it is true that the fictional perspective becomes morally 
significant in virtue of the extra-fictional perspective, it is also important to note that what is 
properly ethically assessed is the extra-fictional perspective, which is what includes fittingness 
commitments, not the fictional perspective itself. What we ethically assess are the author’s 
moral attitudes or the immoral social practices of the context that informs the extra-fictional 
perspective. For this reason, I have argued that the work’s ethical assessment is an extrinsic 
assessment, an assessment of the author and her context via the extra-fictional perspective; and 
this supports a contextual ethical criticism because some of the work’s features become morally 
and aesthetically significant only in a specific context. 
Further, the fact that ethical critics overlook the role of the extra-fictional perspective in the 
ethical assessment of works means that they have overlooked perhaps the most interesting 
cases: narratives with an actual immoral context whose moral flaws are not endorsed by the 
narrative’s fictional perspective. Because ethical critics have focused on a work’s intrinsic 
moral flaws, they have focused on elements of a narrative that are clearly endorsed by its 
fictional perspective; everything that is not endorsed by a narrative’s fictional perspective 
cannot be regarded as an intrinsic moral flaw. But they have failed to see that a fictional 
perspective is not morally significant without an extra-fictional perspective, and they have 
completely ignored the role of the extra-fictional perspective. This means that they have also 
ignored important moral flaws that are endorsed by a work’s extra-fictional perspective, even 
when they are not even addressed by the fictional perspective. These moral flaws endorsed by 
a work’s extra-fictional perspective should be taken into account when ethically criticising a 
fictional narrative; but they cannot be properly considered by focusing simply on intrinsic 
features. On the contrary, a contextual ethical assessment of fiction such as the one that I have 
defended does take into consideration the relevance of the extra-fictional perspective when 
ethically criticising works, and can thus focus on features that cannot be said to be intrinsic 
moral flaws. 
To see what I mean, let us go back to the difference between The Wire and Gone with the Wind. 
Both of these works present what I called an actual immoral context: these are cases where 
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certain immoral attitudes are so deeply ingrained in the context of production of the work that 
they are imported to the narrative. This means that in both of these cases we find an extra-
fictional perspective that endorses immoral attitudes. The difference between the two is that in 
the case of Gone with the Wind, the immoral attitudes are endorsed by the narrative's fictional 
perspective as well: Gone with the Wind fictionally endorses racism because the entire story is 
built around a nostalgic representation of slavery and a condescending treatment of black 
American characters. On the contrary, The Wire’s fictional perspective aims at evidencing 
inequality in America by exploring the interaction of issues of race and class; but, at the same 
time, this fictional perspective fails to acknowledge the issues faced by black American women 
of the same background. While the narrative’s extra-fictional perspective clearly endorses the 
condemnation of racism and inequality, it implicitly endorses the erasure of black American 
women from public narratives. But this important moral flaw is incidental to the fictional 
narrative: it is part of the background, but it is not necessary to understand the work.  
If we were to focus only on the fictional perspective, on intrinsic moral flaws, to assess works 
of fiction we would say that while Gone with the Wind is morally defective, The Wire is not. 
The Wire’s fictional perspective does not endorse the oppression of black women, Gone with 
the Wind’s does. The ethical critic would thus claim that The Wire is not suitable to be ethically 
criticised because the narrative does not have intrinsic moral flaws that could impact its 
aesthetic value.  
The contextual account that I have defended throughout the thesis, however, helps us in 
understanding the moral significance of a narrative like The Wire, even in the absence of clear 
intrinsic moral flaws. The moral failings of a narrative that, while explicitly condemning racial 
oppression, does not address the stories of black women become evident when we examine the 
work’s context. In 2015, the African American Policy Forum and the Center for 
Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies at Columbia Law School released the brief “Say 
Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women”. The brief addresses “the urgent 
need for a gender-inclusive movement to end state violence”:  
The resurgent racial justice movement in the United States has developed a 
clear frame to understand the police killings of Black men and boys, 
theorizing the ways in which they are systematically criminalized and feared 
across disparate class backgrounds and irrespective of circumstance. Yet 
Black women who are profiled, beaten, sexually assaulted, and killed by law 
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enforcement officials are conspicuously absent from this frame even when 
their experiences are identical. When their experiences with police violence 
are distinct – uniquely informed by race, gender, gender identity, and sexual 
orientation – Black women remain invisible. 
The erasure of black American women from public narratives of racial oppression makes The 
Wire’s lack of gender diversity morally significant. And this should not be seen as a ‘vulgar’ 
ethical criticism: the work’s aim is to evidence patterns of oppression and inequality; and not 
only does it ignore an important part of these patterns, but it further contributes to the pattern 
of oppression of black American women that stems from their invisibility. The fact that the 
narrative ignores the issues faced by black women should impact how we engage with the work 
and how we assess its ethical value given the socio-historical conditions. And if the ethical 
critic wants to argue that a work’s ethical value impacts its aesthetic value, we would have to 
say that The Wire’s lack of diversity renders it aesthetically defective as well.  
But it is important to emphasize that the work’s lack of gender diversity only becomes morally 
significant in a specific context, namely, a context where the erasure of minority women from 
public narratives is the norm. Compare the ethical significance of The Wire’s lack of gender 
diversity with Netflix’s Orange is the New Black. The show follows the life of several women 
in a minimum-security prison, and it explores the reasons behind their imprisonment. Orange 
is the New Black focuses on women exclusively; the issues men face in America’s prison 
system are not addressed by the show. And yet the show’s lack of gender diversity is not 
morally significant. Orange is the New Black does not contribute to the erasure of men from 
public narratives simply because men are not absent from public narratives. While The Wire’s 
nearly all-men line-up should impact our assessment of the work, Orange is the New Black’s 
nearly all-female line-up should not. Again, the morally relevant features are not found in the 
works’ fictional perspectives, but in the extra-fictional perspectives that permeate the works, 
and in the socio-historical context in which the works are produced and consumed. The works’ 
extra-fictional perspectives can only be assessed in certain contexts because only in certain 
contexts are some elements of the fictional perspectives morally significant. 
The distinction between fictional and extra-fictional perspectives found at the core of the 
distinction between fictional and actual immorality also has important consequences for the 
assessment of appreciators’ imaginative and emotional engagement with counter-moral 
fictions. As said before, fictional perspectives cannot be ethically assessed because they lack 
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the relevant extra-fictional pretensions. Thus, these fictional perspectives can only be regarded 
as content-immoral. The thesis argued that, in the same way, appreciators’ responses cannot be 
ethically assessed qua responses to fiction. And this is so because responses to fictional 
perspectives lack fittingness commitments: if the fictional perspective is not committed to the 
extra-fictional application of the deviant views, it seems that the responses to fictional 
perspectives are not committed to the extra-fictional application either. Extra-fictional 
perspectives, on the other hand, include fittingness commitments; and so responses to extra-
fictional perspectives can be said to include a commitment to the extra-fictional application of 
the deviant views, and can thus be ethically assessed. To determine whether responses to 
counter-moral fictions can be ethically assessed we thus have to examine whether they consist 
in responses to fictional or extra-fictional perspectives.  
As we have seen, instances of fictional immorality do not include a deviant extra-fictional 
perspective with the corresponding fittingness commitments. The lack of a commitment with 
the extra-fictional application of the deviant perspective removes ethical considerations from 
our engagement with the work. This means that assessing responses to fictional immorality 
does not include assessing them under criteria of ethical appropriateness. Responses to fictional 
immorality cannot, therefore, be legitimately ethically assessed. 
Instances of actual immorality, on the other hand, include an extra-fictional perspective that is 
committed to the extra-fictional application of the deviant moral claims. But, again, it is very 
important to emphasise that the fittingness commitments are not found in the fictional 
perspective, but in the extra-fictional perspective that accompanies the work in certain contexts. 
When appreciators respond to moral deviance in instances of actual immorality they are partly 
responding to the fittingness commitments found in the extra-fictional perspective. The 
responses can be assessed not qua responses to a fictional perspective, but qua responses to the 
extra-fictional perspective. That is, appreciators’ responses to actual immorality in fiction are 
not really assessed qua responses to fiction, but qua responses to actual immoral views held by 
real people. Further, taking into account the deviant extra-fictional perspective found in 
instances of actual immorality, we could say that the responses to the extra-fictional perspective 
also become committed to an extra-fictional application. And this necessarily means that 
assessing the responses under criteria of ethical appropriateness is necessary.  
Responses to deviant extra-fictional perspectives are legitimate candidates to be ethically 
assessed. But it is very important to emphasise that in assessing these responses qua responses 
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to actual views, we are assessing appreciators’ actual moral attitudes, which are committed to 
extra-fictional application. And if this is so we have to say that we are not evaluating 
appreciators’ engagement with fiction, but we are evaluating their actual moral commitments. 
If response moralism is understood as the assessment of responses to fiction it cannot be 
defended. At best, response moralism can only argue for the obvious: that appreciators’ moral 
character can be ethically assessed. 
Given this picture, what should we make of the impact of counter-moral fictions in 
appreciators’ moral lives? After all, this is what drove Plato’s concerns over the role of poetry 
in the city. We can say that we should not be worried about instances of fictional immorality, 
which only include fictional perspectives; but that we should look at instances of actual 
immorality more critically because they include extra-fictional pretensions. And if what is 
problematic about these instances is the extra-fictional application, we should be concerned 
about appreciators exporting immoral attitudes. So while it might be true that during the 
imaginative engagement with fiction these deviant attitudes are only content-immoral, we 
should focus on whether appreciators can export deviant attitudes from their imaginative 
engagement. This is where I think the thesis opens the door to further research. While I do not 
think it is possible to speak of the intrinsic moral value of counter-moral fictions, I do think it 
is important to examine a consequence-based argument on the value of counter-moral fictions 
in our moral lives.  
In the thesis I have not addressed the possibility of appreciators exporting beliefs from their 
engagement with counter-moral fictions. And I have not done so because I think exporting 
moral beliefs when engaging with deviant perspectives in fiction is not a real problem. I think 
when appreciators export beliefs from fiction it is likely because they regard the author as an 
authority in the subject. When it comes to factual matters, appreciators acknowledge that they 
are not competent in all the practices that might be explored in works of fiction. So they might 
believe that an author writing on a specific practice did plenty of research, and they trust her to 
be well informed. For example, we are not all competent in chemistry, so when watching 
Breaking Bad we might trust the writers of the show to have done research on how 
methamphetamines are produced, and we might export the according beliefs as a result. Or, 
because we are not all competent on North American history, we might trust Margaret Mitchell 
to have done some research on the American Civil War when writing Gone with the Wind, and 
we might give ourselves license to export the corresponding beliefs. 
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But while we are not responsible for being knowledgeable about chemistry or North American 
history, we are responsible for being morally competent insofar as we are moral agents. 
Moreover, the identities of the people whom we come to regard as moral authorities already 
says something about our moral competence. The imaginative engagement with counter-moral 
fictions could go either one of two ways: (1) appreciators could acknowledge the deviant 
character of the perspective, or (2) they could fail to recognise that the perspective explored in 
the work of fiction is morally inaccurate. If appreciators acknowledge the deviant character of 
the moral perspective explored by the work of fiction, they will not regard the narrative as a 
reliable moral source, and thus they will not export beliefs.  
But if appreciators fail, on the other hand, to recognise the deviant character of the perspective, 
and they regard the counter-moral fiction as a reliable moral authority, we have to wonder 
whether what is really happening in these cases is that appreciators export beliefs. The fact that 
appreciators in this case regard the deviant work of fiction as a reliable source, and the fact that 
they fail to recognise the deviant nature of the perspective, already says something about their 
moral beliefs. That is, it seems that in these cases appreciators are not so much exporting beliefs 
as reinforcing previously held deviant attitudes. And this could be either because there is 
something wrong with individual appreciators’ moral attitudes, or because the context they 
inhabit obscures the deviant nature of the perspective and normalizes immoral attitudes. If this 
is right, it is important to question how fiction might reinforce previously held immoral 
attitudes. But in any case, it does not seem that what is happening in these cases is that 
appreciators export deviant moral beliefs from their imaginative engagement. I believe an 
important future project should focus on examining how the engagement with fiction might 
contribute to moral knowledge if it is not simply a matter of exporting beliefs.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even when I have argued that counter-moral fictions 
cannot be said to possess intrinsic moral value, it is important to acknowledge the role fiction 
might play in consolidating patterns of oppression and injustice. While it might be true that 
appreciators do not export deviant moral beliefs, works of fiction might be responsible of 
reinforcing immoral attitudes that are prevalent in certain social contexts. For example, Patricia 
Hill Collins has emphasised the role of what she calls ‘controlling images’ in systems of 
oppression. Cultural products disseminate and consolidate controlling images. According to 
Hill Collins, controlling images “are designed to make racism, sexism, and poverty appear to 
be natural, normal, and an inevitable part of everyday life” (Hill Collins, 2002, 69). Moreover, 
controlling images do not simply aim at normalising oppressive structures, but they are aimed 
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at providing “effective ideological justifications for racial oppression, the politics of gender 
subordination, and the economic exploitation inherent in capitalist economies” (Hill Collins, 
2002, 84). More work needs to be done in how art, and fiction in particular, might contribute 
to systems of oppression. The distinction employed in this thesis between actual and fictional 
immorality will be important here. 
The account I have put forward aims at addressing the moral complexity of works of fiction 
without falling in the trap of moralism, while acknowledging the cultural impact and social 
responsibility of any work of art. In his defence of immoralism, Daniel Jacobson dismissively 
refers to the “vulgar ethical criticism often practiced by socially committed critics” (Jacobson, 
1997, 160). On the contrary, this thesis aimed at showing that both moralism and autonomism 
risk oversimplifying how audiences interact with works of fiction, and how fictional narratives 
impact cultural practices. And so, while it is not necessary to ban anyone from our city, it is 
important that we reflect critically on our artistic practices and our engagement with works of 
fiction. 
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